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Kalen: Dormant Commerce Clause's Aging Burden

DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE’S AGING
BURDEN
Sam Kalen*
Stare decisis means little in a changing society when for every
new case the number of possible precedents is practically
unwieldy. Without principles as guides, the body of
precedents becomes an uncharted sea; and reliance on
principles is worse than useless unless these principles receive
critical scientific attention.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Constitutional dogma occasionally changes with the passage of time,
but sometimes not swiftly enough.2 Citizens United v. FEC poignantly
illustrates how doctrines can morph within a few decades; the same
occurred not long ago when the Tenth Amendment quickly surfaced as a
potentially significant constitutional barrier only to depart shortly
thereafter.3 It occurred again when the Court reversed its position on
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1
MORRIS R. COHEN, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER 197 (1933) (emphasis omitted).
2
Thomas R. Powell, Commerce, Pensions, and Codes, 49 HARV. L. REV. 193, 238 (1935)
(“Dogmas derived from conditions that have long since changed or vanished may persist
as eternal truths in the minds of men trained to regard legal precedents with something
approaching veneration.”).
3
Compare Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913, 916–17 (2010)
(holding that under the First Amendment the government may not suppress political
speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity and that it was unconstitutional for
federal statues to bar corporate expenditures for electioneering communications), with
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 233 (2003) (affirming “the District Court’s
judgment finding the plaintiffs’ challenges to BCRA § 305, § 307, and the millionaire
provisions non justiciable, striking down as unconstitutional BCRA § 318, and upholding
BCRA § 311”), and Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668–69 (1990)
(holding that “[b]y requiring corporations to make all independent political expenditures
through a separate fund made up of money solicited expressly for political purposes, the
Michigan Campaign Finance Act reduces the threat that huge corporate treasuries amassed
with the aid of favorable state laws will be used to influence unfairly the outcome of
elections”); compare Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985)
(explaining that Congress’s authority is limited to that under the Commerce Clause and
that these limits are built within the restrains of the governmental system), with The Nat’l
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976) (reaffirming that states and individuals
and corporations have different challenges to Congress’ power to regulate commerce; and
that “Congress may not exercise that power so as to force directly upon the States it choices
as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions are
to be made”).
*
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state sodomy laws, and in other less significant areas as well.4 Propitious
circumstances might propel change, or too slowly evolving social
conditions might impede necessary reform. Either way, the past—often
cloaked under the lawyer’s rubric of stare decisis—cannot cabin the
future. But discerning precisely when following past constitutional
doctrine becomes too inimical to progress tests the judiciary’s
conscience.5 Such moments, therefore, neither occur lightly nor often
prior to a robust debate.6 For roughly thirty years, voices have
encouraged the Court to revisit either all or part of the inherent restraint
on state action embedded in theory of the Commerce Clause,
“universally regarded as the great unifying clause of the Constitution.”7
After all, the Court’s vacillating approach toward the Dormant
Commerce Clause (“DCC”) reflects, perhaps as much as any other
particular constitutional provision, the tension between dynamic and
static constitutionalism when confronting societal transition. “The law, it
is often said, reflects the climate of social, political, and economic
Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that individual private
rights have liberties under the Due Process Clause and that the State cannot hold private
sexual conduct as a crime), with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that
there are no constitutional protection under rational basis review for acts of sodomy and
that states were free to outlaw those practices); compare Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544
U.S. 528, 548 (2005) (holding that the “substantially advances” formula is not a valid
takings test (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,
263 (1980) (holding that because a taking had not occurred the Court could not apply
remedies such as a mandamus or declaratory judgment to recover damages). The Court
reaffirmed that, because Chevron argued a “substantially advances” formula instead of the
“Lucas-type total regulatory taking, a Penn Central taking, or a land-use exaction,” the Court
found Chevron was not entitled to summary judgment on that claim. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
5
See DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE & FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 2–3 (2006)
(explaining how legal consciousness reflects a “body of ideas through which lawyers
experience legal issues); see also Karl E. Klare, Contracts Jurisprudence and the First-Year
Casebook, 54 N.Y.U.L. REV. 876, 876 & n.2 (1979) (referring to legal consciousness); Karl E.
Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness,
1937–1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 268 (1978) (portraying how legal consciousness influenced
the Court’s approach toward the Wagner Act and labor). See generally MICHAEL KAMMEN,
A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 29, 38–
39, 399 (1986) (referencing how Michael Kammen implicitly places this notion under the
umbrella of “constitutionalism” as a consensus oriented mechanism for achieving both
progress and stability in a changing cultural community).
6
See Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 723, 724 (1988) (arguing whether stare decisis can provide an acceptable ground for
preserving the existing constitutional edifice without simultaneously licensing further
departures from original understanding); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 879–80 (1996) (discussing various components of the
common law approach to constitutional interpretation).
7
Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARV. L. REV.
1335, 1337 (1934).
4
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opinion, the Zeitgeist of any given period in history.”8 Perhaps more
than any other jurist, the German philosopher Friederick Karl von
Savigny explained how law mirrors aspects of the Volksgeist (shared
assumptions or spirit of the people) or prevailing “dominant” national
conscience.9 But spirits evolve slowly, pushing and pulling between the
past and present—and possibly the future. The Court moderates these
forces, and in the process reflects the cultural changes occurring in
society.10 When caught in this tug of war between outmoded principles
and precedents and modern circumstances, the Court naturally must
push the law forward in a manner that maintains a dialogue with the
past. Bruce Ackerman describes such periods as “jurisgenerative
events.”11 These events occur iteratively in a dynamic process along
with economic change, and explaining when and how the judiciary
accomplishes this is the “heart of legal history.”12 The difficulty, as
Roscoe Pound warned, is that such events could reflect a rational
dialogue or perhaps they are “equally likely to be a contingent product
of whatever analogy happened to be available during the formative
stages of a particular institution or doctrine” and later followed with
“irrational persistence, though it may become ineffective in practice and
inconsistent with the developing experience of the community.”13
And so it has with the DCC. During the transitory period of the
1940s, Justice Rutledge wrote:

BENJAMIN R. TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: HOW LAISSEZ FAIRE CAME TO
3 (Greenwood Press, 1974).
9
JULIUS STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 421–22 (Harvard University
Press, 1950) (stating “Friedrich Karl von Savigny, the unchallenged founder of historical
jurisprudence, and the study of the relation between social and legal development”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see Mitchell Franklin, Legal Method in the Philosophies of
Hegel and Savigny, 44 TUL. L. REV. 766, 776 (1970) (arguing the law according to Savigny
became the expression of the Volksgeist).
10
See JOHN E. SEMONCHE, KEEPING FAITH: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT 11 (1998) (stating the Court engages in a “dialogue with the past,” inquiring into
what has changed and whether new problems warrant “reevaluating and reconstituting”
prior decisions).
11
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 41 (1991). It is at these moments,
he posits, that the Court can employ rhetorical devices to achieve intergenerational synthesis.
Id. at 122–23 (discussing Carolene Products).
12
Max Lerner, The Supreme Court and American Capitalism, 42 YALE L.J. 668, 684 (1933)
(discussing the economic and range of problems brought before the Supreme Court); see
ANTHONY CHASE, LAW & HISTORY: THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 45
(1997) (“It is the legal system’s constant efforts both to remain consistent with the past and
to reflect the dominant interests of the present—or perhaps even to anticipate a revolution
just around the corner—which lies at the heart of legal history.”).
13
DAVID M. RABBAN, LAW’S HISTORY:
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE
TRANSATLANTIC TURN TO HISTORY 444 (2013).
8
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The continuing adjustment of the clause has filled many
of the great constitutional gaps of Marshall’s time and
later. But not all of the filling has been lasting. Great
emphases of national policy swinging between nation
and states in historic conflicts have been reflected,
variously and from time to time, in premise and
therefore in conclusion of particular dispositions.14
He continued by observing “their sum has shifted and reshifted the
general balance of authority, inevitably producing some anomaly of logic
and of result in the decisions.”15 Suggesting that the Commerce Clause
and its negative implication had finally reached stasis by 1946, he
acknowledged that, “in its prohibitive, as in its affirmative or enabling,
effects the history of the commerce clause has been one of very
considerable judicial oscillation.”16
The dialectic surrounding the DCC has produced a cascading fugue
of commentary, seemingly evading why the modern DCC analysis is the
way it is.17 At the cusp of the resurgence of the DCC jurisprudence,
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 413 (1946).
Id.
16
Id. at 420.
17
See, e.g., Jim Chen, A Vision Softly Creeping: Congressional Acquiescence and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1764, 1764–65 (2004) (deflecting some of the criticism
that has fallen on the DDC). Jim Chen writes:
Its many opponents characterize the dormant Commerce Clause as the
Voldermort of American constitutional law, a dastardly doctrine with
no basis in the text of the Constitution. . . . Justice Scalia and Thomas
stand far taller than other critics of the dormant Commerce
Clause. . . . [They] call it the “negative” Commerce Clause.
Id.; Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 44
(1988) (“academic criticism continues unabated on one front: the dormant commerce
power doctrine and its expansive influence on the interpretation of federal commercial
statutes”); Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1468, 1475 (2007) (arguing that the dormant Commerce Clause is a constitutional default
rule because its enforceability is contingent on the absence of congressional authorization
of interstate discrimination); Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the
Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations But
Preserve State Control over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 8 (1999) (arguing that the existing
approaches to the Commerce Clause are inadequate and instead the authors push for a
“Neo-Federalist” methodology, which examines the meaning of the Commerce Clause
through originalism and applies that understanding in light of modern challenges); Donald
H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1092–93 (1986) (arguing in support of how the Court has
applied the dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence and that the Court should primarily
be concerned with preventing purposeful protectionism); Robert A. Sedler, The Negative
Commerce Clause as a Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of
Constitutional Structure, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 885, 893–94 (1985) (“the commerce clause may be
viewed as embodying the nondiscrimination principle . . . the affirmative grant of the
14
15
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Julian Eule argued that the interests sought to be protected by the DCC
could be better served through the privileges and immunities clause of
article IV, section 2 of the Constitution. Martin Redish and Shane
Nugent too argued that neither the structure nor language of the
Constitution warranted continued adherence to DCC dogma.18
Emerging scholarship aptly explores the jurisprudential justification for
the doctrine, with many scholars illustrating the implicit and erroneous
assumptions animating DCC jurisprudence.19 Perhaps, the best of these
commerce power to Congress was to prevent discrimination by the states against interstate
commerce and out-of-state interests in favor of local commerce and in-state interests”). See
generally Steven Breker-Cooper, The Commerce Clause: The Case for Judicial Non-Intervention,
69 OR. L. REV. 895, 896 (1990) (examining the issues arising from the rubric of the dormant
Commerce Clause); Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1097,
1097 (1988) (“It is a maxim of constitutional law that states may not discriminate against
citizens of other states to enrich their own citizens. But like many supposed truths, this
maxim is subject to exception.”); Earl Maltz, How Much Regulation is Too Much—An
Examination of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 47, 47–49 (1981)
(providing information on how the current approach and opposition within the court on
state regulation of interstate commerce by comparing his model to what is used by the
courts); see also Michael E. Smith, State Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CALIF.
L. REV. 1203, 1205 (1986) (concentrating on the current era, arguing that the “Supreme
Court’s rules concerning state discrimination against interstate commerce are reasonably
clear; that they fit together and rest on tenable reasons; and that they have produced
reasonably uniform results”); Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979
WIS. L. REV. 125, 126 (1979) (attempting to “return the dormant commerce clause from its
position of isolation and incoherence to be reintegrated with the rest of the Constitution”);
Jonathan D. Varat, State “Citizenship” and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 493
(1981) (defining the proper scope of state authority to favor state residents in the
distribution of public resources). See generally DAN T. COENEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE 212 (2004) (explaining “five reasons rooted in economic theory suggest
why the ‘national common market,’ safeguarded by the dormant [c]ommerce [c]lause
principle, has had these wealth-maximizing effects” (citations omitted)).
18
See Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 599 (1987) (arguing that the implicit
structural argument for the dormant Commerce Clause does not have textual authorization
but the implicit principle is valid); Richard D. Friedman, Putting Dormancy Out of its Misery,
12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1745, 1745 (1991) (suggesting that the doctrine is “an historical
anomaly” that “has long outlived its usefulness”).
19
See generally Maxwell L. Stearns, A Beautiful Mend: A Game Theoretical Analysis of the
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 11–13 (2003) (arguing against
jurists and legal scholars who condemn the dormant Commerce Clause). Rather, Stearns
believes that the dormant Commerce Clause has two important dimensions, state laws,
tariffs and subsidies, and laws through which “individual states undermine other states in
their efforts to adopt common pro-commerce strategies that represent one of two or more
stable, pure Nash equilibrium outcomes.” Id. at 11; see also Leslie Meltzer Henry &
Maxwell L. Stearns, Commerce Games and the Individual Mandate, 100 GEO. L.J. 1117, 1117,
1120 (2012) (applying the constitutionality of the Commerce Clause jurisprudence through
the lenses of game theory and identifying common features of cases where “the Court has
limited state powers on the dormant side, and has sustained or restricted congressional
powers on the affirmative side of its jurisprudence.”); Maxwell L. Stearns, The New
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is Brannon Denning, who rejects any balancing under the DCC and
offers a decision rule model capable of addressing the perceived interests
being served by the DCC.20 Others suggest that the DCC’s antidiscrimination principle is economically flawed, nestled erroneously
upon an unstated economic assumption that the relevant actors are
competing in the same market.21 More recently, I along with others,
have questioned the extra-territorial appendage to the modern DCC
analysis.22 Previously, I explained how the concept emerged from a
long-since eroded paradigm imbued with spherical connotations and
defined conceptually by dual federalism and geographically by
simplistic notions of territoriality.23 And finally the DCC continues to
influence Commerce Clause scholarship as well, with inquiries exploring
hidden meanings in the Court’s struggle with the reciprocal affirmative
Commerce Clause Doctrine in Game Theoretical Perspective, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1, 9 (2007)
(offering a new framework to the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine that attempts to
resolve insights that remain in tension by offering a normative account of the doctrine and
a framework for implementing the policy based on decided case law).
20
See Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 417, 516 (2008) (“[T]he Court . . . should explicitly abandon ‘balancing’ as
part of the DCCD, a step it appears to have already taken sub silentio.”); see also Brannon P.
Denning, Confederation-Era Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce and the Legitimacy of
the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 94 KY. L.J. 37, 93 (2006) (“[S]uch balancing had long
been criticized as an improper arrogation of legislative duties. Such criticisms continue
among the DCCD’s vocal critics.” (footnote omitted)); Norman R. Williams, The Foundations
of the American Common Market, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 409, 409 (2008) (engaging critically
with existing DCC theories, suggesting an overriding commitment to deliberative
equality).
21
Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 217, 217–23 (1995)
(questioning the Court’s nondiscrimination formulation); Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed
Economics of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 1196 (1998) (“[T]he
Court implicitly has adopted a neoclassical view of economics—that free competition
among rational economic actors will necessarily improve the national economy.” (footnote
omitted)). Cf. Michael S. Greve, The Dormant Commerce Clause as an Ex Ante Rule, 3 J. L.
ECON. & POL’Y 241, 241–42 (2007) (favoring anti-discrimination principle as sensible
option).
22
See Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A
Doctrinal Post-Mortem, 73 LA. L. REV. 979, 979 (2013) (explaining how since 2003, the Court
limited extraterritoriality principles); Mark P. Gergen, Territoriality and the Perils of
Formalism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1735, 1735 (1988) (arguing that the extraterritoriality principles
are too formal and that these theories work poorly on the regulations of states); Sam Kalen,
Dormancy Versus Innovation: A Next Generation Dormant Commerce Clause, 65 OKLA. L. REV.
381, 384 (2013) (analyzing the judicially construed doctrine and how the modern DCC
approach does not warrant strict adherence to precedent); see also Mark D. Rosen,
Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 920
(2002) (advocating a narrow reading of the cases).
23
See Sam Kalen, Reawakening the Dormant Commerce Clause in Its First Century, 13 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 417, 424 (1988) (examining the twofold impact of dual federalism and its
ancillary theory of territorial sovereignty).
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and negative implications.24 Stephen Calabresi, for instance, argues that
Congress’ Commerce Clause power is exclusive, effectively questioning
the last 100 years of DCC jurisprudence premised upon the notion that
Congress can sanction state actions that otherwise would violate the
DCC.25 The issue, though, necessarily resuscitates the omnipresent
dialogue about federalism overall, whether courts must police spheres of
jurisdiction, protecting the states and Congress from one another.26
The urgency of exploring how the DCC should respond to the
politics, language, and circumstances of the present moment is critical.
We live in global economy, with consumers purchasing products as
easily from China as from a neighboring city. Typically, cities, more
than states, sometimes compete in the international financial arena,
generally leaving the economic marketplace both localized and
globalized. And with gridlock at the federal level “inhibiting or
impeding progress, allowing entrenched interests to maintain their
privileged status,” it has become incumbent upon state and local
governments to experiment with programs for addressing our modern
challenges.27 But experimental efforts in several areas, including natural
resources and climate, product bans and food systems, as well as land
use planning, become unnecessarily inhibited or chilled by past DCC

See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 101, 101 (2001) (arguing that despite various interpretations of the Constitutional
Convention, the ratification debates, and the Federalist Papers, commerce cannot be used
in a broad sense, rather should be interpreted by a narrow viewpoint); Thomas B. Colby,
Revitalizing the Forgotten Uniformity Constraint on the Commerce Power, 91 VA. L. REV. 249,
254–56 (2005) (arguing that the Supreme Court has not interpreted this standard under a
narrow originalistic reasoning and suggesting that the clause inhibits Congress from acting
in a manner not affording uniformity in treatment among the states); Richard A. Epstein,
The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1388 (1987) (arguing that the
expansive construction of the Commerce clause is wrong and inconsistent with proper
interpretation); Barry Friedman and Genevieve Lakier, “To Regulate,” Not “To Prohibit”:
Limiting the Commerce Power, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 256, 258–59 (2012) (exploring the
power to regulate); Thomas W. Merrill, Toward a Principled Interpretation of the Commerce
Clause, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 31, 33–38 (1998) (explaining the interpretational
development by various justices on the Commerce Clause).
25
See Steven G. Calabresi, The Right to Buy Health Insurance Across State Lines: Crony
Capitalism and the Supreme Court, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1447, 1513 (2013) (cautioning that under
the Commerce Clause, Congress cannot delegate certain powers because it is
unconstitutional).
26
See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 215 (2000) (affirming the concept articulated by Herbert Wechsler,
but on different grounds); Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and the American Economic Order,
1780–1910, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 57, 57–58 (1975) (exploring how federalism operated in an
economic realm for allocating power between the states and national government).
27
Michael J. Gerhardt, Why Gridlock Matters, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2120 (2013).
24
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jurisprudence.28 This is all because the Court avoided the sublime
current transcending the development of the Commerce Clause,
28
Ethan S. Williams, Comment, Last Call for the Pike Test? The Constitutionality of State
Unique-Mark Requirements on Beverage Containers Under the Commerce Clause, 6 J. MARSHALL
L.J. 283, 287 (2012) (arguing that the state’s Bottle Bill is constitutional under the Commerce
Clause because it provides a public benefit and promotes the prevention of fraudulent
redemption of out-of-state beverage containers). See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Rachel M.
Lary, Retail Store Size-Capping Ordinances and the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 37 URB.
LAW. 907, 908–09 (2005) (analyzing the conflict between local business and large retail store
size cap ordinances to DCCD challenges); Justin Shoemake, Note, The Smalling of America?:
Growth Management Statutes and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 48 DUKE L.J. 891, 895 (1999)
(analyzing the dormant Commence Clause challenge to the fiscal criteria of Vermont’s Act
250). See generally Michael H. Abbey, Note, State Plant Closing Legislation: A Modern
Justification for the Use of the Dormant Commerce Clause as a Bulwark of National Free Trade, 75
VA. L. REV. 845, 848 (1989) (analyzing the constitutional jurisprudence and how its current
interpretation has been left open for judicial manipulation); Erwin Chemerinsky et al.,
California, Climate Change, and the Constitution, 25 ENVTL. F. 50, 55 (July/Aug. 2008)
(applying the dormant Commerce Clause principles to the leakage issue in California). See
also Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965,
969, 970 (1998) (analyzing the superstructure for evaluating monetary subsidies in the postWest Lynn Creamery era); Robin Kundis Craig, Constitutional Contours for the Design and
Implementation of Multistate Renewable Energy Programs and Projects, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 771,
792–95 (2010) (addressing the multistate constitutional ambiguities on the regulation of
energy production and how courts uphold state regulations of energy issues when there
are not overt economic protections); Brannon P. Denning, Smokey and the Bandit in
Cyberspace: The Dormant Commerce Clause, the Twenty-First Amendment, and State Regulation
of Internet Alcohol Sales, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 297, 299–300 (2002) (arguing that by striking
down state regulations, courts have ignored constitutional text by indulging in broad
applications of the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of the Twenty-first Amendment,
and by construing narrowly state power); Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and
the Constitution, U. OF ARIZ. 1, 3 (2008), available at http://www.rehnquistcenter.org/
Climate%20Change%20and%20Federalism%20REV.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
DGV8-CCFG (considering “the constitutional authority of states to pursue climate change
mitigation measures when Congress has not acted or has legislated but without clearly
addressing the validity of state measures.” (footnote omitted)). Others too question
conventional wisdom. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 787 (2001) (discussing the flaws of the conventional
wisdom to the dormant Commerce clause). The authors argue to deviate from the
emerging constitutional wisdom and show that the dormant Commerce Clause allows
states to have more flexibility with internet transactions than previously regarded. Id.;
Ward A. Greenberg, Note, Liquor Price Affirmation Statutes and the Dormant Commerce Clause,
86 MICH. L. REV. 186, 188 (1987) (explaining how the “Constitution does not recognize a
distinction between retrospective and prospective affirmation statutes[]” but that all
affirmation statutes hinder interstate commerce and are “an unconstitutional
extraterritorial exercise of state legislative power”); Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen,
Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789,
792 (1996) (analyzing the restraint that the Commerce Clause imposes on state tax
incentives and subsides); Christine A. Klein, The Dormant Commerce Clause and Water Export:
Toward a New Analytical Paradigm, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 131, 131 (2011) (examining the
dormant Commerce Clause as it pertains to water export); Michael J. Ruttinger, Note, Is
There a Dormant Extraterritoriality Principle?: Commerce Clause Limits on State Antitrust Laws,
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reconciling how to limit some state and local programs once the Court
extricated linguistic masks and dual federalism from Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.
Contemporary scholarship generally portrays how the DCC,
originated first with Chief Justice Marshall, became tempered by the
local/national distinction announced by Justice Curtis in Cooley v. Board
of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, only to be replaced shortly thereafter
by distinguishing between direct and indirect effects, with the
succeeding period between 1937 and the 1940s marking a transformative
shift toward the Court’s modern approach toward the Commerce
Clause.29 This is when the Court ostensibly abandoned a pretense of
spheres of jurisdiction and attendant dual federalism paradigm.30 The
Court then subsequently “firmed up” the “current framework” with its
“1970 . . . decision in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.”31 The Pike Court
succinctly suggested that even-handed state or local regulations affecting
interstate commerce would be subjected to a balancing of the asserted
local interests against the interest of nationally uniformity.32 Of course,
state or local regulations that discriminate against interstate commerce,

106 MICH. L. REV. 545, 545 (2007) (advocating an “‘Inconsistency Principle’ as the best way
to understand the Court’s concern with extraterritorial regulation”).
29
Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 312–14, 321 (1851) (holding that the
provisions regarding state pilotage law was not in contention with the second and third
clauses of the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution, rather that the state had
authority to legislate the law). See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2
(2010) (“Roughly between 1937 and 1942, the Supreme Court significantly altered the law
of federal-state relations, including the federal power to regulate commerce and to tax and
spend for the general welfare.”); Denning, supra note 20, at 437–40 (drawing on the analysis
of Barry Cushman’s survey on the application of the direct-indirect distinction); Michael L.
Lawrence, Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause: A Proposed Unitary Framework,
21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 409–10 (1998) (discussing the Court’s action in Cooley).
Lawrence states that:
[T]he Court attempted to merge its previous dormant-commerceclause holdings into a single doctrine standing for the proposition that,
in the absence of conflicting congressional action, States may regulate
those aspects of interstate commerce that are so local as to require
diverse treatment, whereas Congress alone may regulate those aspects
of the same that require a single, uniform rule.
Id. at 409 (footnote omitted).
30
See Garrick B. Pursley, Federalism Compatibilists, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1365, 1371 (2011)
(discussing the change from the old dual federalism view between national and state
government and exclusive spheres of authority).
31
Mehmet K. Konar-Steenberg & Anne F. Peterson, Forum, Federalism, and Free Markets:
An Empirical Study of Judicial Behavior Under the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 80
UMKC L. REV. 139, 142 (2012) (referring to Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970)).
32
See infra notes 409–10 and accompanying text (explaining how Pike was a foundational
case for DCC balancing analysis).
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on their face, in purpose, or effect, would be subjected to a strict scrutiny
analysis.33
Constitutional development, unfortunately, is not so simple. The
Court is an institutional actor, comprising transitory personnel, reacting
to advocates, operating within a changing economic, social, political, and
cultural milieu, and struggling to adjust past rhetoric to current
challenges.34 And yet, when modern scholars purportedly examine the
historical account of the DCC, they often do so through shaded lenses.
They search for utilitarian theories, occasionally scouring cases for
hidden decisional rules, but often relegate the importance of exploring
why the DCC doctrine developed the way it did.35 The overly—yet too
often parroted—simplistic mosaic of the negative aspect of the
Commerce Clause obscures how horizontal federalism, the unresolved
background debate over exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction, impeded
the next phase in developing an analytically sound DCC doctrine and
accompanying decisional rules. This next stage likely would have
interred any pretense of “balancing” in DCC analysis. Balancing merely
served as a temporary rhetorical device for the Progressives’ attack
against formalism, one that avoided outright any debate over federalism
and ostensibly maintained a cloak of having a dialogue with the past.36
It achieved, therefore, an intergenerational synthesis.
This Article mines the evolution of the DCC and the Court’s constant
dialogue with its past, illustrating the Court’s struggle with the
Constitution’s framers’ acceptance of imperium in imperio and how it

33
See United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330,
343 (2007) (“[W]hen a law favors in-state business over out-of-state competition, rigorous
scrutiny is appropriate because the law is often the product of ‘simple economic
protectionism.’ Laws favoring local government, by contrast, may be directed toward any
number of legitimate goals unrelated to protectionism.” (citations omitted)); Hunt v. Wash.
State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353–54 (1977) (“When discrimination against
commerce of the type [the Court has] found . . . the burden falls on the State to justify it
both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of
nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake.”); Pike, 397
U.S. at 142 (“Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
punitive local benefits.”); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951)
(holding that a State cannot discriminate by erecting an economic barrier to protect against
competition, even if reasonable and adequate to conserve legitimate local interests).
34
See generally G. Edward White, Constitutional Change and the New Deal: The
Internalist/Externalist Debate, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 1094, 1098 (2005) (explaining the change of
the Court during the New Deal era).
35
See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 29 at 399–40 (searching for the hidden order).
36
See infra Part III.B (discussing how Progressives rejected classical formalism and
instead promoted active governmental guidance).
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impeded embracing concurrent federal/state jurisdiction over interstate
commerce—or, at least, an internally consistent coherent theory
justifying the converse. Understanding this dialogue requires, at the
outset, an appreciation of how the doctrine emerged during the nation’s
formative years. Part II of the Article, therefore, examines the pre-Civil
War period, focusing first on the framers and then on how the Court left
unresolved whether the Commerce Clause vests Congress with exclusive
jurisdiction. The DCC became trapped in an unstable vortex between
nationalism and a desire to maintain diversity and experimentation at
the local level. The Court in Cooley responded by mirroring President
Jackson’s political solution by attempting to appease both factions.37
Next, Part III explores how the country’s changing political,
economic, and social landscape merged with Fourteenth Amendment
principles to foster judicial rhetoric premised upon distinct spheres of
jurisdiction, including a constitutional right to engage in interstate
commerce.38 William Nelson explains how judges during the post-Civil
War period mirrored anti-slavery language when employing a
formalistic approach toward deciding cases, where they would reason
from perceived objectively determined rules of structure and principle.39
Yet, once this rhetoric confronted the progressive subservience toward
facts and deference to the legislative body, the product was an optically
palatable judicial rhetoric purportedly tying the past to the present, but
glossing over the undeniable reality that the DCC had no clothes.40
Parts IV and V then review how the progressive tendency toward
nationalism and emphasis on empirical information merged with the
doctrine from Cooley to produce the foundation for a balancing test in
DCC dogma.41 Recent scholarship amply explores how the New Deal
Court’s approach toward the Constitution reflects an evolving legal
consciousness rather than any discrete transformative occurrence.42
Barry Cushman, in particular, portrays how the Justices struggled with
37
Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 321 (1851) (holding that the State law
did not conflict with any law of Congress).
38
See infra Part II (discussing the early factors that influenced the Commerce Clause).
39
William E. Nelson, The Impact of Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning
in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 554–58 (1974).
40
See generally MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST
FORMALISM 11 (1947) (describing intellectual response to formalism).
41
See infra Parts IV–V (establishing a foundation for a balancing test).
42
See generally Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the
States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 484 (1997) (finding that the New Deal era should be looked at
as one that was a revolution of federalism). Gardbaum opines that the New Deal Court
employed concurrent jurisdiction to vest states with greater authority, arguably
downplaying how the rise of progressivism and focus on nationalism impeded the
adoption of actual concurrent jurisdiction. Id. at 496–97.
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jurisprudential continuity.43 And G. Edward White masterfully dispels
some contemporary myths by explaining how the New Deal era reflects
a particular constitutional moment defined by the social, economic, and
political circumstances, and how modern constitutional dogma did not
simply arrive quickly on the New Deal stage and usher in modernism.44
But neither analysis explains the persistence of an admittedly narrower,
yet still present, federal exclusive power over certain activities affecting
interstate commerce. The Court may have “dramatic[ally] shift[ed]” its
“methodological approach in constitutional cases from the 1920s to the
1940s[,]” but not so dramatically because it retained aspects of
“boundary tracing” under the guise of a balancing test whose genesis
was a boundary case itself—Cooley.45
In Part III, I describe how the Court maintained a dialogue with its
past but engaged in an internal conversation over its role in supervising
spheres of jurisdiction—acknowledging the dilemma its tests posed, yet
accepting an exclusivity paradigm.46 And Part IV explains how the
progressive embrace of Cooley favored nationalist tendencies by
maintaining exclusivity for matters warranting national uniformity.47 In
lieu of justifying such an approach under a dual federalism paradigm,
however, the progressives, and in particular Professor Thomas Reed
Powell and his correspondence colleague Chief Justice Stone, could tout
how prior cases conformed to this approach if one examined the facts—
another progressive creed.48 This left the roots of DCC dogma in place,
as if the law itself remained stable; and all this could be accomplished
under the rubric of balancing local and national interests. And here, the
Article reviews in detail how Professor Powell and the Chief Justice
combined to produce the Southern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Arizona
decision.49 Part V then picks up with Pike and how the litigants
continued to reflect uncertainty surrounding DCC dogma and how the
Court uncritically accepted balancing without addressing why the

See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 208–25 (1998) (noting the difficulty Justices encountered in
keeping continuity in their decisions).
44
See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 15 (2000) (finding that
changes in the constitutional jurisprudence in relation to the New Deal was largely affected
by policy judgments relating to human experience).
45
White, supra note 34, at 1098, 1110.
46
See infra Part III (discussing the Court’s evolution).
47
See infra Part IV (exploring the influence of Cooley).
48
See infra Part IV (expanding on Professor Thomas Reed Powell’s and Chief Justice
Stone’s progressive approach).
49
See infra notes 344–415 and accompanying text (elaborating on Southern Pacific Railroad
Co.).
43
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Commerce Clause mandated certain spheres beyond state control in an
age where dual federalism had long since faded.50
II. EARLY FOUNDATIONS
A. The Federalist Agenda
The tapestry woven by pre-Civil War era circumstances provides
limited insight into the nature and scope of the negative aspect of the
Commerce Clause. Two hundred years of academic and judicial
commentary have yet to produce even marginal consensus into what the
framers expected about the Commerce Clause’s role in restricting the
rights of the states and local communities. In Covington & Cincinnati
Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, the Court identified how the Commerce Clause
serves as the fulcrum for deciding when matters rest: (1) exclusively
within the states’ jurisdiction; (2) exclusively within Congress’
jurisdiction, except when Congress affirmatively allows otherwise; or (3)
may be concurrently exercised by Congress and the States.51 While the
concept of “commerce” naturally transforms with a changing society,
how the Court ultimately drifted toward the third but remained
encumbered by the second is the story of the DCC.52
50
See infra Part V (expounding on Pike and how the litigants reflected uncertainty
regarding the DCC dogma).
51
Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204, 209 (1894). To the
extent a matter permits concurrent jurisdiction, it is only until Congress expresses its will
and supersedes any inconsistent state efforts. Id. at 212. See, e.g., Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S.
(5 Wheat.) 1, 75–76 (1820) (finding a federal exercise of authority precluded state
prosecution under state militia act).
52
See Covington, 154 U.S. at 222 (holding that the statute in question was one that was
exclusively in Congress’ control). Randy Barnett’s review of contemporary materials
suggests that commerce is limited to economic exchanges. Randy E. Barnett, The Original
Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 104 (2001). Robert Natelson’s
examination confirms Barnett’s review of the prevailing rhetoric surrounding “commerce,”
circumscribing it to activities surrounding the law merchant. Robert G. Natelson, The Legal
Meaning of “Commerce” in the Commerce Clause, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 789, 799–800, 846
(2006); Robert G. Natelson & David Kopel, Commentary, Commerce in the Commerce Clause:
A Response to Jack Balkin, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 55, 56 (2010),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assests/fi/109/natelsonkopel.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/6GNU-3MJ9 (finding that there is little question to what the meaning of
“commerce” entails in the legal and everyday usage). Unfortunately, Barnett and
Natelson’s primary materials focus on legal sources rather than perhaps more broadly
recognizing that the founders were well versed in moral and political philosophy when
writers like Adam Smith, William Paley, and others addressed “commerce.” Jack Balkin
amply undermines Barnett’s cribbed analysis. Balkin, supra note 29, at 15–19; see also
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Obamacare and the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause: Identifying
Historical Limits on Congress’s Powers, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1703, 1704–06, 1709–11 (2012)
(responding, in part, to Balkin). Compare Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 17, at 110 (stating
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Promoting commerce undoubtedly fostered a belief during the new
world of American exceptionalism—a nation destined toward progress
in lieu of the cyclical history surrounding past civilizations.53 While
some founding fathers, such as Benjamin Franklin, were familiar with
Adam Smith,54 most of the contemporary discussion about the nature of
the economy and the role of the Constitution focused on foreign
commerce, imposts, and taxation.55 The framers’ paramount concerns
that the concept includes all economic activity), with Richard A. Epstein, supra note 24, at
1388–89 (arguing for narrow interpretation of “commerce”). See generally STUART BRUCHEY,
ENTERPRISE: THE DYNAMIC ECONOMY OF A FREE PEOPLE 58–62 (1990) (providing a picture of
the economy during the nation’s formative years); THOMAS C. COCHRAN, FRONTIERS OF
CHANGE: EARLY INDUSTRIALISM IN AMERICA 8 (1981) (discussing technological innovations
that started the surge of industrialization); RONALD E. SEAVOY, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES FROM 1607 TO THE PRESENT 1–166 (2006) (exploring agriculture and
economic development); CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN
AMERICA, 1815–1846, at 4–5 (1991) (explaining the changing society of early America and its
effect on the economy); Lawrence A. Harper, Mercantilism and the American Revolution, in 1
PIVOTAL INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 76, 78–80 (Carl N. Degler ed., 1966)
(discussing the early English tariffs and trade in America); James A. Henretta, The
Transition to Capitalism in America, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY:
SOCIETY, AUTHORITY, AND IDEOLOGY 218, 218–20 (James A. Henretta, Michael Kammen &
Stanley N. Katz eds., 1991) (discussing America’s early economy and its move toward a
more market-driven labor force).
53
See RALPH LERNER, THE THINKING REVOLUTIONARY: PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE IN THE
NEW REPUBLIC 195–221 (1987) (suggesting that “commercial republicanism,” a belief in the
power of equality in economic progress as expressed by A. Smith and others, animated
aspects of the revolutionary dialogue); GORDON S. WOOD, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A
HISTORY 106–07 (2002) (stating that trade promoted harmony); see also ROBERT NISBET,
HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 184–236 (1980) (finding that this dialogue fostered
American exceptionalism and favored progress); GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 337–47 (1991) (discussing that commerce was occasionally tied
to societal cohesion). In her seminal work on the rise of the social sciences and the
persistence of American exceptionalism, Dorothy Ross observes how “American
exceptionalism implied a particular kind of political economy as well as a particular kind of
historical stance.” DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 26 (1991).
54
See Thomas D. Eliot, The Relations Between Adam Smith and Benjamin Franklin Before
1776, 39 POL. SCI. Q. 67, 67 (1924) (explaining that Franklin and Smith knew each other and
were familiar with each other’s work, but the author questions assumption that they were
friends). Cf. ROBERT E. WRIGHT, ONE NATION UNDER DEBT: HAMILTON, JEFFERSON, AND
THE HISTORY OF WHAT WE OWE 39 (2008) (explaining that Adam Smith’s work was not
widely read until later, but founders were “conversant” with his ideas). See generally
Samuel Fleischacker, Adam Smith’s Reception Among the American Founders, 1776–1790, 59
WM. & MARY Q. 897 (2002) (“[T]here is good evidence that many of the founders, including
Jefferson, Madison, and Wilson, were reading his work.”).
55
James Madison, for instance, explained the importance of Congress’s authority over
foreign commerce:
The want of authority in Congress to regulate commerce had produced
in foreign nations, particularly Great Britain, a monopolizing policy,
injurious to the trade of the United States, and destructive to their
navigation[.] . . . The same want of a general power over commerce led
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were to ensure that only Congress could affect and promote foreign
commerce, a principle that became embedded unambiguously in the
Constitution, and to secure Congress’ authority to regulate interstate
commerce.56 But the power of the purse, the ability to raise sufficient
revenue, as well as establish credit and incur debt drove the framers’
to an exercise of the power, separately, by the states, which not only
proved abortive, but engendered rival, conflicting, and angry
regulations.
5 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 115, 119 (2d
ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]; see also DAVID WALTER BROWN, THE COMMERCIAL
POWER OF CONGRESS: CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF ITS ORIGIN: THE ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT,
AND CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATION OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, FROM THE NEW JERSEY REPRESENTATIONS, OF 1778, TO THE EMBARGO LAWS OF
JEFFERSON’S SECOND ADMINISTRATION, IN 1809 1–152 (1910) (discussing the dialogue
surrounding foreign trade and state tariffs, imposts, tonnages and duties).
56
See Calvin H. Johnson, The Panda’s Thumb: The Modest and Mercantilist Original
Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 1 (2004) (“All of the concrete
programs intended to be forwarded by giving Congress the power to regulate commerce
were restrictions on international trade . . . .”). Unfortunately, discussions surrounding
federal authority over commerce often occurred along with language about imposts,
tonnage duties, tariffs and regulating foreign commerce—separate clauses in the
Constitution. See BROWN, supra note 55, at 40–41. One example is the proposed
amendment to the Articles of Confederation that would have given the Confederation the
“sole and exclusive power” to regulate trade among the states and foreign governments,
laying prohibitions and imposts and duties on imports/exports. Id. at 41–42. Pre-dating
the federal convention, the Annapolis and Alexandria conferences explored interstate
trade; the Annapolis conference, in particular, resolved squabbling between Virginia and
Maryland over commerce along and use of the Chesapeake Bay and Potomac River.
GERALD W. GAWALT, GEORGE MASON AND GEORGE WASHINGTON: THE POWER OF PRINCIPLE
58–60, 141 (2012); see also RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 19 (2009) (extrapolating on how the Articles of Confederation did
not have provisions for uniform regulations among the states and thus the states were in
frequent competition with each other); Denning, supra note 20, at 59–66 (finding a
description of the internecine activities before the Constitution). In his essay The
Continentalist, Alexander Hamilton championed the importance of affording a national
government with superintending power over commerce, albeit adding a preference for
“common direction.”
Alexander Hamilton, The Continentalist, in THE WORKS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 243, 271 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904), available at
http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=1378&chapt
er=64156&layout=html&Itemid=27, archived at http://perma.cc/X2P3-M6V9; Barry
Friedman & Daniel T. Deacon, A Course Unbroken: The Constitutional Legitimacy of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 1877, 1884–96 (2011) (explaining that the Framers
felt a need to adopt a uniform trade policy among the states). But cf. Edmund W. Kitch,
Regulation and the American Common Market, in REGULATION, FEDERALISM, AND INTERSTATE
COMMERCE 7, 15–19 (A. Dan Tarlock ed. 1981) (exploring three issues under the Articles:
Foreign trade; tariffs at ports; and—albeit discounting—trade among the states). See
generally Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty
Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1169–92 (2000) (explaining that the Committee was specifically
precluded from transacting business with foreign ministers without the approval of
Congress).
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dialogue about commerce.57 They, too, undoubtedly recognized the
possible need for uniform commercial intercourse.58 It was, after all, an
era marked by the “release of energy,” in the words of James Willard
Hurst, to facilitate the country’s transition from a mercantile/agrarian
economy to the modern market economy.59 Yet, such sentiments do not
necessarily establish that the commercial power is exclusive in Congress
rather than concurrent between Congress and the states.
The framers assuredly sought to establish a government capable of
protecting interstate trade.60 They expected that the federal government
would enjoy sufficient authority to address “injurious impediments to
the intercourse between the different parts of the Confederacy . . . .”61
James Madison explained how Congress needed this “superintending
authority” to ensure harmonious imports, exports, and traffic among the

See generally E. JAMES FERGUSON, THE POWER OF THE PURSE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
PUBLIC FINANCE, 1776–1790, at xiv–xv (1961) (expounding on how the power of the purse
was “a determinant of sovereignty”); THOMAS K. MCCRAW, THE FOUNDERS AND FINANCE:
HOW HAMILTON, GALLATIN, AND OTHER IMMIGRANTS FORGED A NEW ECONOMY 1 (2012)
(exhibiting how the United States, in its founding years, operated in almost bankruptcy);
WRIGHT, supra note 54, at 237 (elaborating on how the early American funding system led
the country to prosper).
58
See ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 55, at 115 (“[C]onsider how far a uniform system in
their commercial intercourse and regulations might be necessary to their common interest
and permanent harmony[] . . . .”).
59
See JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 7, 22, 29 (1956) (discussing how the release of energy
related to objective law measures). Such juridical behavior, however, does not support a
laissez faire approach to economic and social behavior. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S
WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 84–85 (1996); see
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, 31–35 (1977)
(reflecting on the change the nineteenth century underwent from agrarian society to
modern property laws); William J. Novak, Law, Capitalism, and the Liberal State: The
Historical Sociology of James Willard Hurst, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 97, 124–25 (2000) (stressing
that “law’s instrumental role in the allocation of scarce resources in nineteenth-century
America should [not] be confused with a . . . laissez-faire approach”); Donald J. Pisani,
Promotion and Regulation: Constitutionalism and the American Economy, 74 J. AM. HIST. 740,
741–42 (1987) (explaining how the Constitution provided a framework for the first phase of
industrialization); Harry N. Scheiber, State Law and “Industrial Policy” in American
Development, 1790–1987, 75 CAL. L. REV. 415, 418 (1987) (finding that laissez faire ideology
did not stand in the way of state action).
60
THE FEDERALIST NO. 11, at 89–91 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(elaborating on Hamilton’s thoughts on protecting trade between the states). While in
Federalist No. 11 Hamilton writes in terms of “unrestrained intercourse between the
States[,]” context is critical. Id. at 89. Hamilton here is persuading the reader about the
importance of a “unity of commercial” trade of an “American system,” primarily foreign,
to ensure a continued “aggregate balance” of trade in products. Id. at 90–91.
61
Id. at 144–45.
57
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states.62 But this intended grant of federal authority, however, does not
implicitly suggest the converse.63 The framers, after all, purportedly
resolved the dilemma of an imperium in imperio with a new form of
government exercising legal authority dependent upon subject matter
rather than territorial boundaries, and how this nascent arrangement
would work was not likely fully explored.64 Federalist No. 32 provides a
possible window into the framers’ approach toward distinguishing
between concurrent federal/state jurisdiction and exclusive federal
jurisdiction. In this part of the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton
suggested that states would enjoy aspects of sovereignty, except in areas
the Constitution transferred to the United States. He wrote that such a
transfer would occur in one of three instances:
[W]here the Constitution in express terms granted an
exclusive authority to the Union; where it granted in one
instance an authority to the Union, and in another
prohibited the States from exercising the like authority;
and where it granted an authority to the Union to which
a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and
totally contradictory and repugnant.65
According to Hamilton, this last category omitted instances where
concurrent jurisdiction might precipitate clashing policies.66 Hamilton’s
62
Id. at 268. Madison favored Benjamin Franklin’s proposal to add to Congress’ power
the express authority to create canals and federally charter internal improvement
companies. Id. Madison had written to Thomas Jefferson about the importance of vesting
the national government with “the positive power of regulating trade” and addressing
issues where “uniformity is proper.” To Thomas Jefferson (March 19, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 317–18 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975) (relaying Madison’s
correspondence to Jefferson regarding trade regulation).
63
See Friedman & Deacon, supra note 56, at 1906, 1908 (finding that discussions at the
Convention of the domestic commerce power supported exclusivity). Friedman and
Deacon suggest otherwise, but arguments for or against an intent toward exclusivity all
rest on weak inferences. Id.
64
See ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 172–73
(2010) (describing how the federalists overcame the imperium imperio question); Alison
LaCroix, Drawing and Redrawing the Line: The Pre-Revolutionary Origins of Federal Ideas of
Sovereignty, in TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
PROFESSOR MORTON J. HORWITZ 58, 72 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2009)
(discussing how in the context of the 1773 debates, the Council made a delineation between
superior and subordinate powers and moved beyond taxation to the theoretical problem of
imperium in imperio).
65
THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, supra note 60, at 198 (Alexander Hamilton).
66
Id. (clarifying that the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction may produce “occasional
interferences in the policy of any branch of [an] administration, but would not imply [a]
direct contradiction”). In The Federalist No. 17, Hamilton explored how state governments
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analysis suggests that, if the regulation of interstate commerce is
exclusive, it is because state jurisdiction “would be absolutely and totally
contradictory and repugnant.”67
Exclusive jurisdiction appeared reserved for subjects the
Constitution assigned to Congress and correspondingly expressly
removed from state jurisdiction. Hamilton, for example, referenced the
power to tax in Article I, Section 8 Clause 1, as illustrating one subject
where Congress’s power to levy and collect taxes and duties on imports
and exports precluded similar state regulation—the Constitution barred
state regulation because of the corollary clause in article I, section 10,
limiting the states’ ability to impose any imposts or duties on imports or
Hamilton explained that “[t]his restriction implies an
exports.68
admission that if it were not inserted the States would possess the power
it excludes; [and that in all other respects the States’ power is]
undiminished.”69
When over a century later scholars combed the constitutional period
to justify and promote the progressive ideal of a new nationalism, they
latched onto what few morsels they found. A remarkable scholar of the
period, therefore, observed “[i]t is impossible to read the correspondence
of Madison, Hamilton, Mason, and others without perceiving the
imperative necessity that they felt of committing the regulation of trade
and commerce to a single national authority.”70 Some constitutional
historians merely deploy Gibbons v. Ogden to support the claim that the
framers looked at the Commerce Clause as an exclusive grant intended
to negate certain state actions.71
Courts and scholars, however, generally conflate the framers’
discussion about imposts and tonnage duties for foreign imports or
exports with the more general category of commerce. Addressing the

more than Congress would likely encroach on the others’ interests, professing that
Congress would be ill-disposed to address matters of mere local concern. Id. at 118–19. In
doing so, while suggesting that the regulation of commerce resided in the “first instance”
with Congress, he missed an obvious opportunity to emphasize exclusivity had he believed
it applied. Id. at 118.
67
Id. at 198.
68
Id. at 199 (describing the tax regulation found in the Constitution).
69
THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, supra note 60, at 199 (Alexander Hamilton). Jack Rakove
suggests that, while modern scholars overlook Federalist No. 32, it was “closely read”
during the period. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 195 (1996).
70
George L. Haskins, John Marshall and the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, 104 U. PA.
L. REV. 23, 26 (1955).
71
See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 47–49 (1993)
(discussing how Marshall broadened the view of the Commerce Clause to include all
economic intercourse).
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concern that states might need to defray the costs of inspection before
exporting products to foreign nations, James Madison suggested that
states could explore ways of doing so and the check against any abuse
“was the right in the general government to regulate trade between state
and state.”72 Indeed, Madison originally suggested federal supremacy
could be achieved by having potentially discriminatory state trade
regulation subjected to a federal (the Senate) veto power.73 When a
measure for state duties on tonnage was presented by Mr. M’Henry and
Mr. Carroll, Madison apparently “was more and more convinced that
the regulation of commerce was in its nature indivisible, and ought to be
wholly under one authority.”74 And then, replying to the proffer that
Congress would need exclusive jurisdiction over commerce, Mr.
Sherman observed “[t]he power of the United States to regulate trade,
being supreme, can control interferences of the state regulations, when
such interferences happen; so that there is no danger to be apprehended
from a concurrent jurisdiction.”75 Over a century later, the Court in
Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin used these exchanges to support a
DCC.76
Also, considerable attention often focuses on an overly generous
interpretation of correspondence between James Madison and Joseph C.
Cabell, roughly forty years after the Constitution.77 While the Court
affords weight to the views of those contemporary with the
Constitution’s formation, this correspondence alone provides a weak

ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 55, at 539.
See Alison L. LaCroix, What if Madison Had Won? Imagining a Constitutional World of
Legislative Supremacy, 45 IND. L. REV. 41, 44, 52 (2011) (explaining how Madison insisted that
Congress have the power to veto state laws). Modern readers should be wary of ascribing
too much significance to such sentiments, without first appreciating that preemption
principles and the doctrine of judicial review and supremacy had yet to evolve. These
doctrines eventually obviated the need for Madison’s “negative.” Id. at 44–45, 48–49; see
also Alison L. LaCroix, The Authority for Federalism: Madison’s Negative and the Origins of
Federal Ideology, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 451, 483–84 (2010) (discussing how Madison’s federal
negative was defeated).
74
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 55, at 548.
75
Id.
76
See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 419 n.17 (1946) (quoting statements
of Madison and Sherman debating the commerce clause).
77
See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 n.9 (1994) (citing a letter
from Madison to Cabell regarding the commerce clause); Balkin, supra note 29, at 14 n.43
(examining a letter from Madison to Cabell, in which Madison expressed his belief that the
scope of commerce should be construed differently depending on its purpose); Collins,
supra note 17, at 55 (suggesting that “Madison’s statement that the commerce power was
‘intended as a negative’ is direct support for the substance of a dormant commerce power
doctrine”).
72
73
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foundation for building an entire doctrine. 78 A few years before his
death, James Madison wrote Cabell and suggested that regulating
“commerce” was entrusted exclusively to the federal domain; these
letters led Albert Abel to infer that view on the delegates during the
convention.79 Abel’s 1941 article became widely accepted during a
period when scholars and jurists perceived the necessity of justifying an
expansive approach toward federal regulation of commerce.80 But an
overly broad reading of Madison’s 1829 letter ignores its context.81 Later
in life, Madison believed that the country’s economy could not succeed
on the basis of an agrarian society alone, because overproduction had led
to depressed land prices and insufficient domestic and even foreign
markets.82 As such, he recognized the constitutionality of tariffs and
opposed aspects of doctrinaire Jacksonianism.83 This is when Madison
justified national power to encourage manufacturing and create jobs for
an exploding population unable to sustain itself on productivity from the
land.84 His letters were intended to achieve the particular objective of
securing Congress’ ability to promote manufacturing.85 To suggest,
78
See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 886 (2012) (considering the views of early
contemporaries of the Constitution).
79
See Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in
Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432, 469, 492 (1941) (examining Madison’s opinion
that the clause was designed as “merely ‘a negative and preventative’ function” and thus in
federal control).
80
See infra note 219 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the nineteenth
century dual federalism paradigm on twentieth century economy).
81
See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 197–98 n.108
(1995) (suggesting that Madison’s correspondence reflects an appreciation for Congress’s
supremacy under the Commerce Clause rather than exclusivity or acceptance of DCC).
82
See DREW R. MCCOY, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS: JAMES MADISON AND THE
REPUBLICAN LEGACY 176–85 (1989) (examining Madison’s theories regarding agrarianism
and the economy).
83
See id. at 123–26 (stating that Madison believed “the constitutional assault on the tariff
[to be] absurd”).
84
See id. at 127 (explaining that Madison thought Congress should be involved in
manufacturing). Madison used broad strokes to express his point, but implicit in his
discussions was the need for federal power, not necessarily a restriction on state domestic
authority. Id. at 133. For instance, in 1831 he wrote:
A review of the state of our commerce and navigation; of the abortive
efforts and conflicting regulations among the states, of the distracted
condition of affairs at home, and the utter want of respect abroad,
during the period between the peace of 1783 and the convention of
1787, could not fail to open the eyes of many who have been misled,
and to cherish in all a love for a constitution which has brought such a
happy order out of so gloomy a chaos.
Id. (quoting a letter from Madison to Everett, dated Nov. 14, 1831).
85
See id. at 127–28. (demonstrating that Madison wanted to encourage manufacturers).
Madison further suggested that continued acquiescence to Congress’ authority to regulate
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therefore, that this correspondence supports a DCC ignores historical
context, as well as the unsettled debate surrounding the role of the
judiciary in securing supremacy of federal laws and eventually
developing doctrines of preemption.86
B. The Court’s Early Struggle
The Supreme Court’s early forays into the negative component of the
Commerce Clause similarly resolves neither the concurrency/exclusivity
dilemma nor supports a modern DCC. Chief Justice Marshall accepted
that the Constitution necessarily entrusts certain matters to Congress’s
exclusive jurisdiction.87 Justice Story initially limited exclusivity to
matters removed from state jurisdiction or involving “a direct
repugnancy or incompatibility” in a concurrent exercise of power,
although he later endorsed Marshall’s treatment of the Commerce
Clause as exclusive.88
In Gibbons v. Ogden, the Chief Justice held that New York’s grant of
monopoly rights for the operation of a steamboat conflicted with the

manufacturing since 1787 suggested the need for stability in that view, to avoid societal
disruption. See MCCOY, supra note 82, at 127–28. This is evident when reading Madison’s
Sept. 18, 1828 letter to Cabell, in its entirety. Letter from James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell
(Sept. 18, 1828), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_3_
commerces18.htl, archived at http://perma.cc/PU5F-XZ7Q; see also Letter from James
Madison to Joseph C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/
founders/documents/a1_8_3_commerces19.html, archived at http://perma.cc/TF3-GYHX
(stating curtly that the clause was “intended as a negative and preventive provision[,]”
with no real elaboration).
86
See generally RAKOVE, supra note 69, at 176 (quoting letter from Madison to Jefferson
about judicial authority).
87
See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 248–49 (1833) (suggesting simultaneously
that the Constitution did not restrain the states absent express constitutional restrictions on
the exercise of that power, while the Constitution assigned some matters to Congress when
“the people of all the states feel an interest”); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
122, 193 (1819) (explaining that when Congress has jurisdiction, state governments cannot
interfere).
88
See Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 48–49 (1820) (Story, J., dissenting)
(revealing that powers are not exclusive unless specifically granted in the Constitution).
Story’s opinion suggests he would admit state power unless concurrent powers would be
“repugnant” or “incompatible,” allowing Congress the ability to exercise and preempt state
legislation if it chooses to exercise its power. Id. at 49–52; see also 1 & 2 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES; WITH A PRELIMINARY REVIEW
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES, BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF
THE CONSTITUTION §§ 515–18, 669 (1833) (referring to the power as exclusive). See generally
Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Debating the Transformation of American Law: James Kent, Joseph Story,
and the Legacy of the Revolution, in TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 1, 4–6
(2009) (noting that both Justice Story and Chancellor Kent supported a national economic
market, although they disagreed about whether commerce power was concurrent).
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federal Coasting License Act of 1793.89 Arguing for the appellant, Daniel
Webster rejected the concept of concurrent powers, and urged an
expansive view of the Commerce Clause.90 Responding, Marshall
reasoned that Congress exercises capacious power under the Commerce
Clause, embracing all aspects of commercial intercourse, including
navigation.91 Appreciating the framers’ division of sovereignty, he
necessarily noted that jurisdictional lines could not be defined merely by
geographic limits but instead, rather, operated “within the territorial
jurisdiction of the several States.”92 Marshall further distinguished
between two spheres of jurisdiction, the commercial power delegated to
the federal government and that reserved to the states under the
Constitution.93 States retained their power to regulate police or trade
“which does not extend to or affect other States[,]” and which is
completely within a state.94 Responding to the threat that state
quarantine and inspection laws would become unconstitutional,
Marshall admitted that, while such laws affect interstate commerce,
states may exercise “that immense mass of legislation, which embraces
every thing within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general
government[.]”95 Marshall indicated that if the object of the state law is
permissible, then the means chosen would be acceptable even if
resembling those that could be employed by the federal government
under the commercial power.96 The Chief Justice arguably misread
(possibly deliberately) the federal statute as superseding state law, deftly
avoiding the principle issue in the case—the DCC, but he nevertheless
left little doubt that he believed that the Commerce Clause vested
exclusive authority in Congress.97 But, as Herbert Johnson cogently
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 221 (1824).
See generally HERBERT A. JOHNSON, GIBBONS V. OGDEN: JOHN MARSHALL, STEAMBOATS,
AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 73–74 (2010) (discussing Webster’s arguments regarding state
power under the Commerce Clause); Haskins, supra note 70, at 25 (explaining that the
Commerce Clause created a uniform law).
91
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189–94.
92
Id. at 196.
93
Id. at 123–24.
94
Id. at 194. The eminent jurist Chancellor Kent held below that Congress’ commerce
power was concurrent. “Not only was it not designated to be exclusive,” he believed, “but
it was also arguably concurrent by virtue of the fact that the states were prohibited from
imposing duties or taxes on exported goods.” JOHNSON, supra note 90, at 33.
95
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) at 203.
96
Id. at 204.
97
See Norman R. Williams, Gibbons, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1398, 1399, 1414–17 (2004)
(evaluating the progression of Marshall’s discourse on the DCC). Williams suggests that
Marshall’s discussion of the DCC ultimately mirrored what Chief Justice Taney later
adopted. Id. at 1401–02. This is because, while Marshall purportedly endorsed exclusive
federal power, he eschewed vesting the Court with the superintending power of judicial
89
90

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss3/9

Kalen: Dormant Commerce Clause's Aging Burden

2015]

Aging Burden

745

notes, “virtually all of its lasting material was merely dictum, well
beyond relevance to the narrow ruling of the case.”98
For the next several decades, the Court’s sensitivity toward slavery,
internal improvements, and temperance inhibited consensus among the
Justices over whether the commercial power was concurrent or
exclusive.99 According to Owen Fiss, Chief Justice Marshall first
announced—through dicta—in Brown v. Maryland the concept of a
DCC.100 But two years later, the Chief Justice accepted William Wirt’s
argument that a state could authorize a dam to promote the public
welfare and safety, unless superseded by congressional action.101 Yet the
Justices disagreed over whether Congress or the states could promote
internal improvements.102 In cases implicating temperance and slavery,
the Court similarly failed to resolve how to approach the allocation of
review to implement the DCC. Id. at 1460. Here, Williams chronicles the events
surrounding a seamen act and slavery in South Carolina, illustrating the difficulty of any
DCC holding, particularly in light of the pending legislative proposals affecting the Court’s
ability to engage in judicial review. Id. at 1467–69, 1471. Although issues surrounding
slavery, temperance, and internal improvements chilled a willingness on some of the
Justices to render potentially sweeping decisions, it does not necessarily translate into a
belief by Justices about the proper role of the Court or Congress for the DCC. But
Williams’ thorough treatment of Gibbons underscores the importance of appreciating
contextualism. Id. at 1478–82; see Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the “Great” Marshall
Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1127–34 (2001) (underlining the unimportance of
McCulloch and Gibbons on national issues); see also JOHNSON, supra note 90, at 35 (“Neither
Kent nor Marshall after him was willing to accept the broad modern recognition of a [DCC]
power existing independently from an actual congressional enactment.”); Charles W.
McCurdy, American Law and the Marketing Structure of the Large Corporation, 1875–1890, 38 J.
ECON. HIST. 631, 635 (1978) (observing that Marshall avoided the issue). Cf. FELIX
FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 24–26 (1937)
(noting that Marshall neither employed his exclusive jurisdiction theory nor adopted
Webster’s selective exclusiveness, possibly recognizing the need for incremental decisionmaking).
98
JOHNSON, supra note 90, at 159.
99
See generally id. at 50 (noting issue during Marshall’s tenure); Kalen, Reawakening the
Dormant Commerce Clause, supra note 23, at 429–38 (discussing that various social problems
hampered the Court’s efforts in determining the scope of the Commerce Clause).
100
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 448 (1827); 8 OWEN M. FISS, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF
THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910, at 267 (1993) (“Marshall must have read the Commerce
Clause to have a preemptive power that would nullify state laws regulating interstate
commerce.”).
101
See Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829) (explaining
that if Congress expressly regulates something, then a conflicting state law would be void);
see also FISS, supra note 100, at 267–68 (“Marshall must have read the Commerce Clause to
have a preemptive power that would nullify state laws regulating interstate commerce.”);
JOHNSON, supra note 90, at 155–58 (discussing Willson).
102
See Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 151, 180 (1845) (Daniel, J., dissenting) (denying
power to Congress); STORY, supra note 88, at § 150 (affirming Congress’s power).
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state and federal power. In the License Cases, for instance, the Justices
rejected exclusivity but without any majority opinion.103 When the
debate shifted to state programs affecting the movement of people,
potentially implicating jurisdiction over slavery, the opinions became
even less clear.104 In Mayor of New York v. Miln, for example, a majority
appeared willing to accept certain state efforts, while Justice Story
promoted exclusiveness couched in dual federalism rhetoric.105
Additionally when the issue surfaced again in the Passenger Cases, the
Court issued separate opinions that “were so diverse that attempts to
summarize could only confuse.”106
Consequently, the simplistic exclusive paradigm sponsored by the
Federalists appeared doomed from the outset, and when tested in the
realm of internal improvements proved untenable.
Internal
improvements critical for economic growth and territorial expansion
often could not await Congress, and generally depended upon state
103
Pierce v. New Hampshire, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 504–05 (1847) (providing separate
opinions of each Justice).
104
See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S (16 Pet.) 539, 609 (1842) (reviewing the cooperation
between states). Additionally, interstate tensions underscored the consideration of the
Fugitive Slave Clause to such a degree that Justice Story commented on the “friendly and
courteous spirit” surrounding the two states effort to procure Court review. Id. See
generally DAVID L. LIGHTNER, SLAVERY AND THE COMMERCE POWER: HOW THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST THE INTERSTATE SLAVE TRADE LED TO THE CIVIL WAR 66–67 (2006) (acknowledging
the strained relationship between Chief Justice Marshall and Judge Johnson). Lightner, for
instance, describes how Chief Justice Marshall, during the steamboat controversy, was
quite aware of Justice Johnson’s lower court decision invalidating South Carolina’s proslavery seamen act. Id. In 1841, the Court avoided deciding the constitutionality of a
Mississippi statute, although various opinions addressed the application of the commerce
power. Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 510–13 (1841). See generally PAUL
FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 266–71 (1981)
(discussing the effect of Groves on state and federal laws regarding the transport of slaves).
Additionally, when addressing whether the power was exclusive or concurrent, Justice
Story parroted Chief Justice Marshall’s focus on the nature and object of the power
afforded Congress, particularly over a matter warranting uniformity and whose origin and
establishment occurred with the Constitution rather than pre-dated it. Prigg, 41 U.S. at
622–25. He further remarked that a state’s police power is distinguishable from Congress
power, suggesting that the states’ power would continue to apply but could not “interfere
with, or . . . obstruct the just rights” constitutionally guaranteed to slave owners. Id. at 625.
Chief Justice Taney objected to Story’s allegedly unnecessary discussion of exclusivity. Id.
at 626–27 (Taney, C.J., concurring).
105
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 153, 157–58 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting) (stating that if the subject
is regulated by Congress, then the state’s act could be unconstitutional). See generally R.
KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC
208–09, 221–24 (1985) (noting that Story may have assisted in drafting Gibbons, and
ultimately favored strong exclusivism).
106
48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 430–35 (1849); 5 CARL B. SWISHER, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836–
1864, at 388 (1974).
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chartered—often at the time single purpose—corporations.107 While
undoubtedly Henry Clay’s American System tilted toward ordered
economic progress at the national level, his opponent President Jackson
too favored some federal support.108 Yet sectional interests and
jealousies dominated the debate.109 When vetoing the Maysville Road
internal improvement project, President Jackson acknowledged
Congress’ past internal improvement measures and yet expressed
reservation about their constitutionality, proclaiming instead that such
projects, in the words historian Daniel Walker Howe, “were better left to
private enterprise and the states.”110 Both then and later, Jackson offered
a distinction between subjects national in scope, and those that are local,
with the latter entrusted to the states.111
This moderating economic and political solution then morphed into
legal doctrine, with the Court in Cooley settling on what later nineteenth
century writers would call a middle ground of partly exclusive and
partly concurrent jurisdiction.112 It was here that Chief Justice Taney,
who had unsuccessfully argued the case for Maryland in Brown v.
Maryland, could attempt to entrench his lost effort.113 And it was in
107
See, e.g., Perrine v. Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co., 50 U.S. (9 How.) 172, 183–84,
192 (1850) (considering whether a corporation has the right to charge a toll to passengers or
vessels who pass through the canal). The Court often construed charters narrowly, even
when states jointly worked together with corresponding charters to promote commerce
between their jurisdictions. Id. See generally STANLEY I. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE
DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE 146 (1971) (summarizing that the Court
tried to account for public good and economic needs).
108
See generally DANIEL WALKER HOWE, THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE AMERICAN
WHIGS 123–49 (1979) (expanding upon Clay’s debates and relationships with various
members of the Supreme Court and government).
109
Congress, for instance, rejected the former Federalist Joseph Hemphill’s proposed
national highway, while passing a more localized Maysville Road improvement project; see
SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 327–28 (2005)
(explaining Hemphill’s difficulty in achieving a national highway because of the political
climate in deciding which entity had power to regulate).
110
DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICA, 1815–1848, at 358, 557–59 (2007). Sean Wilentz posits that Martin Van Buren and
a young James K. Polk assisted drafting this moderate message. WILENTZ, supra note 109,
at 328.
111
See Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, Dec. 6, 1832, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT
available
at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=67040,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/N665-2N9U (explaining that President Jackson vetoed the act because the
Federal Government would be given too much power over a state issue).
112
Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319–21 (1851) (describing the
methods Congress used to determine jurisdiction). See, e.g., Louis M. Greeley, What is the
Test of a Regulation of Foreign or Interstate Commerce?, 1 HARV. L. REV. 159, 174 (1887)
(ascertaining the differences and similarities between exclusivity and concurrency).
113
See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 575–76 (1840) (clarifying that power must
belong to either Congress or the states). Chief Justice Taney reviewed how to examine
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Cooley where the Court would attempt to craft rules for highly charged
transportation disputes such as the construction of the Wheeling
Bridge.114 Justice Benjamin R. Curtis accepted what has become known
as the concept of “selective exclusiveness.” Pennsylvania required
vessels without a pilot and weighing over seventy-five tons entering any
port other than on the Delaware River pay a pilotage fee. Curtis
admitted that the state pilotage statute regulated commerce, but upheld
the law by reasoning that Congress’ power was not exclusive over
subjects local in character; rather, only when regulation demands
national uniformity is Congress’ power exclusive.115
Curtis reasoned that, because pilotage laws are a valid subject for
congressional action, indeed a matter upon which Congress had
legislated, such laws must be regulations of commerce.116 Yet Curtis
posited that if one treats Congress' power over commerce as exclusive,
then arguably Congress could not re-convey that power to the states by
authorizing future state legislation.117 This dilemma is critical to Curtis’
opinion, because, in 1789, Congress approved state pilotage laws.118
Such was the problem of an exclusivity assumption Justice Story and
others generated—either the power is not exclusive or Congress could
not authorize states to legislate on local matters.119 The latter conclusion

concurrent jurisdiction where he reflected the prevailing sentiment for distinguishing
between powers expressly conferred on Congress and equally expressly denied to states,
and those powers granted to Congress but not specifically denied to states. Id.; see FISS,
supra note 100, at 267–68 (stating that Taney, among others, denied that Congress had
preemptive power). The former he held were exclusive in Congress, while the latter were
only so if “similar authority in the states would be absolutely and totally contradictory and
repugnant[.]” Holmes, 39 U.S. at 574. Similar language appeared in Justice Story’s opinion
in Houston v. Moore. See 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 22 (1820) (reemphasizing that sometimes
Congress does not have to overrule a state’s law). Taney’s moderating approach toward
federal authority corresponds with his willingness to expand federal admiralty jurisdiction.
See SWISHER, supra note 106, at 444–45, 455 (evaluating Taney’s reasoning behind the
Court’s decision).
114
See Cooley, 53 U.S. at 311 (holding that the complainant’s rights were exempted from
payment because the law conflicted with the Constitution); ELIZABETH BRAND MONROE,
THE WHEELING BRIDGE CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 128–
30 (1992) (explaining the Court’s jurisdiction for crafting rules on waterways and Chief
Justice Taney’s opposition to the reasoning); SWISHER, supra note 106, at 408–417
(discussing the Cooley case and the reasoning behind the Court’s decision).
115
See Cooley, 53 U.S. at 316–17. Elsewhere in the opinion, Justice Curtis suggested that
such laws “rest upon the propriety of securing lives and property exposed to the perils of a
dangerous navigation, by taking on board a person peculiarly skilled to encounter or avoid
them[.]” Id. at 312.
116
Id. at 325.
117
Id. at 318.
118
Id. at 302.
119
Id. at 319.
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would have required invalidating the 1789 statute.120 Curtis escaped this
box by concluding that it was necessary to examine the nature of the
power, which he treated as synonymous with the subject being
regulated.121 “If they are excluded,” he wrote, “it must be because the
nature of the power, thus granted to Congress, requires that a similar
authority should not exist in the States.”122 Here, Curtis's reasoning
follows Hamilton’s Federalist No. 32, suggesting that only when a
uniform, nationwide rule is required would the nature of the power
demand that it be within the exclusive domain of Congress.123 And
Congress’ 1789 statue illustrated that the matter was susceptible to local
rather than uniform regulation.124
By the end of the century, a leading Commerce Clause monograph
proclaimed that Cooley reflected the “most satisfactory solution” to the
issue and had “been followed in every case in the Supreme Court upon
Many of the Court's opinions followed Curtis's
this subject.”125
reasoning in Cooley.126 These opinions suggested that the critical factor
for assessing state or federal regulations was whether the character of the
regulated object was local or national, with states capable regulating only
the former.127 Yet the allure of Cooley began to wane later in the century,
Cooley, 53 U.S. at 319–20.
Id. at 320.
122
Id. at 318.
123
Id.
124
See id. at 319–20 (reaffirming the importance of considering local influence on
legislation). Justices McLean and Wayne dissented, with McLean taking the position that
Congress’ power is exclusive. Id. at 324–25 (McLean, J., dissenting). Justice Daniel
concurred, treating the law as matter inherent in state sovereignty and not a commercial
regulation. Cooley, 53 U.S. at 325–26 (Daniel, J., concurring).
125
E. PARMALEE PRENTICE & JOHN G. EGAN, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 28 (1898).
126
See, e.g., Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 721–22 (1865) (adopting the
Cooley rationale). Gilman involved the construction of a bridge over a navigable river when
the bridge threatened to interfere with the navigation of vessels over a certain size that
travelled under the arches. Id. at 715. For a divided Court, Justice Swayne observed that
municipalities must consider the convenience of their citizens and the passage from one
state to another across the river. Id. at 722. He then declared that states exercise concurrent
jurisdiction over commerce local in character, while the federal commercial power extends
only to those subjects calling for uniform rules and national legislation. Id. at 726–27, 729–
30; see also Ex parte McNiel, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 236, 239–40 (1871) (upholding state pilotage
law even though it was a regulation of commerce); Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.)
450, 460, 463 (1864) (establishing the need for a uniform law to protect the public); The
Albany Bridge Case, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 403, 403 (1864) (discussing, in the Court’s four-to-four
decision, state’s power to pass a law authorizing the erection of bridges over navigable
rivers).
127
See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. James, 162 U.S. 650, 655 (1896) (affirming that
Congress has jurisdiction over national matters and the state over state matters); Pittsburgh
& S. Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U.S. 577, 587–88 (1895) (stating that states may regulate where
120
121
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with a changing economy and the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment and accompanying rise of rights jurisprudence.
III. THE NASCENT DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. A New Economy and Federal Right to Engage in Interstate Commerce
Throughout the post-civil-war era until roughly the 1920s, states,
Congress, and the courts all explored how federalism could or should
respond to the newly evolving national economy. The economy changed
radically during this period, as Ray Ginger explains:
From 1877 to 1892 the United States grew—in
population, in wealth, in output per man-hour, in the
value of real estate. In these years the economy became
industrial. The society became urban. Vast corporate
Congress does not); Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204, 212
(1894) (providing that “laws, instead of being of a local nature and not affecting interstate
commerce but incidentally, are national in their character, the non-action of Congress
indicates its will that such commerce shall be free and untrammeled”); Hamilton v.
Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pac. R.R., 119 U.S. 280, 282 (1886) (favoring local input in
transportation matters); Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543, 548–49 (1886) (explaining that even
though the state must act for the public good, those decisions are usually subject to
congressional oversight); Morgan's Steamship Co. v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455,
464–65 (1886) (establishing that until Congress acts, state laws are valid); Gloucester Ferry
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 217 (1885) (holding that states cannot interfere with
waterways); Cardwell v. Am. Bridge Co., 113 U.S. 205, 208 (1885) (describing that states can
regulate actions related to internal police power); Parkersburg & Ohio River Transp. Co. v.
Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691, 700–01 (1883) (stating that wharf law should be determined by
local law until overruled nationally); Escanaba & Lake Mich. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 107
U.S. 678, 687–88 (1883) (expounding that the state may regulate until Congress decides to
act); Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U.S. 559, 564–65 (1881) (deciding that a municipality
may erect wharves and forbid landing elsewhere); Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U.S. 572, 575
(1880) (upholding state pilotage law because of congressional affirmance, although part of
general commercial law); Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 351 (1880) (finding that issues
national in nature should be within Congress’ exclusive jurisdiction); Lord v. Steamship
Co., 102 U.S. 541, 543–44 (1880) (defining Congress’ jurisdiction over commerce as having
to do with nationwide commerce); Wisconsin v. Duluth, 96 U.S. 379, 386–87 (1877)
(asserting that Congress may regulate harbor improvements and preempt state laws, but
not exercise exclusive jurisdiction); Pound v. Turck, 95 U.S. 459, 464 (1877) (confining the
actions of the state to matters that only affect internal issues); Case of the State Freight Tax,
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232, 279–80 (1872) (finding transportation of merchandise or passengers
to be of a national nature, thus requiring exclusive legislation by Congress); Cushing v.
Owners of the John Fraser, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 184, 187–88 (1858) (holding that states may
regulate ships lying in the harbor); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59
U.S. (18 How.) 421, 444 (1856) (reasoning that allowing local jurisdiction on a national issue
will disrupt uniformity in all ports). Cf. Newport & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. United States,
105 U.S. 470, 492 (1881) (holding that Congress can exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the
subject).
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bureaucracies were forged. Power was caught up into
the hands of a few men as never before in this country.128
But with it a new bureaucratic middle class emerged, facilitating the
growth toward the twentieth century consumer economy.129 This was an
economy fueled by a marketing revolution that transferred marketing
from merchants to manufacturers.130 And with these changes, disparity
in the distribution of wealth and bargaining power changed
dramatically.131 Morton Keller, in his seminal work on the late
nineteenth century, reviews how these changes pushed the need not only
to regulate the economy but also to facilitate it.132 This precipitated what
William Novak describes as forging a new relationship between law and
business—and modern capitalism.133
The Court as an institution responded cautiously to legislative
measures targeting the vicissitudes of societal changes.134 Under the

128
RAY GINGER, AGE OF EXCESS: THE UNITED STATES FROM 1877 TO 1914, at 36 (1965). The
late 1800s witnessed rapid urbanization. See HAROLD U. FAULKNER, POLITICS, REFORM AND
EXPANSION 1890–1900, at 10 (1959) (stating that between only 1880 and 1900, population in
towns over 8000 was one fifth of the nation). By 1915, urban residents outnumbered their
rural counterparts, and the railroad system ensured that the bulk of rurally grown
agricultural products would be “consumed in U.S. cities.” SEAVOY, supra note 52, at 187.
129
GINGER, supra note 128, at 46–47, 49 (explaining that economies of scale pushed
industry consolidation, concentration and vertical integration, and ultimately led to the
growth of the trusts and monopolies). A new managerial (professional worker) class
emerged, and wholesale merchants transitioned to jobbers—and ultimately to large scale
retail chains like J.C. Penny, Woolworths, Wanamaker, and Sears. SEAVOY, supra note 52, at
245.
130
See GLENN PORTER & HAROLD C. LIVESAY, MERCHANTS AND MANUFACTURERS: STUDIES
IN THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY MARKETING 131–53 (1971)
(explaining the transfer from the old marketing network to independent groups with
manufacturer-owned distribution facilities.). Alfred Chandler chronicles how the modern
corporation, principally with its organizational and manufacturing structure, distribution
and marketing systems, along with its purchasing power, emerged between 1880s and the
early 1900s. See generally Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Beginnings of “Big Business” in
American History, in 2 PIVOTAL INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 107, 132 (Carl N.
Degler, ed. 1966); see also ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 484–500 (1977) (tracing the broader development of the
modern business enterprise from the 1840s to World War II).
131
See FAULKNER, supra note 128, at 72–93 (discussing the increase in poverty that
accompanied the progress of the late 1800s).
132
MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY
AMERICA 171–81 (1977).
133
See William J. Novak, Law and the Social Control of American Capitalism, 60 EMORY L.J.
377, 390–91 (2010) (detailing the combination of law and business in modern capitalism).
134
See KELLER, supra note 132, at 289 (explaining that the period is often characterized by
traumatic forces propelling societal change clashing with entrenched ideas pushing
backward). This clash produced an era, in the words of the title of a work by historian
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rubric of “political economy,” scholars began to champion and expand
on Adam Smith’s theories and promote political economy as a science.135
The legal bar before the Civil War undoubtedly was aware of the
principles of “political economy,” but many pre-war judges believed that
“economic” issues—often in the context of taxation, were better
entrusted to legislative judgments.136 But after the war the issues became
exceedingly complex. General incorporation laws for the first time
allowed an increasing number of foreign corporations to engage in
business outside their incorporating state, facilitating trade in the newly
minted industrial revolution.137 The economy witnessed new corporate
organizational structures accompanying the rise of a more robust
manufacturing sector, facilitating a changing labor force, and an ever
increasing diversity in wealth and concentration of money. Classicists
believed in competitive markets and free trade. Embedded in their
theory was the idea that free trade—that is, unfettered by legislative
intrusion—reflected natural law and any interference with the natural
law conflicted with “our traditions and inherited rights of security.”138
This paradigmatic shift became more pronounced during Chief
Justice Fuller’s tenure than during the Waite Court years.139 The Fuller
Robert Wiebe, “searching for order.” ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877–1920,
at 1–10 (1967).
135
See generally SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-WELFARE STATE: A STUDY
OF CONFLICT IN AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1865–1901, at 203–08 (1956) (discussing the “New
Political Economy”); Justin Desautels-Stein, The Market as a Legal Concept, 60 BUFF. L. REV.
387, 398–443 (2012) (describing economic history).
136
The eminent Ohio Judge, Frederick Grimke, suggested that the “science of political
economy” was relevant to legislatures, not courts. See Perry v. Torrence, 8 Ohio 521, 522
(1838) (reviewing taxation of steamboats); see also Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137, 143 (1841)
(stating that “enlightened views of political economy . . . must be addressed to the
legislative department” when reviewing limit on price of bread).
137
See KELLER, supra note 132, at 431–33 (detailing the expansion of businesses due to
lessened restrictions on interstate trade). Keller explains how, later, the Court’s treatment
of foreign corporations assisted in averting the need for a general federal incorporation
law. Id. at 588–90.
138
Joseph S. Auerbach, The Legal Aspect of “Trusts,” 169 N. AM. REV. 375, 376–77 (1899);
see also GEORGE E. MOWRY, THE ERA OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT, 1900–1912, at 16–37 (1958)
(describing the rise of laissez faire thought). See generally FINE, supra note 135, at 29–31
(giving a brief overview of the rise of the laissez faire economic doctrine); KELLER, supra
note 132, at 182 (noting that “[m]ost educated men of the time believed that natural laws
controlled the market, the flow of money, and the cost of labor”).
139
See generally PAUL KENS, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MORRISON R. WAITE, 1874–1888,
at 15–31 (2010) (analyzing the stance that the Supreme Court took on federalism while
Morrison Waite was Chief Justice). The Waite Court followed a traditionalist federalism
paradigm.
See PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF
RECONSTRUCTION 15–16 (2011) (tracing the nuances in the Waite Court’s approach to the
Reconstruction amendments); Michael Les Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction
and the Waite Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 39, 53–56 (1978) (noting the effect of the Waite
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Court, sitting near the epicenter of the country’s “experiencing sweeping
social and economic change,” began protecting vested property interests
against both federal and state legislative efforts.140 Although aggregately
the Court’s decisions do not necessarily reflect a laissez faire Court, the
judicial rhetoric employed by some Justices facilitated aspects of a free
trade economy.141 This became evident in certain Justices’ nationalist
tendencies. The Court, after all, had federalized the law of commercial
contracts in an effort to facilitate a national economy.142 A late
nineteenth century observer echoed this sentiment, when he wrote that
diversity is:
[I]ntolerable, in a commercial age, when it affects the
laws of trade and commerce in communities bound to
each other by railroads and telegraph wires, and
depending on one another by the daily exchange of
articles of food and wear, of machinery and raw
material, and dealing together without regard to state
lines, past or present.143
And the classical legal doctrine corresponded with the Court’s approach
toward liberty of contract, with the Court invalidating some programs
that “arbitrarily interfere[d] with private business, or impose[d] unusual
and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.”144 Some Justices
Court’s “dual federalism” in upholding much state legislation). That Court, after all,
upheld the Granger Laws, with Justice Field dissenting. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 135–
36 (1876). Also, Chief Justice Waite echoed Chief Justice Marshall’s broad construction of
the commerce power, concluding it is not only Congress’ power but “duty . . . to see to it
that intercourse among the States and the transmission of intelligence are not obstructed or
unnecessarily encumbered by State legislation.” Pensacola Tel Co. v. Western Union Tel
Co., 96 U.S. 1, 9 (1877).
140
JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888–1910, at 57, 70–
71 (1995) (demonstrating the Court’s interest in defending vested property rights from any
legislative interference). Owen Fiss observes that the Fuller Court decisions “embod[ied]
principles of economic nationalism and . . . a mandate to keep the commercial arties of the
nation free and open.” FISS, supra note 100, at 266 (footnote omitted).
141
See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 20 (1842) (“It is for the benefit and convenience of the
commercial world, to give as wide an extent as practicable to the credit and circulation of
negotiable paper, that it may pass not only as security for new purchases and
advances . . . but also in payment of and as security for, pre-existing debts.”). See generally
LINDA PRZYBYSZEWSKI, THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN 150 (1999)
(explaining that the Court was not laissez faire).
142
See Swift, 41 U.S. at 18–19 (determining that the opinion of local tribunals is not
conclusive with regard to commercial law).
143
Lewis N. Dembitz, Uniformity of State Laws, 168 N. AM. REV. 84, 84 (1899).
144
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894). Christopher Tiedeman’s treatise, Limitations
of Police Power, often epitomizes laissez faire constitutionalism. ARNOLD M. PAUL,
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avowedly believed that “the liberty of pursuit—the right to follow any of
the ordinary callings of life—is one of the privileges of a citizen of the
United States.”145 Justice Field, often associated with laissez faire
constitutionalism, echoed the sentiment of those who distrusted the
legislative process and opposed special privileges or perceived class
legislation.146 And later Chief Justice Taft would write that “[f]reedom is
the general rule” and only “exceptional circumstances” warranted their
abridgement.147
Yet, how past constitutional dogma would accommodate
corresponding centripetal and centrifugal forces favoring federalization
and an escalating need for state police power regulation, respectively,
eventually became untenable under the prevailing paradigm of dual
federalism. “[C]onstitutional issues [after all,] pervaded the discussion
of nearly all matters of public policy during the Gilded Age—issues such
as regulating railroads, suppressing unsafe or fraudulent products, labor
issues, counteracting monopolies and trusts[.] . . . ”148 Republicans
favored strong national government and governmental intervention,
CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887–1895, at
16–17 (1969). David Mayer explains how Tiedeman “separated law from popular will” and
believed judges could discern legal principles from a “prevalent sense of right.” David N.
Mayer, The Jurisprudence of Christopher G. Tiedeman: A Study in the Failure of Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism, 55 MO. L. REV. 93, 119–20 (1990). Less doctrinaire was Thomas M.
Cooley’s, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of
the States. See generally KELLER, supra note 132, at 345 (calling Cooley’s treatise “[t]he most
influential” of its kind); FINE, supra note 135, at 142–44 (praising Cooley’s treatise); TWISS
supra note 8, at 18–19 (discussing Cooley’s intentions in writing the treatise).
145
Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City LiveStock & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 764 (1884) (Bradley, J., concurring); see also
ROBERT B. HIGHSAW, EDWARD DOUGLASS WHITE: DEFENDER OF THE CONSERVATIVE FAITH
101–118 (1981) (discussing White’s embrace of dual federalism in commerce clause
context).
146
See Charles W. McCurdy, The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of
American Corporation Law, 1869–1903, 53 BUS. HIST. REV. 304, 310–11 (1979) (analyzing the
Court’s break from precedent and explaining their belief that the “commercial power [of
Congress] continues until the commodity has ceased to be the subject of discriminatory
legislation by reason of its foreign character”); Wallace Mendelson, Mr. Justice Field and
Laissez-Faire, 36 VA. L. REV. 45, 48 (1950) (noting Field’s resolute opposition to
“communism” and the Granger cases). Field, according to Kens, “seriously distrusted” the
legislative process. PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN FIELD: SHAPING LIBERTY FROM THE GOLD
RUSH TO THE GILDED AGE 164, 216 (1997).
147
Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations of Kansas, 262 U.S. 522, 534 (1923)
(reviewing whether business affected by a public interest). For Taft’s nationalist approach
toward the Commerce Clause as a mechanism for facilitating a national market, see Stanley
I. Kutler, Chief Justice Taft, National Regulation, and the Commerce Power, 51 J. AM. HIST. 651,
652 (1965).
148
Michael Les Benedict, Constitutional Politics in the Gilded Age, 9 J. GILDED AGE &
PROGRESSIVE ERA 7, 12 (January 2010).
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while the Democrats resisted federal intervention or federal power.149 In
some areas, states appeared reluctant to regulate a particular sector
fearing that the industry would relocate to more forgiving neighboring
states—what we now often call “race to the bottom” or “degenerative
competition.”150 And often the progressive interest in reform at the
federal level merged with industry support for federal regulation in lieu
of local efforts that might thwart a more rational or stable national
market.151 While notable decisions invalidated some state efforts, the
Court concomitantly occasionally limited federal regulation as well.152
David Currie, therefore, cautions against suggesting that the Court
during the 1888 through 1910 period was “hostile to either state or
federal authority.”153 Instead, modern scholarship posits that the Court
Id. at 14–16.
David A. Moss, Kindling a Flame Under Federalism: Progressive Reformers, Corporate
Elites, and the Phosphorus Match Campaign of 1909–1912, 68 BUS. HIST. REV. 244, 247 n.5 (1994)
(employing the term “degenerative competition” to describe what occurred).
151
Herbert Hovenkamp makes this point when exploring railroad rate regulation, and
David Moss finds the same scenario occurring for the prohibitory tax on phosphorous
matches. Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the
Railroad Problem, 97 Yale L.J. 1017, 1020 (1988); Moss, supra note 150, at 274 n.69.
152
See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908) (holding that, while the power
to regulate interstate commerce is broad, it does not supersede fundamental rights); see also
Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 588 (1898) (concluding that live-stock commission
merchants are not engaged in interstate commerce, despite the fact that live-stock travels
between states during a transaction, because their business is buying and selling live-stock
consigned to them in various locations); Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429,
modified on reh’g, 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895) (exempting federal income tax from interstate
commerce); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895) (finding that
manufacturing is not commerce).
153
David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Protection of Economic
Interests, 1889–1910, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 324, 325 (1985). The Court remarkably upheld the
federal injunctive power in In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 600 (1895), even absent an explicit
authorizing federal law. Currie, supra, at 344; see also KERMIT L. HALL & PETER KARSTEN,
THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 252 (2009) (“Of the 217 state laws struck
down by the Court from its start in 1920, [forty-eight] were voided in the peak decade of
the 1880s, and the justices, while displaying deference to Congress, still struck down
[thirty-two] federal acts between the Civil War and 1937. That being said, the fact is that
the Court upheld state and federal enactments overwhelmingly.” (footnote omitted));
KELLER, supra note 132, at 176 (“[T]he Court joined the other sectors of the postwar polity in
affirming the principle that government might act concretely, positively, [and] indeed
aggressively in the realm of economic policy.”); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, The Lost World of
Classical Legal Thought: Law and Ideology in America, 1886–1937, at 135 (1998) (noting that
after 1898 Court ushered in new era of activism). The Court’s response to the Granger
Movement, in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), incidentally involving a commerce clause
challenge, illustrates its willingness to affirm particular state economic initiatives. See 7
CHARLES FAIRMAN, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864–1888, PART TWO 353–55 (1987)
(discussing Munn v. Illinois, allowing state regulation of grain elevators). See generally
GEORGE H. MILLER, RAILROADS AND THE GRANGER LAWS 59–96 (1971) (discussing the Munn
149
150
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appeared more interested in protecting economic individualism by
applying classical notions of vested liberty and property interests.154
But how the Court distinguished between a state’s permissible
exercise of its police power, Congress’ legitimate exercise of its
commerce power, or a matter entrusted solely to either state or federal
power entails appreciating more than a mere clash of economic interests:
it requires an appreciation of the unique interplay of the changing
society, economic theory, and the prevailing yet fading paradigm of dual
federalism. This complex dynamic generated three dominant themes
from this era.
To begin with, the Court’s conservatives facilitated interstate
corporate expansion by creating a federal constitutional right to engage in
interstate commerce—a right that only Congress could hinder.155 Absent
congressional action, citizens enjoyed a “perfect freedom of trade.”156
Arguably conflating due process and Commerce Clause rhetoric, the
Court’s dicta hinted that Congress itself could only intercede with this

v. Illinois decision); Edmund W. Kitch & Clara Ann Bowler, The Facts of Munn v. Illinois,
1978 SUP. CT. REV. 313, 313–20 (providing the facts of Munn v. Illinois); Harry Scheiber, The
Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts, in LAW
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 329, 329–402 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn, eds. 1971)
(discussing the implications of Munn v. Illinois).
154
See ELY, supra note 140, at 79–81 (discussing the Court’s use of traditional vested and
liberty property rights to protect economic individualism); see also JOHN E. SEMONCHE,
CHARTING THE FUTURE: THE SUPREME RESPONDS TO A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1890–1920, at
419–34 (1978) (reviewing the Court’s docket during this period, and concluding that the
Court generally accommodated societal change by upholding most federal and state
programs).
155
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 21 (1910) (“[I]t is a right which every
citizen of the United States is entitled to exercise under the Constitution[.]”).
Commentators too employed “rights” language when discussing interstate commerce.
E.g., Frederick H. Cooke, The Right to Engage in Interstate Transportation, etc., 21 YALE L.J.
207, 207 (1912); E. Parmalee Prentice, The Origin of the Right to Engage in Interstate Commerce,
17 HARV. L. REV. 20, 20 (1903).
156
Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622, 633 (1885) (“It cannot be seriously contended, at least
in the absence of any congressional legislation to the contrary, that all goods which are the
product of other States are to be free from taxation in the State to which they may be
carried for use or sale.”). When a prohibition targeted selling products entering a state, the
Court treated its application to out-of-state companies as “violat[ing] . . . the rights of
citizens of other States arising under the commerce clause[.]” Schollenberger v.
Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1, 16 (1898). Conversely, in Kidd v. Pearson, the Court explored
whether a prohibition could affect exporting commerce; and, while recognizing the
difficulty of drawing the line separating commerce from the police power, the Court
echoed the prevailing refrain that Congress enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over interstate
commerce and the states enjoy jurisdiction over “purely internal domestic commerce.” 128
U.S. 1, 17–18, 26 (1888).
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right upon “adequate justification.”157 This corresponded well with the
conservative philosophy promoting economic and legal individualism.
The right operated as a legal conduit: permitting foreign corporations to
carry out business throughout the country by protecting viable interstate
markets in goods and products, while retaining a sphere for state and
local regulation.158 That retained sphere excluded what the Court
considered as interstate commerce.159 And this approach reflected the
persuasiveness of the conservative bar championing the cause of the new
corporate structure.160 Singer Manufacturing Co. was one of the
companies at the forefront.161 In Welton v. Missouri, for instance, the
Court held that a license tax imposed on the selling of sewing machines
manufactured outside of the state impermissibly taxed foreign goods
before they had become part of the general mass of state property.162 “In
holding such discriminatory legislation unconstitutional, Welton became
the leading case.”163 It was followed a decade later by Robbins v. Taxing
District of Shelby County, where the Court held that Tennessee could not
require that drummers for out of state companies obtain a license and
pay a fee before plying their trade.164
If activities associated with interstate commerce involved the
exercise of a federal right, then only Congress could regulate that
right.165 Optically, at least, this approach seemed consistent with both
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Brown and Chief Justice Taney’s
decision in Cooley. States could regulate local matters, including local
activities indirectly affecting commerce, consistent with Cooley; but the
Thomas R. Powell, The Police Power in American Constitutional Law, 1 J. COMP. LEG. &
INT’L. L. 160, 166 (1919).
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
See also TWISS, supra note 8, at 214, 218–19 (explaining the Court’s transition to dual
federalism, which gave way to the new corporate structure); PAUL, supra note 144, at 22–23
(noting “the role of the bar as a balancing factor in the tension between populism and
conservatism”). See generally McCurdy, supra note 97, at 637–43 (describing how the Court
acted without the weight of precedent).
161
McCurdy, supra note 97, at 642.
162
91 U.S. 275, 281–83 (1875); see also McCurdy, supra note 146, at 310–11 (analyzing the
Court’s break from precedent in the Welton v. Missouri decision).
163
FAIRMAN, supra note 153, at 665.
164
120 U.S. 489, 492–94 (1887).
165
E.g., Hall v De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485, 487 (1877) (“There can be no doubt but that exclusive
power has been conferred upon Congress in respect to the regulation of commerce among
the several States.”). It later became axiomatic for the Court to assert “the elementary and
long-settled doctrine . . . that there can be no divided authority over interstate
commerce[.]” Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Hardwick Farmers Elevator Co., 226
U.S. 426, 435 (1913). But cf. Norman R. Williams, The Commerce Clause and the Myth of Dual
Federalism, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1847, 1847 (2007) (analyzing the impact of dual federalism,
although arguably without addressing the nuances identified in this Article).
157

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 [2015], Art. 9

758

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

Constitution assigned matters requiring national uniformity exclusively
to Congress—consistent with Chief Justice Marshall’s opinions.166 Justice
Field illustrated this sentiment in County of Mobile v. Kimball.167 And
Justice Fuller, in Leisy v. Hardin, similarly pronounced the exclusive
nature of Congress’ authority over matters purportedly demanding
uniformity.168 Justice Fuller, in particular, exhibited his bias toward a
strong national economic marketplace, and he successfully persuaded
his colleagues to incorporate Marshall’s original package doctrine for
foreign imports into commerce clause jurisprudence.169 Explicitly
rejecting the concurrent theory embraced by Chief Justice Taney, Justice
Fuller allocated power between federal and states by deciding when a
matter constituted interstate commerce.170 An expanded notion of
commerce, assuming exclusivity, necessarily meant circumscribing state
authority.171
This became evident in the now infamous United States v. E.C. Knight
Co.172 There, Congress sought to regulate combinations in restraint of
166
William R. Howland, The Police Power and Inter-State Commerce, 4 HARV. L. REV. 221,
223 (1890) (“The commercial powers of Congress are not in terms exclusive; but it is now
settled that they are exclusive where the subject-matter is national in character, and admits
of and requires a uniform rule.”).
167
102 U.S. 691, 696–707 (1880).
168
135 U.S. 100, 119 (1890); WILLARD L. KING, MELVILLE WESTON FULLER: CHIEF JUSTICE
OF THE UNITED STATES 1888–1910, at 167 (1950).
169
See KING, supra note 168, at 167–69. King’s generous treatment of Fuller suggests that
Fuller tried to “unshackle the future from the past[,]” and yet the Court undermined his
approach only four years later, in Plumley v. Massachusetts. Id. at 238–39. Justice Harlan
recognized the unmanageability of Fuller’s embrace of the original package doctrine:
“It . . . would encourage American merchants and traders seeking to avoid state and local
taxation, to import from abroad all the merchandise and commodities which they would
need in their business.” F. May & Co. v. New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496, 503 (1900); see also
Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343, 350 (1900) (providing the cigarettes and original package
doctrine).
170
ELY, supra note 140, at 127. After “conceding the weight” to be afforded to the
“eminent jurist,” Fuller was:
[C]onstrained to say that the distinction between subjects in respect of
which there can be of necessity only one system or plan of regulation
for the whole country, and subjects local in their nature, and, so far as
relating to commerce, mere aids, rather than regulations, does not
appear to us to have been sufficiently recognized by him in arriving at
the conclusions announced.
Leisy, 135 U.S. at 118; see also id. at 119 (“the power to regulate commerce . . . is exclusive”).
171
Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 655 (1895) (“If the power to regulate interstate
commerce applied to all the incidents to which such commerce might give rise . . . that
power would embrace the entire sphere of mercantile activity in any way . . . and would
exclude state control over [domestic matters.]”).
172
156 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1895). Fuller’s opinion omitted referencing earlier dicta (in case
where he dissented) that manufacturing corporations engaged in local or domestic business
were outside of interstate commerce. Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 58 (1891).
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trade for activities that included manufacturing.173 For the Court, Justice
Fuller explained how states traditionally had protected against unlawful
restraints upon commerce within their borders, and that Congress had
exceeded its bounds when it intruded upon that authority.174 Had he
ruled otherwise, he likely believed that, absent federal legislation, state
regulation of domestic corporations or even foreign corporations doing
business within another state would violate the DCC—after all, an
exclusive paradigm would not tolerate allowing state regulation of
“commerce.”175 And so he drew the problematic distinction between
manufacturing and commerce.
The incipient federal constitutional right to engage interstate
commerce precipitated the ancillary principle that states may not
discriminate against interstate commerce. The Court’s language in
Walling v. Michigan, involving a state-imposed tax on the business of
selling liquor into the state from out-of-state manufacturers, is
illustrative.176 When Michigan convicted an agent for a Chicago
manufacturer of refusing to pay the tax, the State Supreme Court upheld
the tax, concluding that the tax applied equally to all sellers and did not
discriminate against non-residents.177 The Supreme Court had earlier
signaled the need to address discrimination when it held that:
[N]o State can, consistently with the Federal
Constitution, impose upon the products of other States,
brought therein for sale or use, or upon citizens because
engaged in the sale therein, or the transportation thereto,
of the products of other States, more onerous public
burdens or taxes than it imposes upon the like products
of its own territory.178

Knight, 156 U.S. at 6–8.
Id. at 15–16; see McCurdy, supra note 146 at 336 (discussing history of state
government freely deciding on matters of commerce without considering interstate
commerce ramifications).
175
See McCurdy, supra note 146, at 335 (explaining that the court’s concerns that states
could lose control over right to regulate foreign corporations if a monopolization standard
was adopted).
176
See Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446, 456–57 (1886) (discussing that Congress
regulates commerce between states and cites to judicial history regarding federal control
over interstate commerce to support its decision).
177
People v. Walling, 18 N.W. 807, 810 (Mich. 1884).
178
Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 439 (1879). The Court suggested that this rule was
necessary to avoid annul[ing] Congress’ power to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce. Id. at 439–40.
173
174
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The Michigan statute undoubtedly had a discriminatory motive: an
earlier version of the statute, after all, discriminated on its face against
The Court, therefore, concluded that as a
non-residents.179
discriminatory measure it operated as a regulation of interstate
commerce within Congress’ exclusive domain.180
Finally, the Court assumed responsibility for ensuring that states
could not, through subterfuge, interfere with the federal right to engage
in interstate commerce and Congress’ corresponding exclusive power
over it.181 The Court assessed whether a state’s purported exercise of the
police power appeared rational or rather served as a ruse limiting market
entry.182 Decisions often teetered on the Court’s perception about
whether a particular state measure “appears” to have had a sufficiently
reliable motivation other than class or economic protectionist.183 When
the Court became convinced that a state measure was little more than
class legislation or an effort to protect a local market, the DCC became an
easy foil to strike down the measure.184 Many of the late nineteenth
century cases, therefore, turned on whether the Court became convinced
that the state had acted legitimately—or reasonably—when purporting
to regulate for public health, welfare, or safety.185 This inquiry
occasionally fused the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth

179
Walling, 116 U.S. at 449. The Court also explained how the tax effectively targeted
drummers for out-of-state liquor manufacturers. Id. at 459.
180
See id. at 455–456 (discussing the necessity of a national system to regulate certain
classes of interstate trade); see also Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 99–101 (1897) (invalidating
tax for inspection program effectively discriminating against out of state products); Voight
v. Wright, 141 U.S. 62, 66 (1891) (invalidated Virginia flour inspection program).
181
Walling, 116 U.S. at 460.
182
Id. See, e.g., Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299, 303–04 (1896) (whether a “real or
substantial relation to [health or safety] objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured
by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge”).
183
See Walling, 116 U.S. at 456–58 (discussing the motivation for the state law).
184
See id. at 458–61 (finding the state act to be a violation of the commerce clause).
185
E.g., Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 399 (1894) (protection of
property interest warrants inquiring into “the reasonableness and justice of the rates”). The
Court played comfortably in a “reasonableness” sandbox, examining, for instance, the
reasonableness of rate regulation under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Smyth v. Ames,
169 U.S. 466, 547 (1898) (examining the reasonableness and fairness of return for the value
of property as compared to what the public was entitled to demand); Chicago & G. T. Ry.
Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 344 (1892) (stating that the legislature has the power to fix
railroad rates, but the judiciary may intercede if the rates are unreasonable); Chicago, M. &
St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 458 (1890) (explaining that the element of
reasonableness is a question for judicial investigation, which requires “due process of law
for its determination”). Even in liberty of contract cases, “the Fuller Court was prepared to
recognize major exceptions . . . when a state could demonstrate the reasonableness of its
regulations[]”—such as in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 418–23 (1908). ELY, supra note
140, at 101.
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Amendment principles.186
Barry Cushman highlights this “cross
pollination” when portraying the New Deal Court.187
This “cross pollination” surfaces particularly in Justice John Marshall
Harlan’s Commerce Clause opinions. Several of his prominent police
power opinions upheld state regulation of economic transactions.188 And
these opinions often examined whether the state acted arbitrarily or in a
hostile manner against interstate commerce.189 In Minnesota v. Barber, the
Court examined the “natural and reasonable effect” of the regulation and
whether a sufficient relationship existed between the means and the
ends.190 Legitimate railroad safety measures survived scrutiny when the
Court perceived the measure was rationally related to a legitimate state
police power purpose.191 Yet, if a measure appeared unrelated to
186
See PAUL, supra note 144, at 42–45 (explaining the judicial review of reasonableness);
see also BERNARD C. GAVIT, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
24 (1932) (discussing the suggestion of a reasonableness test in cases). “[T]he language of
some of the cases has consciously or unconsciously employed the idioms of the ‘due
process’ cases.” Id.; see also id. at 49–50, 79–81 (treating due process and Commerce Clause
together); id. at 372 (noting that there is not difference in the result whether a property tax
is tested by the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment).
187
See CUSHMAN, supra note at 43, 107–12 (examining the change in the judicial
interpretation of the due process clause and the commerce clause); see also Barry Cushman,
Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1089 (2000)
(analyzing the developments in commerce clause jurisprudence in relation to substantive
due process and the dormant commerce clause doctrine).
188
See PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 141, at 149–50 (citing Justice Harlan’s noticeable
inclusion of state police power considerations in his decisions). Conversely, Justice Harlan
also affirmed Congress’ power to regulate the interstate traffic of lotteries. Champion v.
Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 355 (1903).
189
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 543–44 (1896) (dissenting, Justice Harlan explained
that Connecticut acted arbitrarily and “inconsistent with the liberty belonging to every
man,” and violated the Commerce Clause by denying citizens the ability to sell lawfully
obtained game into the interstate market). Congress responded by passing the Lacey Act,
prohibiting the interstate sale of dead wild animals or birds killed or shipped in violation
of state law. Lacey Act, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (1900).
190
Minnesota v Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 320–26, 328–29 (1890) (invalidating state meat
inspection statute). A searching means/end inquiry reflected the Court’s general approach
toward police power measures. See FISS, supra note 100, at 162 (Lochner reflected
means/ends inquiry); see also id. at 165 (noting that even when dissenting in Lochner, Justice
Harlan articulated the same approach, permitting sufficiently established health objectives
but not economic class legislation).
191
New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U.S. 628, 632 (1897); see Wabash, St.
Louis, and Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 573 (1886) (holding that it would hinder the
transportation of goods and chattels if every state on the train route could impose
regulations concerning price, compensation, or taxation). Railroad rate regulation,
conversely, highlighted the difficulty with dual markets, such that by 1886, the issue
reached its crescendo when the Court touted the “freedom” of interstate commerce in
holding that states could not regulate the rates for interstate railroad transportation. Id.
Contra Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 163 U.S. 142, 154 (1896) (declining to uphold train stop
measure that would require a fast-mail train to go seven miles out its way creating
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traditional “police power” aims, Harlan had little trouble invoking the
Commerce Clause. In Brimmer v. Rebman, for instance, Justice Harlan
invalidated Virginia’s meat inspection statute, reasoning that the
constitutional right to send wholesome meat into Virginia could not be
inhibited by a statute that denied equality in markets.192 Because the
Court found inescapable the conclusion that the statute was not
legitimately aimed at health, the inspection program necessarily
targeted—and, therefore, illegitimately directly burdened—interstate
commerce.193 The same concern over hostile state efforts led Harlan to
question Kansas’ effort to extract roughly $20,000 for its school fund
from Western Union’s ability to do intrastate business.194 This prodded
Harlan to champion the need to ensure “the freedom of interstate
commerce against hostile state or local action,” but allow local
regulations “established in good faith” to apply to those engaged in
commerce and only incidentally affecting, and not obstructing or
conflicting, with the “substantial rights of those engaged in interstate
commerce.”195 Indeed, several of Harlan’s opinions illustrate how
ostensible health and welfare measures became embroiled in the tension
between ineffective state regulation and coalescing forces favoring

significant delays to passengers and cargo). The Court believed the stop was an
unconstitutional hindrance and an obstruction of interstate commerce. Id. See generally
Hovenkamp, supra note 151, at 1017 (discussing federal regulations within context of public
interest); THOMAS K, MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, LOUIS
D. BRANDEIS, JAMES M. LANDIS, ALFRED E. KAHN 61 (1984) (describing the power of the
railroads). “Ultimately, the railroads grew so powerful and so vital to the national
economy that continued reliance on state regulation alone became futile[,]” particularly
after Wabash. Id.
192
138 U.S. 78, 81–83 (1891) (holding that the Virginia tax discriminated against products
from other states); see also Voight v. Wright, 141 U.S. 62, 67 (1891) (denying equality in a
state’s market directly burdens interstate commerce).
193
Brimmer, 138 U.S. at 83; see PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 141, at 154 (noting Harlan did
not respond to allegations by the state attorneys that moneyed interests were challenging
state sovereignty). Linda Prezybyszewski writes that Harlan considered the state’s health
justification a “ruse.” Id. Congress responded by passing the Animal Industry Act, ch. 60,
23 Stat. 31 (1884), a recognition of state power to effect quarantines for foreign vessels at
state ports, Act of Feb. 15, 1893 (National Quarantine Act), ch. 114, 27 Stat. 449–452 (1893),
the Meat Inspection Act, ch. 555, 26 Stat. 1089 (1891), and in 1906 it mandated inspecting
meat traveling in interstate commerce, Pure-Food Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 384, 34 Stat. 768
(1906).
194
See Western Union Tel. Co. v. State of Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 7, 34–36
(1910) (stating that a state may impose conditions so long as those conditions do not offend
the Constitution or United States laws).
195
Id. at 26.
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federal regulation—forces arguably at odds with the Court’s approach
toward exclusivity.196
B. The Genesis of DCC Balancing
These tensions eventually became too problematic under the Court’s
prevailing jurisprudence. With the new century, the Court struggled to
maintain its dialogue with the past, or its precedent, and to respond to
the challenges confronting a dramatically changing society. “The
twentieth century began amid a remarkable structural transformation of
the economy. Since the 1870s, a constellation of circumstances—a
nationwide railway network, abundant raw materials, emerging
technologies, available finance capital, [and] favorable government
policies—had produced a new kind of industrial firm.”197 The necessity
of addressing growing class inequality associated with the concentration
of wealth and power in big businesses undermined the loci of
individualism dominating the second of the nineteenth century. The
illusion of classical economic theory and its corresponding focus on
individualism, to the extent practiced, became transparent.
It
succumbed to the widely touted need to address health and safety
threats posed by the new economy.198 And classical economic theory
196
See Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 686 (1888) (providing the classic illustration
of the dairy industry’s battle against oleomargarine, and Justice Harlan’s initial decision
upholding state legislation); see also McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 58–64 (1904)
(stating that the judiciary does not hold the power to hold a legislative act unconstitutional
if it reasonably relates to public health); Collins v. New Hampshire, 171 U.S 30, 33–34
(1898) (noting a New Hampshire statute’s arbitrary oleomargarine color requirement when
selling the product, the court held the statute to be invalid as a prohibitory law). Cf.
Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1, 14–25 (1898) (invalidating law). See generally
HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA
POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 75 (1993) (describing how some perceived Powell as
embodying class legislation); Benedict, supra note 148, at 17 (discussing prominence of fight
over oleomargarine); Geoffrey P. Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest State:
The Story of Butter and Margarine, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 83, 108–18 (1989) (discussing the causes
of state antimargarine laws and the subsequent judicial invalidation based on their
prohibitory nature).
197
MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870–1920, at 150 (2003). See generally MORTON KELLER,
REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900–
1933, 78 (1990) (describing the events and changes around the turn of the century that
influenced public opinion and policy); MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION
OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890–1916: THE MARKET, THE LAW, AND POLITICS 4 (1988)
(exploring the transition from competitive to corporate capitalism).
198
See Russell Nye, Progressivism: Anti-Business Reform, in CONFLICT OR CONSENSUS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 304, 304–05 (Allen F. Davis & Harold D. Woodman eds., 1966)
(discussing the change in the American political and social perspective on the influence of
wealth in government and the subsequent relationship to injustice in the political system).
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effectively yielded to the emerging consumer economy.199 The soon to
be President Herbert Hoover even rejected laissez faire doctrine when
promoting regulation as mechanism for ensuring equal opportunity.200
By the 1930s, therefore, a “widespread popular conviction” existed “that
the free market was hopelessly flawed.”201
Progressives and subsequently New Dealers embraced the role of
government, and corresponding the belief that through scientific
management experts could resolve economic and social problems.202
Historian David Kennedy explained how progressives touted the need
for “[a]ctive governmental guidance” to “superintend the phenomenal
economic and social power that modern industrialism” had concentrated
“into fewer and fewer hands.”203 Steeped in pragmatism, they rejected
classical formalism and elevated facts over abstractions.204 This surfaced
in the legal arena, in particular, with recognition by historical
SEAVOY, supra note 52, at 213; see also FINE, supra note 135, at 206, 242 (explaining the
rejection of classical economics for one based on the complexities of consumption). See, e.g.,
WILLIAM LEACH, LAND OF DESIRE: MERCHANTS, POWER, AND THE RISE OF A NEW AMERICAN
CULTURE 7 (1993) (examining the rise of the consumer economy and its impact on society).
200
See DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION
AND WAR, 1929–1945, at 11–13, 46–47, 54–55 (1999); AMITY SHALES, THE FORGOTTEN MAN: A
NEW HISTORY OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION 34–35 (2007) (discussing Hoover’s belief that
“America must move toward regulation”); see also LEACH, supra note 199, at 354 (noting his
rejection of laissez-faire capitalism).
201
MCCRAW, supra note 191, at 210.
202
See HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE 265–70 (1909) (championing
democratic nationalism). The New Republic’s founder, Herbert Croly, published Promise of
American Life, where he rejected liberal individualism and extoled the virtues of
democratic nationalism and strong governmental intervention. Id. Early participants with
the New Republic included Judge Learned Hand and Felix Frankfurter. CHARLES FORCEY,
THE CROSSROADS OF LIBERALISM: CROLY, WEYL, LIPPMANN AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA,
1900–1925, at 181 (1961). Frankfurter reportedly even served as a conduit for Justice
Brandeis, with the former publishing in the journal some of Brandeis’ views. See MELVIN I.
UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION 165 (1981) (discussing
Brandeis’ beliefs).
203
KENNEDY, supra note 200, at 32–33. Cf. WIECEK, supra note 153, at 255–59 (discussing
the efficacy of progressive label and ability to synthesize accepted progressive principles).
See generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC
NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 26–27 (1973) (indicating the trend toward the
political involvement of social scientists to exert some means of objective control).
204
See generally GARY J. JACOBSOHN, PRAGMATISM, STATESMANSHIP, AND THE SUPREME
COURT 52–57 (1977) (discussing the shift away from legal formalism in favor of pragmatic
approach); HENRY F. MAY, THE END OF AMERICAN INNOCENCE: A STUDY OF THE FIRST YEARS
OF OUR TIME 1912–1917, at 20–23 (1959) (noting the influence of progressive movement);
ROSS, supra note 53, at 144, 154–157 (examining the influence of the sciences upon the
progressive thought); WHITE, supra note 40, at 11–15 (explaining the campaign against legal
formalism); MORTON WHITE, PRAGMATISM AND THE AMERICAN MIND: ESSAYS AND REVIEWS
IN PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 41–43 (1973) (noting that the rejection of
formalism was a result of the increased emphasis on social thought).
199
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jurisprudes, sociological jurisprudes, and legal realists that juridical rules
were a product of time, culture, place, and circumstances, rather than a
priori pre-ordained principles, and as such could be molded.205 As
governmental actors occasionally clashing over attitudes toward big
business, they generally opposed concentrated wealth and favored
government programs promoting equality of health, welfare, and
economic opportunity—all within the citadel of capitalism.206 With the
emerging consumer economy, their belief in expert management
corresponded with the perceived underlying problem with the economy,
of
matching
production
to
consumption,
and
overseeing
labor/management relations to ensure appropriate wages.

See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 35 (1995) (discussing “The
Metaphysical Club”). The legal realists, including even historical and sociological
jurisprudes, comprised an eclectic and idiosyncratic group, although many arguably
seemed bound together by a Kantian faith in rational, empirical, scientific processes. See
also JAMES E. HERGET, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 1870–1970: A HISTORY 1–5 (1990)
(discussing the changes in legal thought); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927–
1960, at 67 (1986) (noting the realists influenced legal education in encouraging teaching
methods that students could apply to factual situations thereby fusing law with the social
sciences); WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN
AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 110–13 (1994) (examining the goals of a fact based approach
to law); PURCELL, supra note at 203, 74–94, 140–42 (explaining the similar characteristics and
motivations of the realists); JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND
EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 1520 (1995) (discussing the rejection of legal formalism and the
trend in legal education to embrace the social sciences); G. EDWARD WHITE, PATTERNS OF
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 99–100 (1978) (examining the influence of political, social,
intellectual history upon jurisprudential modes and social movements). Arthur Schlesinger
aptly captured their focus, observing:
The new jurisprudence found a host of persuasive teachers—notably,
perhaps, Felix Frankfurter and Thomas Reed Powell of Harvard and
Edward S. Corwin of Princeton. Under their influence, a new
generation of lawyers and political scientists abandoned the notion
that judicial pronouncements were delivered by the stork. They tried
instead to reconstruct the various carnal factors—economic, political,
psychological, as well as legal—which so evidently entered into every
decision. In due course this effort produced an even more radical
school.
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 486
(1960).
206
See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDIES: A LIFE 300 (2009) (explaining Brandeis’s
influence in the debate concerning government control over business interests). “Perhaps
more than any other reformer of his time, Louis Brandeis stood as the opponent of big
business and monopoly.” Id. Some scholars accepted concentration as natural, favoring
“commensurately powerful public controls.” KENNEDY, supra note 200, at 121. See generally
SAMUEL P. HAYES, THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM, 1885–1914, at 166–73 (1995) (discussing
the progressives’ push to increase government funding to aid various public interests,
while also curbing the amount of mergers and monopolies); SCHLESINGER, supra note 205,
at 69–207, 271.
205
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Heralding an engaged federal government capable of readjusting
economic relationships, progressives challenged the judiciary’s
willingness to scrutinize legislative judgments. Charles Beard, after all,
had accused the Court of interpreting the Constitution to protect
predominate economic interests.207 Justice Brandeis echoed the emergent
progressive sentiment in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins when, in
overruling Swift v. Tyson, he elevated legislative supremacy and
democratic decision-making over unnecessary judicial intrusion into
areas constitutionally assigned to a legislature.208
Another aspect of progressivism, however, became pronounced.
Progressive lawyers embraced facts, not legal masks—those formulaic or
talismanic constitutional tests shrouding reality.
And the era’s
progressive icon Justice Brandeis brought “[p]rogressivism . . . to the
Court.”209 Justice Brandeis famously introduced the concept of a
Brandeis brief, marshaling facts to persuade a court, but the corollary is
often overlooked—that a court would agree to examine and respond to
an advocate’s factual arguments.210 This promoted judicial examination
of the “effect” of particular measures, instead of relying on illusory or
See CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 162–63 & n.1 (1986) (noting that the effect of judicial control upon Congress
was not the original intent of the framers).
208
See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (holding that the doctrine of Swift
v. Tyson was an unconstitutional assumption of judicial power); Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 1, 18–23 (1842) (holding that the federal courts had the authority to create federal
common law when deciding matters not yet addressed by that state legislature). See
generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 172–73
(2000) (discussing Brandeis’ opinion addressing Swift in the Erie decision). “Brandeis as
much as any progressive valued expertise; that had made him a champion of scientific
management. But unlike some reformers, he believed in democratic decision making, and
the fact that the people could sometimes choose poorly did not trouble him.” UROFSKY,
supra note 206, at 349.
209
WALTER F. PRATT, JR., THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EDWARD DOUGLASS WHITE, 1910–
1921, at 142 (1999).
210
Id. at 168 (noting that Justice Holmes, Harold Laski, and Roscoe Pound urged that
Brandeis avoid this brief writing style as a Justice). Factual inquiries often dictated the
Court’s assessment of businesses affected with a public interest. In Dorchy v. Kansas, 264
U.S. 286, 289 (1924), Justice Brandeis accepted the judgment in Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v.
Court of Indus. Relations of Kansas. Id. In Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations of
Kansas, 262 U.S. at 522, 536 (1923), the Court rejected relying on a legislative declaration
that the business was so affected. Conversely, in O’Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257–58 (1931), Justice Brandeis upheld a statute limiting an agent’s
commission for the sale of fire insurance, reasoning that no facts adduced or judicially
known warranted overturning the legislative judgment about the evils warranting
correction. Id. In O’Gorman, Brandeis generally referenced Henry W. Biklé’s article. Id. at
258 n.3; see Henry Wolf Biklé, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the
Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action, 38 HARV. L. REV. 6, 1011 (1925) (noting, under the
Cooley DCC test, the question is necessarily a factually-based practical judgment).
207
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malleable legal tests. It meant, for instance, that a court could reach
beyond the legislative realm, beyond a statute or its legislative history,
and measure a statute’s constitutionality based on extrinsic facts as
presented or judicially known.211 This became evident in the Court’s
treatment of both DCC and intergovernmental immunity cases. In
Metcalf v. Mitchell, for example, Justice Stone—a follower of Justice
Brandeis—emphasized practicality and effects.212 Of course, elevating
the criticality of facts rendered constitutional distinctions subservient to
post-hoc factual judgments.213
Indeed, Justice Frankfurter aptly observed that Brandeis’ penchant
for empirical rather than hypothetical evidence prompted him to
examine each case separately, as if the Court could effectively determine
whether the state legislature had over (unreasonably) regulated
interstate commerce.214 This, after all, characterizes much of 1920s

211
See Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 359–63 (1928) (noting Justice Stone’s dissent). For
example, Justice Stone employed a methodology that first presumed a measure’s
constitutionality, and then “indulged” an assumption that a state legislature appreciated
local conditions necessitating regulation, with the Court capable of taking judicial notice of
Brandeis brief type facts warranting—in this case, involving employment agency fees—
state regulation. Id.
212
269 U.S. 514, 523–24 (1926); see Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (noting that
in a due process case, Stone implicitly examined and sub silentio accepted the state’s factual
argument about need to order the removal of ornamental red cedar trees). In Tyson v.
Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 451 (1927), Justice Stone chastised the majority’s invocation of illusory
tests or phrases such as business affected with a public interest. Even though he assented
to the majority opinion in Lochner, Justice McKenna earlier opined that “[l]egislation cannot
be judged by theoretical standards [but] must be tested by the concrete conditions which
induced it[.]” Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225, 233 (1911). Other Justices too
began employing more fact-suggestive language when discussing an activity’s relationship
to commerce. See, e.g., Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Harrington, 241 U.S. 177,
180 (1916) (noting that Justice Hughes used “so closely related” along with “direct”
relationship to interstate commerce); Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 360
(1916) (examining “influence and effect” in upholding state program); Shanks v. Del.,
Lackawanna, & W. R.R. Co., 239 U.S. 556, 558, 560 (1916) (noting that Justice Van Devanter
that federal employer liability act refers to interstate commerce in a practical, not legal
sense, and whether activity “so closely related” to interstate transportation, concluding in
the case that activity “too remote”); Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 223
U.S. 1, 47, 50 (1912) (recognizing that Justice Van Devanter that federal employer liability
act applies to activities with “real or substantial relation” to interstate commerce).
213
See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Harold, 241 U.S. 371, 375–76 (1916)
(examining actual movement of product in interstate commerce). Post hoc factual inquires
under a “rule of reason” became the sine qua non of antitrust law. KELLER, supra note 132, at
32.
214
See Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution, 45 HARV. L. REV. 33, 77
(1931) (stating that state action interstate commerce analysis should be determined on a
case by case basis, without hypotheticals). See, e.g., Davis v. Farmers’ Co-Op. Equity Co.,
262 U.S. 312, 315–17 (1923) (taking judicial notice that an undue burden on commerce, and
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progressivism.215 In Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, for instance, Justice
Butler regaled his colleagues about what he had learned about bread
making to establish that the majority had improperly assumed that
Nebraska had acted arbitrarily when it exercised its police power and
adopted standards for bread being sold at retail.216 The Court held that
the State’s measure was “not necessary” under the Court’s assessment of
the evidence, and as such violated the Fourteenth Amendment.217
Brandeis responded caustically that “[t]o decide, as a fact, that the
prohibition . . . is not necessary . . . is, in my opinion, an exercise of the
powers of a super-Legislature—not the performance of the constitutional
function of judicial review.”218 But Justice Brandeis’ deference to
legislative expertise became overshadowed by his style of reasoning and
marshaling facts to discredit the majority, and Justice Stone
unfortunately conflated the two—and in so doing ultimately stalled the
DCC’s development.
In DCC domain, after all, insuperable problems emerged as the
constitutionality of programs teetered on past formulaic or talismanic
tests.
The decaying, yet still hovering nineteenth century dual
federalism paradigm, posed a catch-twenty-two for the twentieth
century economy and the Court’s response.219 States could regulate local
activities only incidentally or indirectly affecting commerce, yet were
barred from burdening or directly regulating commerce regardless of the

making his own assessment that the burden was so high that it “unreasonably” and
“unduly” burdened commerce).
215
See Henry F. May, Shifting Perspectives on the 1920’s, in 2 PIVOTAL INTERPRETATIONS OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 210, 213 (Carl N. Degler, ed. 1966) (“The typical economic thought of
the twenties, while it avoided Utopian extremes, shared with the other social sciences an
unlimited confidence in the present possibilities of fact-finding and saw in the collection
and use of statistics much of the promise and meaning of the era.”).
216
264 U.S. 504, 514–16 (1924).
217
Id. at 517.
218
Id. at 534; see Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U.S. 460, 467–70 (1929) (examining
Justice Brandeis’ dissenting opinion); Pub. Util. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec.
Co., 273 U.S. 83, 91–92 (1927) (presenting Justice Brandeis’ dissent); Adams v. Tanner, 244
U.S. 590, 597–616 (1917) (dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis). This occurred also with
state regulation of ice manufacturers. See UROFSKY, supra note 206, at 578–80 (discussing
Justice Brandeis’s dissenting style and philosophy); see also Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 42–54 (1928) (examining Justice Brandeis dissenting opinion); N.Y.
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 154–70 (1917) (dissenting opinion of Justice
Brandeis).
219
EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT: A HISTORY OF OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 20 (1934) (presenting a colorful metaphor how the Court had
ensured an open and expansive highway extending throughout the country, with neither
the states nor Congress capable of placing needed stop signs).
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state’s purpose.220 If, therefore, E.C. Knight remained, the regulatory
vacuum would mirror the forces producing the dynamic confronting
health and safety reformers—leaving only a federal prohibitory tax as
the possible solution. But the Court later removed that option when it
explored the purpose behind the tax and concluded that only revenue
infused purposes would suffice.221 The challenge to the 1921 Grain
Future Trading Act, primarily affecting transactions on Chicago’s Board
of Trade, presented the classic problem.222 As a prohibitory tax whose
“manifest purpose” was other than revenue, the Court rejected it; it also
refused to sanction the Act under the Commerce Clause, not only
ostensibly because Congress did not include evidence of its relationship
to interstate commerce,223 but also because the Court itself could not
discern how futures contracts for delivering grain might directly impede
interstate commerce.224 If, conversely, the Court overturned E.C. Knight
but left intact its tests for analyzing the constitutionality of state
regulation, then potentially only Congress could protect against health
220
See Shafer v. Farmers’ Grain Co. of Embden, 268 U.S. 189, 199 (1925) (suggesting that
this approach prevailed yet acknowledging the tenuous line between acceptable and
impermissible state legislation). Citizens, Justice Van Devanter intimated, enjoyed a
“common right” to engage in legitimate interstate activities subject only to Congress’
superintending power. Id. Earlier, he noted Congress’ exclusive charge over interstate
commerce, when extending the concept of commerce to include purchasing along with
transportation. See Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 290–91 (1921)
(discussing that the right to buy shipment does not come from state laws); see also
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 596 (1923) (noting importance of maintaining
uniformity in the commercial intercourse of natural gas, as a “single nation”).
221
See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 55, 57–59 (1936) (highlighting the reasoning for
taxes); see also Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 22–23 (1925) (upholding application of the
Narcotic Law, but noting caveat about other motives); United States v. Constantine, 296
U.S. 287, 295–96 (1935) (concluding that federal penalty tax imposed for violating state
liquor law invaded state’s police power). Butler’s focus on the taxing power was likely a
product of a hasty conference. SCHLESINGER, supra note 205, at 470–71. In Bailey v. Drexel
Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922), the majority indicated that “[o]ut
of respect for the acts of a co-ordinate branch of the government, this court has gone far to
sustain taxing acts as such, even though there has been ground for suspecting, from the
weight of the tax, it was intended to destroy its subject.” Id. The Court later upheld taxes
likely intended to affect behavior. See Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 512–14
(1937) (noting the power and deference given to Congress to impose taxes).
222
See Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 68 (1922) (examining whether the regulation is
constitutional under the Commerce Clause).
223
Id. at 66–69.
224
See Id. at 69 (stating that sales from future deliveries are not interstate commerce). The
Court distinguished United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 535–36, 543 (1913), where it
upheld a conspiracy conviction against traders on the New York Cotton Exchange that
allegedly were running a corner on the available supply of cotton, artificially driving up
the price. Id. In Patten, the Court seemed convinced that the transactions themselves
created “artificial conditions” burdening interstate commerce—it “restrict[ed] the common
liberty to engage” in such commerce. Id. at 541.
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and safety threats. This would occur because the Court imbued only
Congress with exclusive authority over “commerce.”225
Neither scenario seemed plausible. The Court’s rubric left activities
indirectly yet substantially affecting interstate commerce, as well as
activities directly yet minimally affecting interstate commerce, without
ostensible legislative oversight.226 If the Court found sufficient evidence
that the transaction being regulated directly burdened interstate
commerce, then it upheld the exercise of federal power.227 Once Justice
Holmes’ stream of commerce decision nudged the law forward, both his
and other opinions involving the Sherman Antitrust Act demonstrated
the relationship between local transactions and interstate commerce.228
In Stafford v. Wallace, for instance, Chief Justice Taft employed Chief
Justice Marshall’s rhetoric for broad national power when upholding the
Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, affording Congress considerable
latitude to regulate monopolies affecting the interstate trade in livestock,
while conversely issuing another opinion “on the Federal taxing power
[that] would have made the Great Nationalist turn over in his grave.”229
The Court also upheld the Interstate Commerce Commission’s
regulation of intrastate (local) rates for railroads when necessary to avoid
the disparity between interstate and intrastate rates.230 In 1914, Justice
225
See Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 21 (1888) (noting that if commerce were interpreted
broadly it would exclude states from regulating agriculture, fishing, horticulture, stockraising, or almost “every branch of human industry”).
226
Hill, 259 U.S. at 69.
227
Id.
228
See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 399 (1905) (noting that a burden that
obstructs interstate trade is not permitted). Before Swift, the Court already limited E.C.
Knight to situations bearing “no distinct relation[ship] to commerce between the states[.]”
United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 313 (1897). In Loewe v. Lawlor, 208
US. 274, 297 (1908), the Court limited E.C. Knight to situations where the object and
intention was not to obstruct or restrain commerce. Id; see Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38,
42–43 (1939) (holding that it is illegal to obstruct and burden interstate commerce); Bd. of
Trade of City of Chi. v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 40 (1923) (finding that the manipulation of the
market for futures obstructs and burdens interstate commerce); Stafford v. Wallace, 258
U.S. 495, 499–500 (1922) (noting that the conspiracy violated the Anti-Trust Act); United
States v, Ferger, 250 U.S. 199, 203 (1919) (finding that a congressional exercise of authority
over counterfeiting upheld absent any evidence of intent to ship in interstate commerce,
because of “relation to and influence upon” commerce); see also Barry Cushman, A Stream of
Legal Consciousness: The Current of Commerce Doctrine from Swift to Jones & Laughlin, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. 105, 114 (1993) (tracing the development and implications of the
doctrine). But cf. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 67–68 (1922) (invalidating the Grain Future
Trading Tax).
229
258 U.S. 495, 512, 528 (1922) (holding that the Sherman Antitrust applies to the
“practices and obstructions” that burden interstate commerce); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON,
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE 244 (1964).
230
See R.R. Comm’n of Wis. v. Chi, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 588 (1922) (“interstate
and intrastate commerce are ordinarily subject to regulation by different sovereignties, yet
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Hughes in the Shreveport Rate Cases established that federal power was
necessary for the security of the traffic as a consequence of the “close and
substantial” relationship between instate and interstate traffic.231 The
years of labor unrest equally demonstrated how commerce and local
wage transactions became inseparable, and yet economic biases seemed
to dictate which sovereign could regulate strikes.232
Also, lingering ubiquitous language about exclusive federal
jurisdiction for areas demanding uniformity posed an analytical
problem. The Court’s language suggested two distinct spheres of
jurisdiction.233 Either juridical lines would block passage from one
sphere to another, or the Court would need to justify decisions on some
other ex ante basis.234 This became evident in the liquor cases. In Clark
Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railroad Co., the Court deftly avoiding
confronting the argument.235 The Court previously held that interstate
transport of liquor demanded uniformity—subject to Congress’ exclusive

when they are so mingled together that the supreme authority, the Nation, cannot exercise
complete effective control over interstate commerce without incidental regulation of
intrastate commerce”); see also Am. Express Co. v. S.D., 244 U.S. 617, 629 (1917) (finding
that the government, under the authority of the Commerce clause, can standardize
monopolies that have a direct impact on commerce).
231
Houston, E. & W. Tex. R.R. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914).
232
See Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters’ Ass’n of N. Am., 274 U.S. 37,
47–49 (1927) (treating local strikes as conspiracies ultimately designed to affect a company’s
ability to sell products into the interstate market, forcing unionization). Because strikers’
intent is to affect the flow of products outside of a state, the Court held strikes are (and de
facto could be) regulated under the antitrust laws. Id. The Court noted that the means
chosen would “directly and substantially curtail[], or threaten[] thus to curtail, the natural
flow in interstate commerce[.]” Id. at 54. “Congress,” according to the Court, “with the
right to control the field of interstate commerce, has so legislated as to prevent resort to
practices which unduly restrain competition or unduly obstruct the free flow of such
commerce, and private choice of means must yield to the national authority thus exerted.”
Eastern States Lumber Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 613 (1914); see also Coronado
Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 268 U.S. 295, 309–10 (1925) (holding that
interstate trade and commerce cannot be restricted); Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443,
478 (1921) (granting an injunction restraining actions that interfere with interstate
commerce); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 308–09 (1908) (overturning a lower court’s
dismissal of a case for damages arising from restrictions on interstate commerce); United
States v. Brims, 272 U.S 549, 553 (1926) (“The crime of restraining interstate commerce
through combination is not condoned by the inclusion of intrastate commerce as well.”).
The Court’s approach toward strikes elicited one of Brandeis’ most stinging dissents. See
PURCELL, supra note 208, at 146–47 (discussing Justice Brandeis’s opinions and dissents
regarding labor injunctions).
233
See Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 327 (1917) (reasoning that
interstate commerce is divided into two classes).
234
Id. at 327–29.
235
See id. at 331–32 (finding that state prohibitions cannot attach to intoxicant
movements).
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control.236 When Congress thereafter sought to sanction state regulation,
first in the Wilson Act and then in the Webb-Kenyon Act, the question
naturally arose in Clark Distilling Co. how Congress could authorize
disparate (non-uniform) regulation over matters within its exclusive
sphere (because it was a matter demanding uniformity)? With baffling
reasoning, the Court responded:
[T]hat because Congress, in adopting a regulation, had
considered the nature and character of our dual system
of government, state and nation, and . . . so conformed
its regulation as to produce co-operation between the
local and national forces of government to the end of
preserving the rights of all, it had thereby transcended
the complete and perfect power of regulation conferred
by the Constitution.237
Even the nation’s leading constitutional scholars could not easily explain
how this could be so, if the power over interstate commerce is, indeed,
exclusive.238
Conversely, in Lemke v. Farmers’ Grain Co. of Embden, North Dakota,
the Court invalidated North Dakota’s Grain Grading and Inspection
Act.239 The Act addressed a cooperative association’s marketing of
North Dakota produced grain into the Minnesota market.240 The
majority treated the Act as a regulation affecting and burdening
interstate commerce.241 The Court rejected North Dakota’s pitch that the
law was a valid police power measure, until superseded by a federal
statute, by merely claiming that it “passe[d] beyond the exercise of its
legitimate authority” when it deprived the association of its “privilege”
to engage in commerce by burdening commerce.242 The Court arguably
accepted the legitimacy of the State’s effort to protect against fraud, but
held that the State could not “encroach” upon a “field . . . under federal
control.”243 Dissenting, Justice Brandeis retorted that, as a legitimate
See id. at 326–27 (discussing uniformity).
Id. at 331.
238
See Thomas Reed Powell, The Validity of State Legislation Under the Webb-Kenyon Law, 2
SO. L. Q. 112, 127 (1917) (noting the power to regulate commerce is given to Congress by
the Constitution); see also Dowling, infra note 303, at 17 (discussing Professor Noel
Dowling’s analysis).
239
258 U.S. 50, 61 (1922) (holding the act invalid because it goes beyond the state’s police
power).
240
Id. at 53–54.
241
Id. at 52.
242
Id. at 59.
243
Id. at 61.
236
237
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police power measure, the statute would only be unconstitutional if
Congress had so legislated or the law “directly” burdened interstate
commerce.244
Di Santo v. Pennsylvania perhaps best illustrates an emerging Zeitgeist
and the desire to fit precedent within it.245 Pennsylvania’s statute
required a license for selling steamship tickets for foreign commerce, as
well as a bond to ensure against fraud or misrepresentation and proof of
good moral character.246 In one short paragraph of analysis, Justice
Butler’s majority opinion merely concluded that the statute directly
burdened foreign commerce and, therefore, was unconstitutional.247
Butler’s analysis primarily rests on McCall v. California, which was
nothing more than an extension of County of Mobile v. Kimball and
Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District.248 And those cases all held that states
could not impose a requirement on the federal right to engage in
interstate commerce.249 Justice Brandeis issued a caustic dissent, joined
by Justice Holmes.250 He began by exhorting the majority’s failure to
recognize the threat animating the state’s exercise of its police power, a
threat recognized by other states as well.251 With surgical skill he
methodically undermined the majority’s assumptions, but demonstrated
less alacrity in conceptualizing how to escape the rhetoric of the past.252
On the one hand, he suggested possibly overruling McCall, while on the
other, employed the Court’s precedent to suggest how cases rest on
factual judgments about whether a particular statute obstructs, directly
burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce.253
Separately dissenting in Di Santo, joined by Justices Holmes and
Brandeis, Justice Stone suggested that the pre-existing formulations were
unnecessary terms capable of being distilled into a principled factual
Id. at 64.
See Di Santo v. Pa., 273 U.S. 34, 37 (1927) (noting that the majority did not depart or
expand precedent).
246
Id. at 35–36.
247
See id. at 37 (stating that a state statute is invalid if it interferes or burdens interstate
commerce, regardless of the intended purpose of the statute).
248
See McCall v. Cal., 136 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1890) (holding that the legislature cannot tax,
license, or condition so that interstate commerce is obstructed).
249
See supra note 228 and accompanying text (stating that Congress has the police power
to regulate interstate trade).
250
Di Santo, 273 U.S. at 37–43.
251
Id. at 37–39.
252
Id. at 37–38.
253
See id. at 39, 41 (illustrating that Brandeis rejected state measures designed to
discriminate against interstate commerce, treating them as impermissibly directly
burdening interstate commerce); see also Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1925)
(distinguished an instance where the indirect burden on interstate commerce was not
“unreasonable”).
244
245

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 [2015], Art. 9

774

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

inquiry.254 He opined that labels such as “direct” and “indirect” are “too
mechanical,” and that instead the Court should examine the array of
facts: did the program discriminate against or create an obstacle or
barrier to the free flow of commerce, considering “all the facts and
circumstances, such as the nature of the regulation, its function, the
character of the business involved and the actual effect on the flow of
commerce[?]”255 He equally argued that a court could legitimately assess
factually whether the regulation was one of a “local concern” or
infringed a “national interest in maintaining the freedom of commerce
across state lines.”256 Not coincidentally, Justice Stone’s dissent occurred
a year after he emphasized the importance of examining facts and actual
effects in the context of an intergovernmental immunity claim.257
Justice Cardozo’s struggle with New York’s milk pricing laws
similarly presented the emblematic problem.
G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.
purchased milk from Vermont sellers at prices below the allowed
minimum purchase price under New York law, and New York therefore
denied the company’s license to sell that milk into the New York
market.258 “The New York Milk Control Law was enacted in an attempt
to relieve the depressed condition of dairy farmers and to stabilize the
chaotic marketing and distribution structure.”259 Cardozo began by
observing that states could not erect barriers against commerce, joining
together constitutional provisions about imposts, duties, and
commerce.260 From there, he noted how the Commerce Clause operated
254
See Di Santo, 273 U.S. at 43–45 (taking note of Justice Stone’s dissenting opinion).
Holmes had earlier suggested that he would find discriminatory regulations for natural
resources acceptable, and that a state could regulate resources prior to entering the stream
of commerce. See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia & Ohio, 262 U.S. 553, 600–01 (1923)
(“products of a State until they are actually started to a point outside it may be regulated by
the State” (citing Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923))). In 1922, Justice
Holmes also concluded fairly simplistically that America’s past-time, major league
baseball, fell outside of commerce. See Fed. Base Ball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l
Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200. 208–09 (1922) (holding baseball is state regulated).
255
Di Santo, 273 U.S. at 44.
256
Id. at 44–45 (taking special note of key words “local concern[,]” “local character,”
“more than local in character[,]” and “peculiarly local”).
257
See Noel T. Dowling et al., Mr. Justice Stone and the Constitution, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 351,
354–58 (1936) (taking note of Justice Stone’s dissenting opinions).
258
See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 520 (1935) (holding that a license will
not be issued to a milk creamery that sells at prices lower than the established minimum
threshold).
259
Comment, Milk Regulation in New York, 46 YALE L.J. 1359, 1360 (1937) (footnote
omitted).
260
See Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 521–22 (discussing the constitution in conjunction with other
economic ramifications). A year earlier the Court examined whether New York acted
arbitrarily or discriminatorily in enacting New York’s milk price control law. Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536–37 (1934); see also Borden’s Farm Prods. Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297
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to prevent interstate competition and jealousies.261 “National solidarity”
and the idea that all U.S. citizens should “sink or swim together”
undergird his analysis.262 And here, the State’s interest was “too remote
and indirect” to justify the direct burden on interstate commerce.263 Yet,
Cardozo’s decision in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co. upheld Washington
State’s compensating use tax, which accomplished essentially the same
result as in Seelig.264 Even Cardozo’s biographer suggests that Cardozo
poorly explained the distinction between the two cases.265
Judges and scholars uniformly recognized the idiosyncratic nature of
the Court’s opinions.266 One observer, for instance, lamented that the

U.S. 251, 261 (1936) (reviewing the prices based on trade names); Mayflower Farms, Inc. v.
Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266, 274–78 (1936) (noting Justice Cardozo’s dissenting opinion
observing no distinction in this case invalidating distinction based on whether welladvertised trade names and other Ten Eyck case); Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293
U.S. 163, 172 (1934) (upholding New York order fixing minimum producer and resale
prices).
261
Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 522–23.
262
Id. at 523, 527 (illustrating that an “economic barrier” is an “unreasonable clog upon
the mobility of commerce”).
263
See id. at 524 (noting the type of interstate commerce obstruction that is not allowed).
Cardozo acknowledged the line between permissible and impermissible regulation was
one of “degree[,]” suggesting the inquiry turns on whether the object of the regulation is
normally associated with commerce and whether the effect on commerce is drastic. Id. at
525–26. He also accepted the original package doctrine as an “illustration of principle.” Id.
at 526–27.
264
Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 583–84 (1937).
265
See ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 531–32 (1998) (taking note of the fact there was
not a clear distinction drawn between the two cases). Cardozo wrote Justice Hughes
suggesting a willingness to examine both the legislative justification and necessity for
national legislation. Id. at 519–20. Kaufman suggests that Cardozo examined “whether the
impact of the activity was predominantly local or not.” Id. at 521. Frankfurter, however,
cautions that Cardozo adhered to “classic doctrines for constitutional adjudication” and
seemingly justifies Cardozo’s opinion in Seelig as an area less important to Cardozo and
decided based on prevailing precedent. Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Cardozo and Public
Law, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 88, 117–18 (1939).
266
See generally James M. Beck, Nullification by Indirection, 23 HARV. L. REV. 441, 454–55
(1910) (analyzing the impact of Supreme Court decisions); Henry Wolf. Biklé, The Silence of
Congress, 41 HARV. L. REV. 200, 220–24 (1927) (considering various Supreme Court decisions
in conjunction “with the doctrine that Congress has exclusive power to regulate commerce
among the states”); Robert Eugene Cushman, The National Police Power Under the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution, 3 MINN. L. REV. 289, 381, 452, 482–83 (1919) (discussing the scope
of the national police power); Bernard C. Gavit, Jurisdiction over Causes of Action Against
Interstate Carriers, 3 IND. L.J. 130, 130–38 (1928) (examining the jurisdiction of state courts
over interstate carriers and related causes of action); Thurlow M. Gordon, The Child Labor
Law Case, 32 HARV. L. REV. 45, 51–52 (1918) (exploring the Court’s decision in the Child
Labor Law Case); Charles W. Needham, The Exclusive Power of Congress over Interstate
Commerce, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 251, 260 (1911) (explaining when a conflict of law arises);
Clarence G. Shenton, Interstate Commerce During the Silence of Congress, 23 DICK. L. REV. 78,
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decisions reflected the Court’s judgment about the level of confusion
attendant with particular state efforts.267 Irving Brandt’s widely read
Storm over the Constitution suggested that the Court ignored the framers
by defending a plutocracy’s aversion to strong nationalism.268 The
Court’s imponderable dilemma became pronounced.
Against a
backdrop of treatises and articles on the police power generally,
attention shifted to the Commerce Clause specifically. 269 In 1928, George
Reynolds published a text on the regulation of interstate carriers,
chronicling the rise of federal authority and concomitantly chaotic
aspects of precedent.270 His analysis generally portrayed how the
Court’s decisions could not be grouped according to economic effects on
Four years later, Bernard Gavit published a
commerce.271
comprehensive analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence, observing the
“utter confusion[]” of “[t]he language of the cases” and “repeated
expressions of self-evident contradictions.”272 In 1933, Professor Corwin
attributed the Court’s difficulty to the doctrine of dual federalism.273
Then, in 1934, he published The Twilight of the Supreme Court, and two
years later The Commerce Power Versus States Rights, where he advanced
powerful arguments supporting Congress’ broad Commerce Clause
power.274 Also in 1936, Corwin explained how the direct/indirect
139, 160–64 (1918) (concluding that “considerable uncertainty prevails” regarding the
validity of state regulations affecting interstate commerce).
267
See Shenton, supra note 266, at 107, 139 (discussing state regulation of packages by
statute).
268
IRVING BRANT, STORM OVER THE CONSTITUTION 242–43 (1936); see also DREW PEARSON
& ROBERT S. ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN 17 (1936) (portraying judges as political actors,
thwarting progress).
269
E.g., ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
66 (1904); THOMAS REED POWELL, THE SUPREME COURT AND STATE POLICE POWER, 1922–
1930, at 40–41 (1932).
270
See GEORGE G. REYNOLDS, THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER TO REGULATE INTERSTATE
CARRIERS BETWEEN THE NATION AND THE STATES 117 (1928) (noting expansion of federal
control).
271
Id.
272
GAVIT, supra note 186, at 3 (1932); see also JANE PERRY CLARK, THE RISE OF A NEW
FEDERALISM: FEDERAL-STATE COOPERATION IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1938) (discussing the
lack of predictability in the interpretation of the Constitution); JOSEPH E. KALLENBACH,
FEDERAL COOPERATION WITH THE STATES UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 10 (1942)
(examining whether the framers intended to confer exclusive power on Congress); F.D.G.
RIBBLE, STATE AND NATIONAL POWER OVER COMMERCE 9–10 (1937) (discussing the
interpretation of the commerce clause); John B. Sholley, The Negative Implications of the
Commerce Clause, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 556, 559 (1936) (contrasting the exclusive and concurrent
theories in defining the sphere of state power).
273
Edward S. Corwin, Congress’s Power to Prohibit Commerce: A Crucial Constitutional
Issue, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 477, 481 (1933).
274
CORWIN, supra note 219, at xxvii; EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS
STATES RIGHTS 17–19 (1936).
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phrases served as linguistic devices, originally intended to free the states
from an otherwise restrictive view of exclusive authority in Congress,
which then were improperly transplanted into E.C. Knight and Congress’
power.275 In 1937, Dean Alfange wrote that E.C. Knight reflected the
Court’s power of legislating by unbridled interpretation of the
Constitution, and that it allowed big business to play the states against
the Federal Government, or vice versa, whenever it suited their needs.276
Further, Felix Frankfurter published his classic The Commerce Clause
Under Marshall, Taney and Waite, chronically how the early Chief Justices
addressed the issue of exclusivity.277
The early New Deal Court fueled the debate by invalidating aspects
of President Roosevelt’s program, particularly the National Industrial
Recovery Act (“NIRA”). In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
the Court invalidated (nine to zero) the fair practice and wage and hour
provisions of the Live Poultry Code established by Roosevelt.278 Chief
Justice Hughes warned that, if Congress’ commerce power extends to
such matters of domestic or local concern, then states would be at the
sufferance of Congress.279 Hughes employed direct/indirect rhetoric
and rejected sanctioning federal power when merely indirect effects
were present, and he further recounted how the law focused on local
activities—“building is as essentially local as mining, manufacturing or
growing crops[.]”280 The opinion’s rhetoric also reached back to Chief
Justice Marshall’s opinion in Brown, suggesting that the chickens had
come to rest in New York and ceased to be in interstate commerce—and
conversely were subject to regulation by the state.281 But the holding
seemed predictable. After all, the able jurist Judge Learned Hand
thought it unconstitutional and Felix Frankfurter feared having this test
case go to the Court.282 Justice Brandeis afterward exhorted his friends
275
E. S Corwin, The Schechter Case—Landmark, or What?, 13 N.Y.U. L.Q. Rev. 151, 161–62
(1936).
276
DEAN ALFANGE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NATIONAL WILL 147, 149 (1937).
277
FRANKFURTER, supra note 97, at 1, 7.
278
295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (invalidating the fair, wage, and hour provisions of the Live
Poultry Code).
279
Id. at 544.
280
Id. at 547. Concurring, Justice Cardozo (joined by Stone) could not sanction
congressional regulation of wages and hours for intrastate transactions, employing
language from Judge Hand’s lower court opinion. Id. at 554 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
Finding directness here he feared would render the test conceptually unbounded. Id.
281
See FISS, supra note 100, at 267 (stating Chief Justice Marshall’s dictum of DCC in
Brown v. Maryland).
282
See SCHLESINGER, supra note 205, at 278 (stating the Court removed a federal
prohibitory tax when it explored the purpose behind the tax and concluded that only
revenue infused purposes would suffice); Cushman, supra note 228, at 132 (noting
reluctance about the case); see also Ralph F. Fuchs, A Postscript—The Schechter Case, 20 ST.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 [2015], Art. 9

778

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

on how the President had gone too far in attempting to centralize
virtually everything.283
A perturbed FDR responded with his famous horse and buggy press
conference.284 He suggested that the interstate commerce discussion
brought the country back to the E.C. Knight days, ignoring how the
country had evolved from “the horse-and-buggy age when that clause
was written” and when “[t]here [was not] much interstate commerce at
all—probably [eighty or ninety percent] of the human beings in the
thirteen original States were completely self-supporting within their own
communities.”285 Since that time, he continued, the country and
commerce changed radically; it had become “inter-dependent” with
goods and products from the states tied together, necessitating the need
for congressional authority over matters indirectly affecting
commerce.286
The ensuing clamor urging that the Court revisit its approach to the
Commerce Clause could not be divorced from ostensible reciprocal
limitations under the DCC. After all, the rhetoric for one necessarily
influenced the other.
And for activities untethered to interstate
commerce directly, the dilemma became accentuated when, in 1936, the
Court also held that liberty of contract prevented New York from
prescribing minimum wages for women working in New York

LOUIS L. REV. 297, 299, 301–03 (1935) (noting that Schechter was a difficult case to argue, and
that the government’s brief, along the lines of a Brandies brief, tried to present economic
facts). New Deal advocate Robert Jackson admitted how the N.I.R.A. was a bold
experiment, with the Recovery Administration perhaps too unfocused and “[t]he
[Schechter] case was far from ideal as a test case.” ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS 113 (1949).
283
JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT 136–37
(2010); see SHALES, supra note 200, at 243 (stating President Herbert Hoover rejected laissez
faire doctrine when promoting regulation as mechanism for ensuring equal opportunity).
Earlier, progressive journalist Walter Lippmann expressed a similar sentiment. See
KENNEDY, supra note 200, at 186 (discussing the need for government guidance in modern
industrialism). In his 1937 congressional testimony, Professor Corwin later testified that he
too had problems with the Act, not necessarily its constitutionality. 2 CORWIN ON THE
CONSTITUTION: THE JUDICIARY 257–58 (Richard Loss ed., 1987). Later, in Carter v. Carter
Coal, the Court rebuffed the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, expressing the truism that
the national legislative and state police powers could not invade the others’ turf. 298 U.S.
238, 323 (1936).
284
See KENNEDY, supra note 200, at 328 (quoting Roosevelt’s speech).
285
4 FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT: THE COURT DISAPPROVES 209 (1938) (citing Franklin D. Roosevelt, Horse &
Buggy Speech); see also SHESOL, supra note 283, at 147–50 (discussing Justice Brandeis’
opinion that the President had gone too far in attempting to centralize everything).
286
SHESOL, supra note 283, at 149–50.
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laundries.287 Justice Stone wrote his sister that “[s]ince the Court last
week said that this could not be done by the national government, as the
matter was local, and now it is said that it cannot be done by local
governments even though it is local, we seem to have tied Uncle Sam up
in a hard knot.”288 An open dialogue about the DCC then surfaced
among the Justices.
Whether or not one considers 1937 a watershed constitutional
moment, it serves as a convenient loci for exploring how the DCC began
its final journey to its modern pedestal.289 It was 1937 when the Court
purportedly abandoned a dual federalism paradigm that distinguished
between local intrastate and national interstate activities, by affirming
Congress’ power to address local intrastate activities with a “close and
substantial relation” to commerce.290 Commensurately, a year later the
287
Morehead v. N.Y. ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 610–11 (1936). The Court principally
relied on Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). Id. at 604. Dissenting, Chief
Justice Hughes emphasized the legislative findings and the considerable factual material
presented to the Court justifying the measure. Id. at 625–27 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
Also dissenting, Justice Stone added that “[i]t is difficult to imagine any grounds, other
than our own personal economic predilections,” for objecting to such a legislative effort. Id.
at 633 (Stone, J., dissenting). Tipaldo, of course, became fleeting. See West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379, 401 (1937) (relying on Adkins, the court “fled” away from the Tipaldo
opinion).
288
See Kennedy, supra note 200, at 329 (quoting Stone’s private letter).
289
See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 213, 236 (1995) (examining what the author calls
“The Constitutional Revolution of 1937”); PAUL L. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS
TIMES: 1918–1969, at 98–99, 127 (1972) (evaluating the changes in the Supreme Court
between 1929 and 1937); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 40 (1993)
(discussing “The Revolution of 1937”); WHITE, supra note 44, at 6 (2000) (evaluating The
New Deal); Cushman, supra note 43, at 208–25 (stating that the justices struggled with
jurisprudential continuity); see also Cushman, supra note 228, at 105 (discussing the effects
of the New Deal); Barry Cushman, Lost Fidelities, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 95–96, 99–100
(1999) (reviewing Justice Roberts’ opinions to explore constitutional change); Richard D.
Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments:
The Hughes Court and
Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891, 1893–1894 (1994) (analyzing “the socalled ‘switch in time’ of 1937[]” (footnote omitted)); David A. Pepper, Against Legalism:
Rebutting an Anachronistic Account of 1937, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 63, 127–28 (1998) (supporting
the argument for a constitutional revolution). Of course, William Leuchtenburg notes that
Justice Roberts’ votes in the minimum wage cases, first in Tipaldo and later in West Coast
Parish, were not a product of the pending FDR court packing plan. LEUCHTENBURG, supra
at 289. Indeed, Justice Frankfurter later reported that Roberts would have voted differently
in Tipaldo and overruled Adkins had a majority of justices so agreed. Felix Frankfurter, Mr.
Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 313–14 (1955). For a recent account of the infamous
FDR court packing plan, see Barry Cushman, The Court-Packing Plan as Symptom, Casualty,
and Cause of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2089, 2103 104 (2013).
290
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937) (upholding National Labor
Relations Act). The Court abandoned the need to employ a “stream of commerce” theory,
instead concluding that Congress exercises plenary power to protect interstate commerce.
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Court held that states could regulate—albeit within limits—local
activities that directly affect interstate commerce. In South Carolina State
Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers Inc., the Court, through Justice
Stone, reviewed an injunction restraining South Carolina’s limit on the
weight and width of motor vehicles permitted on its highways.291 The
plaintiffs claimed the measure violated the Fourteenth Amendment, was
superseded by the 1935 Federal Motor Carriers Act, was arbitrary and
unreasonable in light of the federal aid supporting the highway system,
and impermissibly directly and substantially burdened interstate
commerce.292 The Court already had held that absent discrimination or
federal legislation, states could prescribe uniform regulations to promote
safety on interstate highway systems.293
Justice Stone responded by emphasizing that states enjoy
considerable leeway in regulating matters of “local concern” even
though a regulation may affect interstate commerce.294 His opinion
initially intimated that the boundary for impermissible state regulation
would be breached when a measure discriminates against interstate
commerce.295 The reason, he suggested, was a political process one: if a
state favored in-state over out-of-state economic interests, the “political
restraints” that normally surround regulation would not be present.296

Id. at 37. “Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if
they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is
essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress
cannot be denied the power . . . .” Id. The “close and substantial relation” test surfaced
earlier in the interstate carrier cases. See, e.g. Houston, E. & W. Tex. R.R. Co. v. United
States, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914) (reasoning that Congress’ authority to regulate interstate
carriers “necessarily embraces the right to control their operations in all matters having
such a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic[]”). See generally Cushman, supra
note 228, at 143–50 (describing the litigation in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel).
291
303 U.S. 177, 178 (1938). South Carolina had regulated traffic on its highways starting
in the 1920s, and only two years earlier the Court had denied certiorari in a similar
challenge to the South Carolina law. South Carolina v. John P. Nutt Co., 185 S.E. 25 (1935),
cert. denied, 297 U.S. 724, 724 (1936).
292
Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 181.
293
Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 135, 143 (1927).
294
Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 184–85; see also id. at 187 (“a state can . . . materially affect[]”
interstate commerce); id. at 189 (“But so long as the state action does not discriminate, the
burden is one which the Constitution permits . . . .”).
295
Id. at 185 n.2. Elsewhere he further emphasized that “[t]he commerce clause by its
own force, prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce, whatever its form or
method[.]” Id. at 185; see also id. at 187 (equal treatment “a safeguard against [] abuse”); id.
at 189 (“It may not, under the guise of regulation, discriminate against interstate
commerce.”).
296
Id. at 185 n.2.
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He reiterated this point two years later in a DCC tax case.297 Echoing the
sentiments of Justices Black, Frankfurter and Douglas, he noted that
Congress could legislate when that body believes the burdens on
commerce are too great—a judgment that necessarily “is a legislative, not
a judicial, function[.]”298 Indeed, his opinion is almost annoyingly
riddled with refrains that certain determinations are legislative, not
judicial. And strikingly absent from the opinion, however, is any
suggestion that the Court should examine the nature or extent of any
burden on interstate commerce.299
Yet Stone’s attempt to weave a hundred years of cases into a
coherent pattern, premised upon perceived long-standing doctrines,
elicited throughout his opinion seemingly idiosyncratic language.300
Stone variously asserted that states may “materially interfere with
interstate commerce[]” when addressing local interests, but equally
intimated that they must act within their “province” and that “the means
of regulation chosen are reasonably adapted to the end sought[,]” that
the Commerce Clause operated to prevent nominally “local” regulation
from securing “local benefit[s] by throwing the attendant burdens on
those without the state[,]” as “preclud[ing] the subordination of the
efficiency and convenience of interstate traffic to local service
requirements”—when, for instance, restrictions might be “unnecessarily
harsh.”301 And he undoubtedly conflated his approach toward the
Fourteenth Amendment and the DCC when he believed that a Court
could examine whether a measure (the end) was truly local and if the
means were sufficiently tailored to achieving the local objective.302 While

297
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 45 n.2 (1940) (“[T]o the
extent that the burden falls on economic interests without the state, it is not likely to be
alleviated by those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it
affects adversely interests within the state.”).
298
Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 190; see also id. (“[C]ourts do not sit as Legislatures, either
state or national.”). “[F]airly debatable questions . . . are not for the determination of
courts[.]” Id. at 191. “[C]ourts are not any the more entitled, because interstate commerce
is affected, to substitute their own for the legislative judgment.” Id.
299
HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, & FUNDAMENTAL LAW 118 (1961) (extolling
Stones’ approach and yet downplaying Barnwell’s emphasis). Even so, Barnwell curiously is
inserted in some textbooks under the heading for modern balancing. KATHLEEN M.
SULLIVAN, GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 222 (17th ed. 2010).
300
Cushman, supra note 228, at 148 (observing how Chief Justice Hughes engaged in a
similar effort in Jones & Laughlin Steel, while trying to preserve some semblance of dual
federalism).
301
Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 186 n. 4 & 186–90 (footnote omitted).
302
Id. at 187. In Buck v. Kuykendall, Justice Brandeis indicated that state highway
measures that “indirect[ly] burden” interstate commerce must be reasonable. 267 U.S. 307,
315 (1925). He invoked Michigan Public Utilities Comm’n v. Duke, where the conservative
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he sought to rest the DCC on discrimination, he nevertheless joined the
Commerce Clause inquiry with his response to the Fourteenth
Amendment challenge when examining whether the means the state
choose were “without [a] rational basis.”303 As every student of
constitutional history learns, this is precisely Stone’s contribution to
equal protection jurisprudence in his famous footnote four of United
States v. Carolene Products Co.304
IV. PROFESSOR THOMAS R. POWELL, COOLEY, AND SOUTHERN PACIFIC
But seven years after Barnwell, when Justice Stone yet again battled
DCC jurisprudence, he—whether deliberately or not—swerved the law
slightly backward.305 By this time, the Court enjoyed a markedly
different composition: Hugo L. Black (1937), Stanley F. Reed (1938), Felix
Frankfurter (1939), William O. Douglas (1939), Frank Murphy (1940),
Justice Butler had indicated that state measures must be necessary, uniform and
reasonable. 266 U.S. 570, 576–77 (1925).
303
Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 192. Supporting review, Justice Stone cited an equal
protection case. Id. (citing Borden’s Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 251 (1936))
(involving an equal protection challenge to New York’s law on the sale of milk and
distinguishing between those with well-advertised trade names and those without). And
while it appears that his inquiry into the merits relates to the Fourteenth Amendment
claim, he did not clearly separate the analysis. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 190–96. Samuel
Konefsky’s biography of Stone illustrates Barnwell’s ambiguity, with Konefsky initially
suggesting that Stone focused on whether the state measure discriminates against interstate
commerce, and yet later suggesting that the test is whether it discriminates or “actually
impede[s] the mobility of such commerce.” SAMUEL J. KONEFSKY, CHIEF JUSTICE STONE AND
THE SUPREME COURT 62, 65 (1946); see Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power,
27 VA. L. REV. 1, 11–14 (1940) (reviewing Stone’s attitude toward multiple burdens in tax
cases, and observing how Stone’s disagreement with some of his colleagues centered on
whether discrimination in “effect” as well as “purpose” violated the DCC, with some
justices opposing its expansion to “effects”). Of course, exploring “purpose” mirrored the
substantive due process inquiry of conservative Justices. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502, 539, 556 (1934) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (“we must inquire concerning its purpose
and decide whether the means proposed have reasonable relation to something within
legislative power”).
304
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The Chief Justice believed that the Court could examine
legislative judgments to ensure protection for minority groups denied sufficient access to
the democratic process. Id.; see also Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 601 (1940)
(Stone, C.J., dissenting) (expressing support for the freedoms guaranteed to all under the
Fourteenth Amendment); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing,
96 YALE L.J. 943, 948–52, 966 (1987) (chronicling the rise of balancing, including in DCC
context and noting relationship to due process analysis). See generally Barry Cushman,
Carolene Products and Constitutional Structure, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 54 (analyzing the role of
due process in Commerce Clause analysis).
305
S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 783–84 (1945); see infra note 348 and accompanying
text (stating that Stone endorsed an approach by Columbia Law Professor Noel T. Dowling
and Harvard Law Professor Thomas Reed Powell in favor of the railroad industry).
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Robert H. Jackson (1941), Wiley B. Rutledge (1943), and shortly thereafter
Harold H. Burton (1945), Frederick M. Vinson (1946), Tom C. Clark
(1949), and Sherman Minton (1949).306 The historic mechanical tests as
applied to Congress’ Commerce Clause power had been abandoned in
favor of a more expansive test in Wickard v. Filburn, and in the
intergovernmental immunity context, the Court had eroded the notion of
jurisdictional spheres endemic to dual federalism.307 The chasm left by
the progressive attack on the Court’s earlier legal consciousness could
not be more pronounced than in the DCC arena. Once it became no
longer tenable to distinguish between commerce and not commerce—the
former funnel for channeling activities toward the federal or state
spheres under an exclusivity paradigm, the Court lost its theory and
accompanying test for classifying permissible and impermissible state
and local regulation. In other words, it threatened to lose its engagement
and relationship with the past. Post-World War II, however, demanded
some theory.308 Hence, pernicious consequences seemed inevitable if the
MELVIN I. UROFSKY, DIVISION AND DISCORD: THE SUPREME COURT UNDER STONE AND
VINSON, 1941–1953, at 15–30 (1997).
307
317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding that Congress could regulate local matters
substantially affecting interstate commerce); see United States v. Rock Royal Co-Op, 307
U.S. 533, 568 (1939) (“inextricably intermingled with and directly affects” product moving
in interstate market). “The authority of the Federal government over interstate commerce
does not differ in extent or character from that retained by the states over intrastate
commerce.” Id. at 569–70; see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941) (“so
commingled with or related”); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942)
(intrastate activities that “so affect interstate commerce, or the exertion of the power” is
necessary to achieve legitimate end; “in a substantial way interfere with or obstruct”
Congress’ power; intrastate and interstate “inextricably commingled”); Edward S. Corwin,
The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1950) (discussing the shift from a focus
on constitutional rights to constitutional powers). See generally Thomas R. Powell, The
Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARV. L. REV. 633, 633–34 (1945)
(considering the state of intergovernmental tax immunity before and after the October 1937
term of the Supreme Court); Thomas R. Powell, The Remnant of Intergovernmental Tax
Immunities, 58 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757–58 (1945) (examining intergovernmental tax
immunities after 1937).
308
See generally DUXBURY, supra note 205, at 200–99 (analyzing the prevailing theories
post World War II); STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM
PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 188–98 (2000) (examining
the consequences of the postmodern period); PURCELL, supra note 203, at 95 (suggesting that
new movements in law challenged “central assumptions of traditional theory”); WILLIAM
M. WIECEK, 12 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN
CONSTITUTION, THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1941–1953, at 440–63 (2005)
(evaluating American jurisprudence after the war); G. Edward White, The Evolution of
Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 280–82
(1973) (discussing the elements of Realism); G. Edward White, From Sociological
Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America,
58 VA. L. REV. 999, 999–1000 (1972) (considering the struggle between Sociological
Jurisprudes and Realists).
306

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 [2015], Art. 9

784

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

Court were to fall back on a pure concurrent theory—leaving state and
local regulation unrestrained would prompt federal legislation and
potentially greater centralization; it optically would untether the past
without judicial rhetoric sufficient to provide reasoned justification; it
would leave unchecked too many activities warranting scrutiny, ranging
from taxing airplanes to racial discrimination on common carriers.309
The only alternative would be for the Court to breath greater life into the
privileges and immunities clause.310
Reluctant to untether the Court’s rope to its past, the Justices began
exploring how to employ rhetoric tying its past to present proclivities.311
In 1941, Robert Jackson unabashedly wrote that “liberal-minded
lawyers” needed to participate in the evolutionary process of
interpreting the Constitution and responding to society’s challenges.312
However, how the Court would accomplish this became muddled under
a progressive paradigm that promoted nationalism, legislative
democracy, and facts over legal fictions. Several of the Justices
309
See Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 304 (1944) (observing that local
taxes aggregated might balkanize and retard air travel, and that while older legal
philosophy might have supported a state’s right to tax, this is “one of those cases where
legal philosophy has to take account of the fact that the world does move.” (Jackson, J.,
concurring)). Justice Black too concurred in Justice Frankfurter’s majority opinion,
suggesting the need for congressional action. Id. at 301–02 (Black, J., concurring). Chief
Justice Stone dissented, believing Minnesota’s tax imposed an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce, in light of the threatened multiple tax burdens facing the airline
industry. Id. at 308 (Stone, C.J., dissenting). But Stone’s penchant for merging the Due
Process and Commerce Clauses surfaced again, with the Justice observing “it has met the
problem of burdensome multiple taxation by the several states through which such
vehicles pass by recognizing that the due process clause or the commerce clause or both
preclude each state from imposing on the interstate commerce involved an undue or
inequitable share of the tax burden.” Id. at 313–14; see Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 386
(1946) (invalidating a Virginia statute that allowed segregation of passengers of public
motor carriers). See generally Thomas R. Powell, Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota: State
Taxation of Airplanes—Herein Also of Ships and Sealing Wax and Railroad Cars, 57 HARV. L.
REV. 1097, 1097 (1944) (explaining that the problem in taxing airplanes and ships arises
because they do not remain in a single state).
310
See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 90–93 (1940) (explaining discriminatory ad
valorem tax punishing out-of-state deposits is not a privilege of national citizenship,
rejecting a privileges and immunities claim), overruling Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404
(1935). Dissenting in Colgate, Justice Stone would have upheld a discriminatory tax,
reasoning that the Court would need to find a “clear indication that the purpose or effect is
a hostile or oppressive discrimination against particular persons or classes.” Colgate, 296
U.S. at 437 (Stone, J., dissenting).
311
See UROFSKY, supra note 306, at 40–42 (emphasizing the justices’ different approaches).
312
JACKSON, supra note 282, at xiv. Justice Jackson later objected to a perceived
extraterritorial operation of a state tax. General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n of Iowa,
322 U.S. 335, 339–40 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). “I can think of nothing in or out of the
Constitution which warrants this effort to reach beyond the State’s own border[.]” Id. at
340.
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individually explored different paths for achieving this result—albeit
wary of precedent. For instance, in Milk Control Board of Pennsylvania v.
Eisenberg Farm Products, Justice Roberts, who later expressed uneasiness
with his colleagues’ penchant for abandoning precedent, recognized that
states could indirectly affect interstate commerce when controlling local
conditions, and suggested that knowing when a measure is a legitimate
effort to control local conditions is necessary as a consequence of “our
dual form of government[]” and arises due to the “application in
connection with the myriad variations in the methods and incidents of
commercial intercourse.”313 He endorsed balancing by suggesting that
the Court’s function would be to “weigh[] the nature of the respondent’s
activities, and the propriety of local regulation of them, as disclosed by
the record.”314 But Roberts’ perfunctory nod toward balancing would
linger, while the Justices for the next decade plodded along until they
could coalesce around an accepted rhetoric and theory.
Barnwell’s almost exclusive focus on discrimination, averting post-hoc
inquiries, appeared destined for consensus.315 Although diverging on
policy, both Justices Douglas and Frankfurter appeared comfortable with
Frankfurter suggested that, in the
a discrimination-laden test.316
economic sphere where both the federal government and the states “may
move,” the line between exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction “depends
ultimately upon the philosophy of the Justices regarding our
federalism.”317 But he equally wrote about the Commerce Clause

313
306 U.S. 346, 352 (1939); see Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co., 321 U.S. 96, 113
(1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the majority disregards precedent).
314
Id. Commenting later, Roberts observed that the Court asked whether the state
measure interfered with interstate commerce, by either taxing directly interstate commerce,
obstructing commerce, or imposing burdensome regulations on interstate business. See
OWEN J. ROBERTS, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
LECTURES 39 (1951) (discussing the considerations of interstate commerce cases).
315
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 44–45 & n.2 (1940)
(rejecting “mechanical or artificial distinctions” and instead seemingly appearing to focus
on whether the tax operated to disadvantage or prohibit—that is, discriminate—against
interstate commerce). Cf. Clark v. Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 595 (1939) (accepting state
justification for treating in-state and interstate transportation of cars differently). For the
intricacies of the Berwind case, see Thomas R. Powell, Note, Sales and Use Taxes: Collection
from Absentee Vendors, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1092 (1944).
316
See Int’l Harvester Co. v. Dep’t of Treas. of Ind., 322 U.S. 340, 345–49 (1944)
(examining whether the state tax discriminated against interstate commerce); General
Trading Co. v. Tax Comm’n of Iowa, 322 U.S. 335, 338 (1944) (“obviously hostile or
practically discriminatory toward interstate commerce”); see also Hale v. Bimco Trading,
Inc. 306 U.S. 375, 379–81 (1939) (invalidating Florida’s unjustified discriminatory treatment
of out-of-state cement).
317
Frankfurter, supra note 214, at 68. Endorsing his perceived understanding of Justice
Brandeis, he wrote:
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protecting free trade among the states and the inability of states to tax
transactions outside their domain.318 Others too focused principally on
discrimination.319 Conversely, Justice Black generally believed that
“[t]he control of future conduct, the prevention of future injuries and the
formulation of regulatory rules in the fields of commerce and taxation,
all present legislative problems.”320 Jackson initially sided with Justices
Frankfurter, Black, and Douglas in suggesting that the Court should
avoid examining whether a state’s regulation interfered with some post
hoc judicially perceived need for national uniformity—albeit later
endorsing the Court’s role of averting economic balkanization.321
Yet the progressive nationalist tendency and accompanying need for
uniformity in some areas garnered considerable support.
Early
progressives touted the need to distinguish between local matters and
those demanding uniformity.322 The prominent Commerce Clause
treatise in the late nineteenth century described as a well settled rule the
formulae from Cooley distinguishing between “matters admitting

“[Justice Brandeis] is keenly mindful that the Nation spans a continent
and that, despite the unifying forces of technology, the States for many
purposes remain distinctive communities. As to matters not obviously
of common national concern, thereby calling for a centralized system
of control, the States have a localized knowledge of details, a
concreteness of interest and varieties of social policy, which ought to
be allowed tolerant scope.”
Id. at 68; see also Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N.Y. State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 777, 780
(1947) (Frankfurter, J.) (“Since Congress can, if it chooses, entirely displace the States to the
full extent of the far-reaching Commerce Clause, Congress needs no help from generous
judicial implications to achieve the supersession of State authority.”). Frankfurter
described as “statecraft” the role of judges in accommodating changing conditions to “past
utterances” when employing the Commerce Clause. FRANKFURTER, supra note 97, at 21–22.
318
See McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330–31 (1944) (providing the background
and purpose of the Commerce Clause). Justice Frankfurter seemingly accepted the Court’s
precedent, invoking cases such as Hall v. De Cuir to invalidate a state statute, and yet
favored Congressional exercise of authority when necessary to achieve national uniformity.
Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 388 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
319
See Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 457 (1940) (Justice Reed) (focusing on
discrimination due to the challenged statute).
“The commerce clause forbids
discrimination, whether forthright or ingenious.” Id. at 455.
320
J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 328 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting). In
Morgan, Justice Black again expressed dissatisfaction with the Court’s willingness to assess
whether a regulation unduly burdened interstate commerce. 328 U.S. 373, 386–87 (1946)
(Black, J. concurring).
321
See JACKSON, supra note 282, at 290 (providing an excerpt from a dissent by Black,
Frankfurter, and Douglas). Justice Jackson, however, did not easily abandon old dogma.
See UROFSKY, supra note 306, at 118–19, 124–25 (analyzing Justice Jackson’s position on
interstate commerce and state regulation).
322
PRENTICE & EGAN, supra note 125, at 27–28.
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uniform regulation” and those of a “local nature.”323 Subsequent
academic scholarship would coalesce around and build off Cooley.324
Notions of national uniformity and discrimination permeated the
Court’s continuing dialogue with itself in several facets of its effort to
respond to an ever-changing society.325 Even the negative reactions to
Justice Brandeis’ Erie opinion focused on promoting centralization and
uniformity.326
Of course, Cooley’s recrudescence in the post-New Deal era shrouded
and, consequently, perpetuated the inherent aspect of dual federalism
and exclusivity. Reynolds’ 1928 treatise amply synthesized the Court’s
precedent, observing how Cooley chartered a middle ground between
Justice Taney’s concurrent jurisdiction approach in the License Cases and
Justice Marshall’s ostensible federal exclusivity, with the Court
examining the subject rather than the power being exercised.327 This
merged with the progressive penchant for empirical facts and the realist
acceptance of the role of the judiciary. Reynolds acknowledged that the
task of exploring economic facts associated with the need for national
uniformity naturally involved a legislative type function, but saw no
alternative to having the Court inquire into such economic facts until
displaced by Congress.328 This is where Reynolds, perhaps laying the
foundation, explained how the Court must naturally engage in
balancing:
But regardless of the formulae used, the Court
frequently reaches its decision by a process of balancing

Id.
See, e.g., Biklé, supra note 266, at 202 (stating that subsequent cases have affirmed
Cooley v. Board of Wardens). In 1928, George Reynolds suggested that, if Congress had not
expressly or impliedly through specific legislation preempted state laws, the role of a court
would be to examine whether it (a) regulates interstate commerce; (b) whether it regulates
a matter requiring “a single uniform rule or plan of regulation,” and if not, and only then
(c) whether it “burden[s] interstate commerce?” REYNOLDS, supra note 270, at 365.
325
See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75 (1938) (examining the relationship
between discrimination and the challenged interstate commerce regulation); see also
PURCELL, supra note 208, at 156–57 (discussing Brandeis’s criticism of diversity jurisdiction).
326
See PURCELL, supra note 208, at 212–21 (focusing on centralization and uniformity); see
also Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power—Revised Version, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 547, 559 (1947) (invoking Erie and a national common law equivalent to support
Congress’s exclusive authority to regulate matters requiring uniformity). In New State Ice,
Brandeis extolled the virtues of diversity and state experimentation. New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310–11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
327
See REYNOLDS, supra note 270, at 84–85 (comparing the different decisions and eras of
the Court).
328
See id. at 88, 410–11 (emphasizing the Court’s role in relation to Congressional
deference).
323
324
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the local need for state action against the interference
with interstate commerce resulting therefrom, a process
which cannot be performed intelligently without an
accurate and detailed knowledge of economic facts.329
And when the subject matter required uniformity, Reynolds indicated
that it fell within Congress’ exclusive domain.330 Yet Barnard Gavit’s
treatment of the Commerce Clause warned that Cooley’s doctrine “is
unnecessary and results only in confusion,” possibly contributing to
“incongruous result[s]” by establishing a “hybrid jurisdictional line[]”—
that is, resurrecting the politically palatable yet intellectually
unsatisfying selective exclusiveness theory.331
The struggle over how to modernize a Cooley-infused paradigm
elicited different responses. The competing approaches surfaced in
McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, where, for example, Arkansas
imposed a tax on vehicles entering the state carrying more than twenty
gallons of gas in the tank or in an auxiliary tank, to offset the costs of
ostensibly maintaining the state highways.332 The lower court had held
that “[in]controvert[ably]” the tax directly burdened interstate
commerce, and could only be sustained if the state affirmatively
established a reasonable relationship between the tax and its purported
purpose.333 McReynolds’ perfunctory majority opinion merely indicated
that states could not directly burden interstate commerce—precedent
simply dictated the outcome.334
Justice Stone, however, was less sanguine about precedent and
simple tests. Writing a concurrence for himself and the Chief Justice, as
well as Justices Roberts and Reed, he emphasized how the Court, when
reviewing questionable state measures, must be satisfied that the state
329
Id. at 366, 411. Others advocated a similar solution. Sholley, supra note 272, at 592–94.
As of 1936, Sholley observed how the Court had yet to resolve the concurrent/exclusive
jurisdiction question. Id. at 559.
330
See REYNOLDS, supra note 270, at 91, 291, 408–09, 413 (expounding on Congress’ role to
promote uniformity); see also id. at 373 (noting but not emphasizing discrimination).
331
GAVIT, supra note 186, at 19–20.
332
309 U.S. 176, 177 (1940).
333
Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. McCarroll, 101 F.2d 572, 574 (8th Cir. 1939).
334
In Interstate Transit v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183 (1931), the Court concluded that, while
states could not directly tax the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, they could
impose a charge upon interstate traffic commensurate with the costs of maintaining or
using the state highway. Id. at 186. A tax would “be sustained unless the taxpayer shows
that it bears no reasonable relation to the privilege of using the highways or is
discriminatory.” Id. Earlier cases suggested that, absent directly interfering or burdening
interstate commerce, the regulation would have to be shown to be discriminatory. See
Interstate Busses Corp. v. Holyoke St. Ry. Co., 273 U.S. 45, 50–51 (1927) (discussing use of
precedent for interstate commerce cases).
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measure (means) bears a sufficiently observable relationship to the ends
(offset impacts to the highway).335 And if it does not, Stone suggested
that it would be considered as discriminatory and invalidated. Implicit
in Justice Stone’s opinion is the assumption that the Court could examine
the degree of interference with commerce to assess if the measure
exceeded some un-predetermined line.336 Yet equally implicit is the
converse: the lack of any suggestion that cases could be decided by ex
ante spheres of jurisdiction.
This was problematic for Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas.
They appreciated the difficulties attendant with apportioning financial
responsibility for constructing and maintaining the modern interstate
highway system, “involv[ing] incalculable variants and . . . beset with
perplexities.”337 To these three Justices, however, that task belonged to
legislatures, not courts. The role of the judiciary, they believed, was
limited to examining whether Congress has preempted the field or the
state measure discriminates against interstate commerce.338 While
recognizing that uniformity and thus federal legislation would be
preferable, they resisted the temptation to perform essentially a
legislative function.339
Justice Stone’s moderating approach nevertheless appears trapped
between two worlds—the realization of a fading nineteenth century
paradigm and the impulse to maintain continuity with opinions grafted
335
McCarroll, 309 U.S. at 181 (“some fair relationship[,]” “apparent relationship[,]” “the
relationship”); id at 182 (“relieve the state from the constitutional prohibition against the
taxation of property moving in interstate commerce”). In another tax (gross receipts) case,
Stone accepted taxes for activities involved in interstate commerce, unless the state
“discriminates against interstate commerce or undertakes to lay a privilege tax measured
by gross receipts derived from activities in such commerce which extend beyond the
territorial limits of the taxing state.” Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434,
438–39 (1939).
336
In Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, for example, Stone wrote that “[t]he incidence of the
particular state enactment must determine whether it has transgressed the power left to the
States . . . although it is related to a phase of a more extensive commercial process.” 322
U.S. 202, 210 (1944)
337
McCarroll, 309 U.S. at 184.
338
Id. at 184–85.
339
Id. at 188–89 (“We would, therefore, leave the questions raised by the Arkansas tax for
consideration of Congress in a nation-wide survey of the constantly increasing barriers to
trade among the States.”). Justice Black elsewhere dissented from a Justice Stone opinion,
warning that the Court was engaged in too much conjecture about discrimination, and that
“if national regulation to prevent ‘multiple taxation’ is within the constitutional power of
this Court, it would seem to be time enough to consider it when appellant or some other
taxpayer is actually subjected to ‘multiple taxation.’” Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford,
305 U.S. 434, 445 (1939) (Black, J., dissenting). Black further repeated his plea that absent
state discrimination, Congress, not the courts, should establish when and how commerce
should be free. Id. at 455.
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from that paradigm. Stone recognized the inherent flaws with dual
federalism, and in taxing cases permitted the states sufficient leeway if
the tax was apportioned to the local aspects of the interstate activity.340
He rejected ill-suited “mechanical” tests and remained wedded toward
the progressives’ reliance on facts and equally gravitated toward
exclusive national authority when necessary to preserve a perceived
need for uniformity.341 The Commerce Clause, he accepted, served as a
“nationally unifying force.”342 And while he began invoking Cooley and
Willson Bridge to justify distinguishing between local matters and
subjects warranting uniformity, that distinction alone would not suffice
without the Court first acknowledging and then incorporating the need
for examining facts.343 This occurred when the Court accepted balancing
as both a current flowing through past cases, allowing continued vitality
to precedent, and as means to justify state regulation except in areas the
Court concluded required uniformity.
In Southern Pacific, Justice Stone ultimately endorsed an approach
advanced by Columbia Law Professor Noel T. Dowling and Harvard
Law Professor Thomas Reed Powell, the latter appearing on behalf of the
railroad industry.344 Dowling, whom Chief Justice Stone corresponded
with and would cite in Southern Pacific, appreciated the urgency of
abandoning formulaic tests and theories of marginal utility, and yet in
praising Justice Stone he remained captured by the past.345 He reviewed
how the Justices debated the Court’s ability to invalidate state measures
other than those involving purposeful discrimination, with Stone
favoring the Court’s “role as mediator between state and nation.”346
Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas thought otherwise.347 Dowling
rejected Justice Black’s approach, but in doing so exhibited little
340
Gwin, 305 U.S. at 441; see also Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Beeler, 315 U.S. 649, 651
(1942) (permitting deference to states for taxes apportioned to local aspects of the interstate
activity).
341
See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 360 (1943) (discussing the test to determine when
interstate commerce begins and ends).
342
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943).
343
Parker, 317 U.S. at 360–62. States, he accepted, could employ legitimate, nondiscriminatory means to achieve local objectives (matters peculiarly local and not likely to
be addressed by Congress), and when those means affected interstate commerce the Court
could accommodate the competing national and local interests by examining relevant
factors—effectively balancing. Id. at 362–63, 367.
344
See generally Brief for the Association of American Railroads as Amicus Curiae,
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (No. 56) (listing Professor Powell on the
brief).
345
Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can it be Revived?, 51 DUKE L.J. 1513, 1534
n.76, 1536 n.86 (2002) (referencing the Stone Papers).
346
Dowling, supra note 303, at 16–17.
347
Id. at 16.
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tolerance for appreciating the Court’s evolving dialogue about the DCC
and effectively relegated the importance of discrimination.348 Dowling
advocated that, absent “affirmative consent a Congressional negative
will be presumed in the courts against state action which in its effect
upon interstate commerce constitutes an unreasonable interference with
national interests[]”—a presumption capable of being rebutted by
affirmative Congressional action.349
Dowling’s analysis not only elevated Cooley, but it equally
countenanced undoubtedly classic dual federalism decisions.350 Indeed,
he noted elsewhere that only a constitutional amendment would permit
states to regulate matters otherwise prohibited by the DCC, denying
Congress the ability to sanction state action.351 And he expressly
endorsed the Court’s ability to assess the “reasonableness” of a measure,
and balance as a policy matter the national and local interests.352 “[T]he
judicial sifting of the facts would have the manifest merit of sharpening
the issues and facilitating legislative efforts in the event that Congress,
dissatisfied with the judicial results, should desire to take corrective
action of its own.”353 He capped his plea with a Justice Stone quote that

See Dowling, supra note 326, at 547 n.1 (reveling in his and Justice Stone’s approach
prevailing over that of Justice Black in a subsequent article).
349
Dowling, supra note 303, at 20. Twice Dowling indicated that Stone clearly articulated
the theory of congressional consent. Id. at 17–18, 27. Dowling never cites Henry Biklé’s
earlier article echoing the same theme. Biklé, supra note 266, at 200. Gavit, conversely,
suggested that the silence theory “says—nothing.” GAVIT, supra note 186, at 7 (footnote
omitted).
350
See Dowling, supra note 303, at 20–21 & n.34 (referencing classic dual federalism
cases).
351
See Noel T. Dowling & F. Morse Hubbard, Divesting an Article of its Interstate Character:
An Examination of the Doctrine Underlying the Webb-Kenyon Act, 5 MINN. L. REV. 100, 100–31,
253–281, 117 (1921) (indicating that a constitutional amendment is needed to regulate).
Dowling apparently believed the only mechanism for sanctioning state action would be if
Congress could “divest” an article of commerce of its “interstate character.” Id. at 122, 268–
69, 277–78, 280. He nevertheless recognized that states enjoy reserved police power for
matters within their domain. Id. at 281; see also Dowling, supra note 326, at 556–58
(questioning Congress’ ability to enact the McCarran Act allowing state regulation of
insurance). But Dowling overlooked that in James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland
Railway Co. where the Court focused on both divesting an article of its interstate character
and divesting individuals of their individual “right” to engage in interstate commerce. 242
U.S. 311, 325, 330 (1917). In Whitfield v. Ohio, the Court permitted congressional sanctioning
of state regulation of convict made goods still in unbroken original packages. 297 U.S. 431,
439–40 (1936).
352
Dowling, supra note 303, at 21. Dowling further suggested that the Court’s function
simply extended a substantive due process inquiry into a statute’s reasonableness. Id. at
21–22.
353
Id. at 23.
348
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the Court’s Commerce Clause decisions “have united to bind the several
states into a nation.”354
Southern Pacific became a natural vehicle for Stone to explore
Dowling’s approach.355 The case involved Arizona’s 1912 Train Limit
Law, as subsequently codified and republished in 1939.356 Arizona’s
statute prohibited trains larger than seventy freight cars (exclusive of
caboose), or passenger trains larger than fourteen cars.357 The State
initiated a test case, seeking to enforce the law against Southern Pacific
once the railroad company admittedly ran trains exceeding the statutory
limit—and became subject to a $500 fine.358 Arizona Superior Court
Judge Levi S. Udall conducted a non-jury trial consisting of forty-six
days of testimony, eighteen volumes of transcripts, seventy-three
witnesses, and over 400 exhibits.359 Judge Udall firmly believed that
certain matters fell within Congress’ exclusive domain, with freedom
rather than restrain of commerce should the norm.360 Therefore, he
found that train length requirements were national, not local matters that
would have extra-territorial effects and required uniformity.361 He also
combined Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence and the DCC, when
observing that, in areas of concurrent jurisdiction, states may not act
unreasonably, arbitrarily, or in a manner that substantially or directly
regulates, obstructs, impedes or burdens interstate commerce.362 And he
concluded that the evidence established a heavy and unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce, examining for himself whether the law
The State Supreme Court then reversed—
promoted safety.363
precipitating the urgency for having the Court resolve its dialogue with
its past.364

Id. at 28 (footnote omitted).
See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768 (examining Dowling’s approach).
356
Id. at 763.
357
Id.
358
See Brief for Appellant, Vol. I: The Law at 8, S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945)
(No. 56) (stating that the case was a test case).
359
Statement as to Jurisdiction at 22, 24–25, S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945)
(No. 56).
360
See id. at 27 (establishing Judge Udall’s arguments of regulation).
361
Brief for Appellant, supra note 358, at 50–51 (summarizing findings of fact number
fifteen).
362
Id. at 52.
363
See id. at 29–30 (examining the safety of the Train Limit Law).
364
State ex. rel. Conway v. S. Pac. Co., 145 P.2d 530, 536 (Ariz. 1943). The court lamented
that the parties cited approximately 325 cases. Id. at 534. A three-judge district court had
invalidated Nevada’s train safety measure. S. Pac. Co. v. Mashburn, 18 F. Supp. 393, 394
(D. Nev. 1937), per curium. Cf. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. Williamson, 36 F. Supp. 607,
616 (W.D. Okla. 1941) (upholding Oklahoma law).
354
355
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In roughly 600 pages of legal arguments before the U.S. Supreme
Court, the parties painstakingly reviewed prior cases absent any
appreciation for the DCC’s dynamic character. Southern Pacific’s brief
on jurisdiction presented conflicting cases, untethered by temporality.365
It referenced cases, for instance, extending back to Hall v. DeCuir that
matters requiring national uniformity are entrusted exclusivity to
Congress or that state statutes could not operate extra-territorially; it
deployed pre-Barnwell cases suggesting that purported state police
power measures could not “directly, substantially, and unreasonably
obstruct[], burden[], and interfere[] with interstate commerce[.]”366 The
railroad company further argued that prior cases concluded that the
same or similar laws had been held to violate the Commerce Clause as
well as the Fourteenth Amendment.367 Strikingly, however, the blurring
of congressional preemption and exclusivity became apparent.
Struggling with articulating what today we term field preemption, the
company also claimed “states are powerless either to annul, augment, or
supplement the congressional regulation.”368 Here, Southern Pacific
invoked Erie, where the Court reasoned “that the police power of the
state could only exist from the silence of Congress upon the subject, and
ceased when Congress acted or manifested its purpose to call into play
its exclusive power.”369 Yet, this continued persistence of exclusivity was
inconsistent with the emerging paradigm: Congress’ power is not
“exclusive” but rather supreme once it acts.370
Indeed, Southern Pacific’s principal brief cited together Brown,
Cooley, Hall, Welton, the late nineteenth century cases, as well as 1930’s
cases.371 The company primarily argued that Congress enjoys exclusive
jurisdiction over matters national in character or demanding national
uniformity.372 According to Southern Pacific, the subject matter and its

See Statement as to Jurisdiction, supra note 359, at 9–16 (comparing cases which had
different rulings on train regulations).
366
Id. at 10–11.
367
See id. at 13–21 (explaining each case which violated the Commerce Clause or the
Fourteenth Amendment).
368
Id. at 11; see also id. at 12–13 (suggesting that Congress had entered the field of train
safety, the company invoked The Federal Safety Appliance Act and the Interstate
Commerce Act).
369
233 U.S. 671, 682 (1914).
370
See id. at 682–83 (discussing Congress’s exclusive power).
371
Brief for Appellant, supra note 358, at 55–56.
372
See id. (explaining how the Train Law invades regulation). In its reply brief, Southern
Pacific reiterated Congress’ exclusive jurisdiction over matters requiring national
uniformity, and the irrelevancy of the purpose of a state’s purported exercise of its police
power. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 3, S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (No. 56).
365
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effect on interstate commerce dictates whether something is national.373
And courts must decide on “the basis of the facts developed by the
record or judicially known to the Court, and in the light of applicable
principles[]” whether “the subject-matter is of exclusive national
The brief joined this argument with the veritable
concern[.]”374
smorgasbord of pre-Barnwell tests, ranging from states’ inability to
regulate extra-territorially, that states are prohibited from directly,
materially, or substantially interfering with, or burdening or obstructing
interstate commerce, that the law invaded a field occupied by Congress,
and finally that Arizona’s statute was arbitrary, capricious and violated
the Fourteenth Amendment.375
Arizona responded somewhat simplistically, mixing late nineteenth
century Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause jurisprudence.376
It argued that, when reviewing a state’s exercise of its police power, the
Court’s function is limited to examining whether the measure has a
rational basis, and here Arizona explained why it believed the measure
had such a basis.377 The State categorically denied the judiciary’s ability
to examine the extent of the burden on interstate commerce when
reviewing the measure’s reasonableness.378 Congress, it argued, could
exercise that function when deciding whether regulatory measures
affecting commerce warranted local or national regulation.379 Of course,
the State had a problem with the lack of any articulated purpose for the
state legislation, and the State responded that “[t]he necessary effect of
the statute and not its stated purpose determines its validity.”380
The stridency of the parties’ briefs was tempered by the amicus
briefs. The United States and the railroad industry amicus briefs
presented the Court with a middle ground between the State and
company’s positions.381 Both briefs emphasized how the judiciary must
assess whether the challenged matter requires national uniformity and
the practical effect of the measure on commerce when compared against
373
See Brief for Appellant, supra note 358, at 56–57 (“Such regulations, because of their
inevitable extra-territorial effects, would create constant difficulty and embarrassment.”).
374
Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 372, at 4.
375
Brief for Appellant, supra note 358, at 59–60, 62, 64.
376
See Brief for Appellee at 79, S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (No. 56) (stating
that the state treated the issues “together because in the final analysis each presents the
identically same questions”); see also id. at 81 (stating that these are the same arguments
“dressed in different clothes[]”); id. at 88 (explaining that there is no “logical” distinction).
377
See id. at 80–118 (examining the rational basis analysis of the court).
378
Id. at 18, 42.
379
Id. at 33.
380
Brief for Appellee, supra note 376, at 89.
381
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15–16, S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S.
761 (1945) (No. 56).
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the local benefits.382 The United States principally argued that Congress
exercises exclusive jurisdiction over national matters demanding
uniformity.383 But the railroad industry brief joined by Professor Thomas
Reed Powell presented what would prove the most persuasive or
perhaps most prescient argument.384
Powell arguably was “the pre-eminent teacher of his generation in
constitutional law,” and his participation likely influenced Stone: the
two were friends, former colleagues, and corresponded occasionally
even during the pendency of the case.385 As a progressive, Powell like
other academics eschewed cloaking reason with linguistic covers,386 and
yet occasionally appeared seemingly temperate in his public writing.387
He had critiqued Corwin’s Twilight of the Supreme Court, for instance, by
suggesting that it was too theoretical and skewed by Corwin’s motive of
justifying stronger federal power and legislative activity.388 In 1932,
Powell noted that “seldom does the Constitution clearly dictate a
decision[]” and the Court exercises arbitrary (albeit not necessarily acting
arbitrarily) power when rendering decisions, although the Court “does
See id. at 11 (explaining when a state law interacts with the commerce clause).
Id. at 19.
384
See generally Brief for the Ass’n of Am. R.R. as Amicus Curiae at 89, S. Pac. Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (No. 56) (providing that Powell was one of the three attorneys
representing the Association of American Railroads).
385
KAMMEN, supra note 5, at 315; see id. at 248–49 (describing Professor Powell); Alpheus
Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone Assays Social Justice, 1912–1923, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 887, 894
n.42 (1951) (noting 1935 correspondence and friendship). They had corresponded before as
well. See Post, supra note 345, at 1535 n.83 (referencing the Stone Papers).
386
See POWELL, supra note 269, at 3 (referencing “alien rubrics”). Powell followed Holmes
in treating the Constitution as a living document implemented by judges influenced by
time and circumstances. Thomas R. Powell, Current Conflicts Between the Commerce Clause
and State Police Power 1922–1927, 12 MINN. L. REV. 321, 323 (1928) [hereinafter Powell,
Current Conflicts].
387
See SCHLESINGER, supra note 205, at 457 (quoting Powell 1937 letter to J.N. Ulman
deriding the conservative Four Horsemen). He particularly chastised Justice Sutherlands’
opinion in the minimum wage case involving women. GILLMAN, supra note 196, at 176–77.
388
Thomas Reed Powell, Book Review, 48 HARV. L. REV. 879, 881 (1935) (reviewing
EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT). Powell’s writings evince an
acute sensitivity toward precision and respect for the Court. Mastering subtlety, for
instance, he wrote that most of the Court’s constitutional cases, referencing as examples
Commerce Clause cases, “fit together nicely if you bend an intellectual corner here and
there.” Thomas Reed Powell, From Philadelphia to Philadelphia, 32 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 12
(1938). He was highly critical of Pearson and Allen’s The Nine Old Men. See Thomas Reed
Powell, Book Review, 46 YALE L.J. 561, 561 (1937) (reviewing DREW PEARSON & ROBERT S.
ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN). Nor was he charitable to Charles Warren’s historic Congress,
The Constitution and the Supreme Court. Thomas Reed Powell, Book Review, 49 HARV. L.
REV. 514, 514–15 (1936) (reviewing CHARLES WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
THE SUPREME COURT). Publically, he quite wittingly ridiculed a prominent book on the
Constitution by James Beck. KAMMEN, supra note 5, at 249.
382
383
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what it prefers to do when it prefers to do as nearly as possible what it
has done before.”389 Not surprisingly, therefore, he commented how in
the DCC “we enter a realm where literary interpretation comes in at best
only as an oracle whose voice is the voice of those who preside over the
sanctuary.”390
His writings on the police and commerce powers focused on facts
and intermingling DCC and Fourteenth Amendment concepts. For
instance, he treated the Fourteenth Amendment as prohibiting a state
from influencing conduct beyond its borders.391 Yet like Dowling, he
also arguably wrote as if accepting relics of a dual federalism and
While he lamented
corresponding exclusivity paradigm.392
direct/indirect tests as a “framework of a compass without a needle[,]”
he nevertheless maintained states could not directly regulate “marketing
of products across state lines[.]”393 To him, states enjoyed sufficient
latitude when exercising their police power, but the “general ordering”
of industries necessitated federal not state power.394 If faithfully
employed, however, the “tests” would leave some industries
unregulated.395 Instead, he argued that courts could exercise practical
judgment to protect against either state discrimination or a state
regulating interstate commerce “too much.”396
His Southern Pacific brief echoed these themes.397 The brief touted
the importance of “practical considerations” in having the judiciary
CORWIN, supra note 283, at 221 (quoting Powell during 1937 congressional testimony).
Powell, Current Conflicts, supra note 386, at 322.
391
See Powell, supra note 2, at 194 (explaining the barriers against state action).
392
Id. at 194, 207.
393
Id.; see Powell, Current Conflicts, supra note 386, at 322–25 (exploring the definition of
“regulate”).
394
Id. at 196. Powell rejected that states exercise concurrent power over commerce on
matters requiring uniformity, and yet he justified allowing states to regulate such matters
when congressionally sanctioned by simply calling the regulation an exercise of the police
power not superseded by either a tacit or explicit congressional directive otherwise.
Powell, supra note 238, at 135. Powell also demonstrated his strong nationalist sentiment
when eulogizing Chief Justice Marshall’s “supporting the exercise of wide national powers
and in circumscribing the centrifugal propensities of the several States.” Thomas Reed
Powell, The Great Chief Justice: His Leadership in Judicial Review, 2 WM. & MARY L. REV. 72, 92
(1955).
395
See Powell, supra note 2, at 232 (explaining the result of implementing federal power).
396
Powell, Current Conflicts, supra note 386, at 491; see also Thomas Reed Powell, State
Production Taxes and the Commerce Clause, 12 CALIF. L. REV. 17, 19 (1924) (“looking through
Supreme Court doctrine to the practicalities of the Supreme Court adjustments”). Practical
judgment infused his scholarship, informing his view that courts could examine each case
to decide whether a state acted reasonably. See Thomas Reed Powell, The Logic and Rhetoric
of Constitutional Law, 15 J. OF PHIL., PSYCHOL. & SCI. METHODS 645, 649 (1918) (stating the
judgment of the court is practical).
397
Brief for the Ass’n of Am. R.R. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 384, at 86.
389
390
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protect the national commercial interest.398 Some subjects resided within
Congress’ exclusive jurisdiction over commerce, while others, he
suggested, arguably fit within “concurrent” jurisdiction—although he
avoided distinguishing between the two by adroitly suggesting that,
regardless, the Arizona law failed all tests.399 He argued that, for a
century, Congress relied on having courts perform this function. Courts,
therefore, must examine practically the “burden” on interstate
commerce.400 They do so to ensure that only Congress may regulate
matters warranting national uniformity.401 And courts do so, he
intimated, by exploring the efficacy of the purported local benefit and
the corresponding burden on interstate commerce.402 This is what he
advanced early in the brief and reflects the brief’s overall structure.403 It
also is what he suggested that Chief Justice Stone had undertaken in his
Di Santo dissent, and followed from the Justice’s observation about the
importance of protecting out-of-state interests from being disadvantaged
in the political process.404 Underscoring the somewhat sophomoric
nature of the arguments, Powell even argued that Arizona’s law
conflicted with existing federal law and therefore the Commerce
Clause—when, in fact, his point was the statute had been preempted and
violated the Supremacy Clause.405
After quickly dispatching any pretense of preemption, the Court
accepted Powell’s dominant argument—citing for good measure
Professor Dowling’s law review article.406 With his penchant for
employing string cites and suggesting temporal consistency in the

Id. at 7–8, 54, 85 (discussing the importance of considerations).
Id. at 6. “[I]t is Congress and not the states which has the power over interstate
commerce[.]” Id. at 67. Indeed, the brief endorsed the inherent dual federalism concept of
examining the “extraterritorial” effect of state regulations. Id. at 41, 49, 64, 73–77.
400
See id. at 86 (suggesting examining the burden is a necessary corollary to protecting
against discriminatory state regulation).
401
See Brief for the Ass’n of Am. R.R. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 384, at 48–49 (“The
question is simply whether or not the subject to be regulated and the character of
regulation are such as require, when tested by the standard of superior fitness and
propriety, that diverse and possibly conflicting local commands be avoided in the national
interest.”); see also id. at 50 (“uniform control by a single authority”); id. at 55 (citing Cooley).
402
See id. at 8, 22, 35, 54 (explaining how courts review the benefit and burden on
interstate commerce).
403
Id.
404
See id. at 59, 64–65 (reviewing the proposition presented by Chief Justice Stone and
discussing out-of-state interests and disadvantages in the political process).
405
See Brief for the Ass’n of Am. R.R. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 384, at 20–21
(establishing the Arizona law was in conflict with the federal law and as such, in violation
of the Commerce Clause).
406
See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768 (1945) (noting the Court’s citation to
Dowling’s law review article).
398
399
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Court’s treatment of the DCC, Chief Justice Stone explained how the
DCC served to ensure that matters requiring national uniformity would
not be substantially interfered with by state or local regulations, unless
otherwise permitted by Congress. This was necessary to protect
“national commerce.” Here he could cite, as if all the seemingly random
cases were reconcilable, Gibbons, Cooley, Leisy, De Cuir, and even
Welton.407 But the Cooley formulae proved victorious, coupled now with
Powell’s practical suggestion that difficult cases demanded that the
Court examine the competing demands for local regulation against any
national interest warranting uniformity.408 Only Justices Black and
Douglas, in dissent, offered the last gasp for a discrimination-laden
approach toward the DCC.409
Of course, Justice Stone’s juridical style ignored tough issues. He
avoided sanctioning any “theory” animating the DCC, by instead relying
on the progressive mantra of facts of what the Court had done since the
early days.410 He emphasized the need for uniformity on important
national matters, and yet simultaneously echoed the derided concept
that states could not “materially restrict the free flow of commerce[.]”411
He included a citation to Cooley when noting the absence of political
restraints for state regulation affecting out-of-state activities, as if the
dual federalism paradigm from the Cooley era had some relevance to the
newly constructed political constraint argument.412 He later emphasized
the practical necessity of uniform legislation when a multiplicity of states
might be regulated similar conduct beyond their borders.413 And he
quite willingly skirted the Arizona Supreme Court’s factual findings on
the importance of the state regulation, by instead referencing the trial
court findings and accepting the Court’s role of examining whether the
asserted state regulatory purpose would achieve its purpose only
The inquiry effectively
“slight[ly]” or “problematical[ly].”414
transformed the progressive marshaling of facts justifying legislative

See id. at 767–69 (identifying citations to cases utilized in the Court’s decision).
See id. at 769–70 (discussing the Court, not the state legislature, is the final adjudicator
of demands of the state and national interests). Stone added that Congress’ years of
acquiescence implicitly sanctioned the Court’s ability to examine “relevant factual
material” to avoid “destructive consequences to the commerce of the nation.” Id. at 770.
409
Id. at 784–96 (dissenting from the majority decision).
410
Id. at 770.
411
S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. at 770.
412
See id. at 767 n.2 (examining the lack of political restraints articulated in Cooley with
regard to the regulation of out-of-state activities).
413
See id. at 775 (emphasizing the need for uniform legislation).
414
Id. at 775–76, 779.
407
408
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judgments into an implicit Fourteenth Amendment factual examination
for possibly undermining those judgments.415
V. SOLIDIFYING BALANCING IN THE MOST UNFORTUNATE WAY
Over the next quarter century, Chief Justice Stone’s constitutionalism
would become institutionalized and seeming immune from critical
examination. By 1970, laissez faire dialogues and dual federalism had
long since faded, and the Court accepted the inevitable—that the new
economy left many state regulatory measures affecting interstate
commerce.416 Justice Stone and the New Deal Court purportedly
resolved that problem by allowing federal regulation on matters
substantially affecting interstate commerce, and upholding state
regulation on matters affecting interstate commerce—unless they
discriminated against interstate commerce or involved an area
warranting national uniformity.417 With these changes, the Court
abandoned the concept of exclusivity. Once it had done so, however, the
Court failed to confront the obvious—it had once again created a line,
this time a shifting one that would move according to the particular facts
of a case, without ever asking why. It did this in the name of protecting
a free national market and averting state balkanization.418
The lingering issues with the DCC became apparent in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc.419 Pike has since become the “canonical source” for modern
DCC balancing.420 There, a three-judge panel of the district court
Id. at 781 (concluding that the state had gone “too far”).
WHITE, supra note 44, at 262 (explaining that by the late 1940s, “police power” as a
category disappeared from the leading constitutional law textbooks, underscoring the
demise of spheres of jurisdiction).
417
See supra Parts III–IV (discussing The New Deal).
418
See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wis., 340 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1951)
(discussing the potential consequences of an alternative decision); see also Hood & Sons v.
DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949) (establishing the protection of a free market).
419
397 U.S. 137, 146 (1970) (discussing issues with DCC). Articles specifically about Pike
v. Bruce generally appear cryptic. See, e.g., Catherine Gage O’Grady, Targeting State
Protectionism Instead of Interstate Discrimination Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 571, 612–15 (1997) (crediting Pike, inappropriately, with the emergence of the
anti-discrimination component to the DCC); see also David S. Day, Revisiting Pike: The
Origins of the Nondiscrimination Tier of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 27 HAM. L.
REV. 45, 46–47 (2004) (examining Pike and the Commerce Clause Doctrine).
420
SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 299, at 217; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 437 (2006) (evaluating Pike as a source for
the balance of DCC). While Professor Chemerinsky suggests that Day examines the origins
of Pike, Day’s article merely analyzes Pike without purporting to explain its origins. See id.
at 437 n.78 (suggesting Pike in the beginning was analyzed by Day); see also, e.g., Day supra
note 419, at 46–60 (discussing the protection of a free national market as the purpose of the
changes).
415
416
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enjoined Arizona from enforcing the Arizona Fruit and Vegetable
Standardization Act.421 Appellants informed the Court, “[a]lmost all
states for whom the raising of fruits and vegetables constitutes an
important industry have enacted some type of law prescribing minimum
standards of quality and pack for produce shipped out of the state.”422
Neither the lower court nor the parties recognized that the New Deal
Court had begun the process of eroding defunct approaches. Yet at least
for Arizona, prior cases generally survived unless the state programs
targeted out of state businesses. The classic case involved Florida’s effort
to protect its branding for citrus fruits, by prohibiting the sale of
immature fruit or fruit otherwise unfit for consumption.423 The Court’s
obvious results oriented opinion justified the measure as involving a
reasonable means for securing a legitimate end, and as such represented
an exercise of the state’s police power to address a local concern.424
The Pike facts seemed destined to produce a problematic decision.
Bruce Church, Inc. (“Bruce”) was a California corporation, engaged in all
facets of producing, marketing, and transporting fruits and vegetables in
Arizona and California for markets throughout the country.425 At the
time of the lawsuit, the company had four processing or packing
facilities in Arizona, where the crops were prepared for out-of-state
shipment.426 It also had been engaged with the Department of the
Interior and Colorado River Indian Tribes to develop operations on an
Indian reservation, at Parker, Arizona.427 The year before, the company
had shipped its cantaloupes grown at Parker to its processing plant in
California, thirty-one miles away.428 The Arizona Fruit and Vegetable
Standardization laws were in effect then, and the State was aware of and
permitted these shipments as well as other companies’ out-of-state
shipments—allegedly for years.429 California, where the cantaloupes
Pike, 397 U.S. at 146.
Appellant’s Brief at 44, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (No. 301)
(footnote omitted). The parties further added to this list, after briefing, that the State of
New York had amended its Agriculture and Markets Law to establish standards for the
packing and grading of lettuce. See Supplemental Brief of Appellee at 2–3, Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (No. 301) (adding additional information to the Appellee’s
brief).
423
See, e.g., S. J. Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 62 (1915) (stating the delivery and
shipment in interstate commerce of citrus fruits may be made a criminal offense).
424
Id. at 59–60, 62 (holding that the fruit at issue was not an article of commerce, and
further that the Court was merely reviewing the statue as applied, without facts about
whether the fruit might have been a useful product outside the state).
425
Pike, 397 U.S. at 139.
426
Id.
427
Id.
428
Id.
429
Complaint at 40, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (No. 301).
421
422
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were being shipped, had “the same or very similar” standardization laws
as Arizona, and nothing in the case suggests that Bruce would not
comply with California’s laws.430 Any cantaloupes re-entering Arizona,
therefore, would have been processed and packed in accordance with
similar standardization requirements.431 Arizona even agreed that the
inspections would be similar, and California inspectors provided Bruce
with certificates that were then submitted to the Arizona inspectors.432
Arizona further admitted that this procedure had been followed for two
years without objection or complaint by the state.433
But when Bruce planted its crop in 1968, Arizona informed the
company that it would enforce its standardization laws, and it would
continue to do so the next year to ensure that the case would not become
moot.434 This naturally prompted Bruce to allege a constitutional
violation, asserting a federal right “to engage in interstate transportation
of its own products, free from undue or unreasonable restraints by the
Defendants[.]”435 If the state prevented the company from shipping its
product to its California processing facility expeditiously, the company
claimed that it would lose approximately $700,000, and jeopardize its
program with the Interior Department and Colorado River Tribes.436
Within three weeks of the complaint being filed, the district court issued
Id. at 12.
See id. (discussing transported crops would not be returned for marketing or sale in
Arizona until they have been processed and packed). Later in oral argument Rex Lee
would equivocate on this point.
432
Id. at 40.
433
See Stipulation of Facts at 38, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (No. 301)
(explaining similar procedures occurred in Arizona and California); see also id. at 40 (noting
Arizona stipulated that others shipped products to California without complying with the
standardization laws); id. at 42 (stating defendant was aware that others in Arizona had
been shipping products into California for processing, packing and shipment to other
states).
434
Id. at 41, 48 (stating that Bruce planted its crop in January, for a June harvest, and
Arizona issued its written notice in March). Arizona’s insistence on testing the
constitutionality of its standardization laws, particularly in this circumstance and given the
history of its implementation, suggests much more than what the case’s official record
reveals. Arizona and Bruce fought over whether Bruce would build a processing plant at
the Parker Ranch, with a proposed legislative amendment narrowly defeated that would
have permitted Bruce to use the California facilities. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 422, at
10–11. Cf. Appellee’s Brief at 22, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (No. 301)
(questioning discussing legislation). California’s border facility, however, apparently
afforded the necessary economies of scale and strategic location for interstate shipping. Id.
at 12, 15–16.
435
Complaint, at 1; see also Complaint, at 9 (“constitute an unreasonable and undue
burden upon, and obstruction of, interstate commerce[]”). Bruce further alleged that the
Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, preempted the standardization law. Id. at 10.
436
See Stipulation of Facts supra note 433, at 45–46 (discussing the alleged aftermath
should the state prevent shipping).
430
431
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a preliminary injunction. A trial occurred six months later, and within
the next month the court issued its opinion enjoining the application of
the statute. The court discussed the merits of the case in a single short
paragraph, simply stating that, under Foster Fountain Packing Co. v.
Haydel, Johnson v. Haydel, Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., and Lemke v. Farmers
Grain Co., the standardization law unlawfully burdened interstate
commerce.437
At oral argument, Arizona admitted that its purpose was to solidify
its place as one of the top three cantaloupe producing states by ensuring
that the packing occurs in state.438 Arizona further informed the Court
that Bruce’s particular Parker cantaloupes were some of the highest
quality produced in Arizona and the State naturally wanted them
identified as Arizona cantaloupes.439 Its legal arguments were equally
simplistic. Arizona variously argued that commerce had not yet begun,
that the standardization law did not “delay” any commerce and were the
sort of program warranting diversity under Cooley, and that Arizona was
not seeking to insulate itself or protect from competition its cantaloupe
market.440 Its brief employed cases without any appreciation for
changing constitutional dogma, or when cases were decided; and
Barnwell, Arizona argued, collapsed the Commerce Clause and
Fourteenth Amendment inquiries by asking whether the state had acted
within its “province” and with reasonably adapted means to achieve the
stated objective.441
The company’s brief similarly deployed cases as if constitutional
dogma remained stagnant. It correctly observed that the law protects
goods as soon as they enter the stream of commerce, here the
harvesting.442 From there it argued historic tests—that states could not
directly interfere with or burden interstate commerce, because to do so

Appendix at 62, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (No. 301).
See Appellant’s Brief, supra note 422, at 43 (discussing the state’s reasoning).
439
Id.
440
Id. at 12–13. Arizona dismissed Baldwin v. Seelig and similar cases as irrelevant
because the State had not purposely sought to “isolate itself as an economic unit[.]” Id. at
34. The State’s reply focused on arguing that economic objectives are legitimate as long as
they do not insulate the state from competition. See Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2, Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (No. 301) (reviewing the State’s reply).
441
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 422 at 12. At oral argument Arizona referred to the
inquiry as one of substantive due process. See Transcript of Record at 4, Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (No. 301), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/19601969/1969/1969_301, archived at http://perma.cc/43TN-V7PG (reviewing the record). The
State relied principally on Barnwell and Cooley as establishing the governing principles.
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 422, at 20.
442
See Appellee’s Brief, supra note 434, at 44 (establishing goods are protected by the law
upon entering commerce).
437
438
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would be an unreasonable exercise of state power.443 It rejected applying
the distinction between the need for uniformity versus diversity,
although it added that the case obviously involved a matter warranting
uniformity.444
Justice Stewart’s short and unanimous opinion avoided any
independent engagement with the cases, merely responding to the
advocates. The Court first agreed that state regulation of products
destined for interstate markets triggered a DCC inquiry.445 It then
invoked Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit as synthesizing the
principle emerging from apparently stagnant constitutional doctrine
“[w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”446
And then citing Southern Pacific, Stewart observed how a court could
assess the legitimacy of the local interest, as well as its effect on
commerce, and perhaps explore in Fourteenth Amendment parlance
other less destructive means, occasionally doing this under a balancing
approach.447 While the Court then accepted that Arizona could
constitutionally seek to promote its economic interests by touting how
Arizona produces superior cantaloupes, it nevertheless discounted the
State’s motive—at one point referring to “the State’s tenuous interest.”448
Indeed, when the Court ended its opinion by agreeing that the law
violated the DCC, it observed that the State lacked any compelling
interest and the Commerce Clause does not “permit a State to require a
443
See id. at 39–41, 57, 62 (determining a state’s interference is an unreasonable exercise of
power). The brief averred that states may not advance local economic interests when doing
so burdens interstate commerce. Id. at 79, 82; see also id. at 85 (stating that availability of
non-discriminatory means underscores unreasonableness of state program).
444
See id. at 69 (discussing uniformity). Bruce agreed with the lower court about the
propriety of relying upon Toomer, Haydel, Schafer, and Lemke, along with the Court’s
admonition in Dean Milk that states may not erect “economic barrier[s].” Id. at 74.
445
Pike, 397 U.S. at 141–42 (establishing that state regulation of interstate market products
warrants a DCC inquiry).
446
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443
(1960). In Huron, however, Justice Stewart reached back to nineteenth century cases to
establish that even-handed state regulation could not unduly burden interstate
commerce—by “materially affect[ing] interstate commerce in an area where uniformity of
regulation is necessary.” Id. at 444; see also id. at 448 (noting that no impermissible burden
was placed on commerce).
447
See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (reviewing an alternative balancing approach).
448
Id. at 143–45; see also id. at 146 (referring to the State’s “minimal” interest). Stewart
added, “the Court has viewed with particular suspicion state statutes requiring business
operations to be performed in the home State that could more efficiently be performed
elsewhere.” Id. at 145.
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person to go into a local packing business solely for the sake of
enhancing the reputation of other producers within its borders”—said
another way, it lacked a legitimate interest!449
And with Pike, modern DCC dogma became solidified.
VI. CONCLUSION
The negative aspect of the Commerce Clause is one of the few metaConstitutional principles reflecting a perceived higher law surrounding
the adoption of the Constitution. From the DCC’s very inception, courts
struggled with the framers’ intent, and yet nineteenth century jurists
consistently deployed the concept to promote a national economic
marketplace. The Court removed from state jurisdiction subjects
warranting national uniformity, whether under an exclusivity paradigm,
or later simply because the Court said so. The difficulty today is that it is
doing so under the guise of a balancing test that masks an implicit
acceptance of Cooley’s political solution of only partially concurrent
jurisdiction. Partially concurrent, however, means exclusive on some
things. Absent facial, purposeful, or actual discrimination, that means
also a post hoc judgment, whether a subject falls on one side or the other.
But the charge to draw this particular line of demarcation through
balancing developed despite the demise of dual federalism and the
acknowledgement that defining “commerce” in the modern world will
not work.
The task emerged from the progressive push toward nationalism,
reverence toward facts, and acquiescence toward governmental
intervention. Yet once the Court accepted an enlarged Commerce
Clause, it no longer was necessary to embrace a Cooley-infused
paradigm. Nor could the Court thereafter gird its analysis in a
historically consistent theory behind the Commerce Clause itself. And
even Professor Powell readily admitted that any judicially drawn line
would be a product merely of the clash amongst advocates (implicitly
questioning the Court’s competence perhaps).450 Charles Black, Jr.,
therefore, famously suggested that in lieu of such “Humpty-Dumpty
textual manipulation,” the Court instead should honestly resort to the
underlying theory of the Constitution to promote a unitary nation, and
from there draw any necessary restraints on state or local action.451
Unfortunately, the clause’s history has been less about an honest

Id. at 146.
Current Conflicts, supra note 386, at 631–32.
451
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 29
(1969).
449
450
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dialogue and more about grappling with discerning amorphous
boundaries hidden in the clause itself. Perhaps, therefore, the time is
ripe to remove the shadow of DCC dogma.
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